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I'm not saying that people never put random garbage in a form field. We're talking about a specific incident where a person apparently made at least 44 request
by Consultant32452 12y ago
I'm not saying that people never put random garbage in a form field. We're talking about a specific incident where a person apparently made at least 44 requests attempting to perform SQL injection. The intent of unauthorized access or destruction of information. When you get caught trying to pick the lock at your bank you can argue you weren't trying to exceed authorized bounds or cause harm all you want but I doubt it will get you very far.
- Dylan16807 12y ago"SQL Injection" can be as simple as including an apostrophe. It depends on the details. Deliberately injecting "SELECT * FROM customers" can potentially exceed authorized bounds. (Even then the intent might not be there in all cases.) Injecting "SELECT 1=1" to see if the system is broken is clearly not exceeding authorized bounds.
- Consultant32452 12y agoWhile I may have disagreed with you, I felt your original position was a reasonable one. Now you're attacking the straw man of someone being brought up on charges for an apostrophe in a form field. When that happens I'll gladly join you in declaring the ludicrousness of those charges.
- Dylan16807 12y agoNo, I'm not making a straw man, I'm pointing out that "SQL Injection" is very vague, and attempted SQL injection even more so. There is a huge gulf between checking for access and abusing access.
- Consultant32452 12y agoAnd that's why we have DAs, grand juries, judges, and juries. If someone gets brought up on charges for literally putting an apostrophe in a form field on a website the system has failed because there's no clear intent to perform an attack of any kind in that case. When that happens, let's talk.
- yebyen 12y agoIntent to cause harm? By checking all the locks, and not just a handful of them? I don't think it's enough to show he was thorough to establish there is actual mens rea for a crime to have been committed. I bet that site had at least 44 separate form inputs. No sense checking just a handful of them. None of the third-party certifications you suggest looking for to assess a vendor's worthiness are even roughly analogous to a bank with, for example, FDIC insurance. If I have never undergone the certification processes myself (or perhaps even if I have, more so) they are the information-security equivalent of "tiger repellent" to me. I can only take the word of "experts" that they are good. If I can't tug on all the exposed levers, then I guess at least I can be assured only people who are paid to do that (or people who are breaking the law) have actually tugged on them. Can you understand how this kind of assurance would not reasonably instill any confidence of a system's security? The law does not forbid one from looking over one's own shoulder, so why should it be any more criminal to do that at every single corner you passed, even in an airport? There is a reason info-sec experts are sometimes seen as paranoid, it's because you don't know if you don't check.
- Consultant32452 12y agoThe remark about there being 44 instances was in direct reference to the idea that it could have just been random stuff put into form fields. I've already stated I think that being brought up on 44 counts is abuse and shouldn't have stood up in court. However, even if it's just 44 form fields that's far more than enough to show intent to perform SQL injection and not just an oopsie bad copy/paste or errant form entry. It seems clear that he was attempting to gain unauthorized access to information. What he intended to do with that information is irrelevant. While 3rd party certifications might not hold the vigor of FDIC insurance you are unlikely to put information on a website that is as valuable or irreplaceable as what you put into a safe deposit box. Most of time we're talking about a name, address, and potentially credit card information as the maximum damage possible. Well, your name and address are almost certainly already public record. Your credit card similarly has excellent protection and aside from some incredibly rare nightmares most people who have their CC info stolen are back to normal within a few days of calendar time and less than an hour of time actually spent dealing with the issue. If you're putting something more valuable on the website you're perfectly within reason to contact the vendor and request permission to perform a security analysis or have your own trusted security analysis vendor perform such tests. This happens all the time in business. You can feel assured that only people who are paid to tug on the levers or people who are breaking the law are the only people tugging the levers at every company you conduct business with. And the literal "tuggin on the lever" analogy is really poor. A closer analogy would be, "I know many locks are vulnerable to being opened with a specially crafted bump key. I will walk around the building after hours and attempt to use a bump key on all the doors to ensure it's safe to conduct business here."