4 ms·

If you remove the password, how is that a two factor? The day you loose your phone/get robbed could lead to your worst nightmares. Definitely would never opt-in

If you remove the password, how is that a two factor? The day you loose your phone/get robbed could lead to your worst nightmares. Definitely would never opt-in. I loose my phone all the time (I know...), but I am pretty sure I am not the only one.

csixty4 12y ago
The factors are shifted to the phone. The Clef app on your phone is protected by a PIN (separate from your lock screen code) or TouchID on iOS. Each instance of the app is registered with Clef so you can revoke an individual device.
- e12e 12y ago
  Yeah, well. "protected" by a PIN. You're implying that if someone gets hold of the phone/mirrors the storage, they can't get at the clef secret key because of the "pin". That's probably not true. I think (pragmatically) phone's can be "something you have" -- but except for a pin/passphrase that actually unlocks the full-device encryption on the phone -- nothing you do with the phone to access a secret key can be considered a second-factor "something you know". Last I heard iphones have a decent storage for secrets, in the sense that you can't get at them except by using the phone to bruteforce the pin (and get into the trusted storage/unlock the key). It's been a while -- maybe iphone 5/6 are better though. But I doubt it. Android devices in general have no such luxury -- on the other hand one can/should use a complex pass-phrase when enabling FDE, similar to other "soft" FDE-solutins, like cryptsetup for Linux. There's host of possible attack vectors, like subverting the BIOS/bootloader, getting at the juicy bits if the phone is booted up/the device decrypted, probably possible to do cold boot attacks etc... At any rate, claiming that anything stored in an app is "secure" beyond the basic security of the phone -- is probably just wrong. That doesn't mean a pin is useless, it's just not really "two-factor".

csixty4 12y ago

The factors are shifted to the phone. The Clef app on your phone is protected by a PIN (separate from your lock screen code) or TouchID on iOS. Each instance of the app is registered with Clef so you can revoke an individual device.

e12e 12y ago
Yeah, well. "protected" by a PIN. You're implying that if someone gets hold of the phone/mirrors the storage, they can't get at the clef secret key because of the "pin". That's probably not true. I think (pragmatically) phone's can be "something you have" -- but except for a pin/passphrase that actually unlocks the full-device encryption on the phone -- nothing you do with the phone to access a secret key can be considered a second-factor "something you know". Last I heard iphones have a decent storage for secrets, in the sense that you can't get at them except by using the phone to bruteforce the pin (and get into the trusted storage/unlock the key). It's been a while -- maybe iphone 5/6 are better though. But I doubt it. Android devices in general have no such luxury -- on the other hand one can/should use a complex pass-phrase when enabling FDE, similar to other "soft" FDE-solutins, like cryptsetup for Linux. There's host of possible attack vectors, like subverting the BIOS/bootloader, getting at the juicy bits if the phone is booted up/the device decrypted, probably possible to do cold boot attacks etc... At any rate, claiming that anything stored in an app is "secure" beyond the basic security of the phone -- is probably just wrong. That doesn't mean a pin is useless, it's just not really "two-factor".