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So we all know Truecrypt is dead. What should we use instead? I don't know of any other software that provides cross-platform, encrypted, and mountable disk im
by wyager 12y ago
So we all know Truecrypt is dead. What should we use instead?
I don't know of any other software that provides cross-platform, encrypted, and mountable disk images. We have Bitlocker, Filevault, and Luks, but none of these work (easily, at least) on different platforms.
- tptacek 12y agoThe idea that you'd want cross-platform full disk encryption suggests you may be investing too much faith in the powers of full disk encryption. FDE does basically one thing for you: it reassures you if your laptop is stolen from the back seat of your car or left in a cab. Cross platform encryption is very important, and you should look for good solutions (most of us who rely on encryption for real operational reasons just hold our noses are use PGP). But full disk encryption has very limited utility. The idea of a USB drive you can plug into any computer that is locked by default is attractive, but you can get better security out of a USB drive that holds nothing but files encrypted at the application layer. More: http://sockpuppet.org/blog/2014/04/30/you-dont-want-xts/ http://sockpuppet.org/blog/2014/04/30/you-dont-want-xts/
- michaelt 12y agoA few times in the past I've taken a hard drive out of a failed computer and retrieved data from it on another computer. Sometimes this was cross-platform, reading Windows data on a Linux machine. I haven't had to do this often, but the times I have had to do it, it's been a lifesaver. Any advice, apart from keeping better backups so I don't have to do any cross-platform data recovery?
- kogepathic 12y agoPass the disk through to a VMWare/KVM/Xen container (if you can find another machine of the same processor architecture) and then boot the OS in the VM. Usually it will piss Windows right off to be booted on completely different hardware, but usually it works enough to grab any files you may want from within the FDE. It's utterly useless if the FDE was using any TPM hardware though, in that case then I'm afraid you're stuck using the original hardware.
- kevin_thibedeau 12y agoGP didn't ask for full disk encryption, only "mountable disk images" which are far more flexible to deal with in heterogeneous environments.
- tptacek 12y agoYes, and I'm saying that "flexibility" isn't worth its cost in security. Use app-layer crypto. Among other things, app-layer crypto gives you fine-grained data integrity, foreclosing on a vector for remote code execution attacks.
- tokenizerrr 12y agoDo you have any specific examples of implementations on what you mean? I'd love to store word documents, pdfs, etc. gpg encrypted on an USB stick, without having the decrypted bytes be written to the device (Which I've previously done with TrueCrypt volumes). The concern being that I've decrypted a file, am working on it and someone pulls out the USB and leaves with it.
- tptacek 12y agoIf you're serious about protecting PDFs and stuff, encrypt them with PGP. It's much more annoying than using FDE systems like Truecrypt, but much more secure. If you're not so serious that you're willing to manually encrypt and decrypt files (or ZIP archives of files), just use your OS's full disk encryption scheme. On a Mac, for instance, you can create virtual disks with AES-XTS and keys derived from passwords; that's built into the OS. What people really want is some kind of transparent encrypted filesystem. That's a reasonable thing to want, and it would be more secure than Truecrypt. I don't know of a good one.
- chiph 12y agoExactly. While I could use PGP to encrypt individual files, that's really inconvenient for more than a handful. Putting them into ZIP-style archives introduces potential problems with data being written to temp files, etc. A container-based file system solution would be preferred. It'd also be nice if it were cross-platform, since lots of people do use different operating systems during their day. I know I do. :) Over the weekend I was looking at some of the commercial products that are positioning themselves as TC replacements. And most of them are a little too close to the military/govt for my comfort. I'd rather have something open source just for the ability to inspect the code, if nothing else.
- Perseids 12y ago> You can’t authenticate the data. Authenticating every sector is too expensive. Try to (painfully) authenticate the whole disk and any disk error trashes the disk. Maybe your users enjoy exciting games of chance? Authenticate arbitrary groups of sectors and you can play Russian Roulette with your files. (http://sockpuppet.org/blog/2014/04/30/you-dont-want-xts/ http://sockpuppet.org/blog/2014/04/30/you-dont-want-xts/) Out of interest: Doesn't the use of error detecting filesystems like ZFS and Btrfs solve the authentication problem? I don't have anything resembling a formal argument, but intuitively having each block checked in a Merkle tree like fashion should inhibit attacks where attackers can only change blocks in a random manner or restore old backups of the blocks. Of course time traveling - i.e. replaying - the file system as whole is still possible, but selectively manipulating the data should not.
- tptacek 12y agoIt would probably make the exploit harder (unless the exploit targets the filesystem code itself), but there are almost always subtle gaps between "breaking the exploit" and "fixing the vulnerability". This is a fun question to dig into, though. This is also very similar to the tactic of using an encrypted message digest in place of a MAC. The whole point of a MAC is that it can't be calculated without the secret that provides its security, and so schemes that use digests instead are (a) harder to attack than systems that do nothing and (b) still broken.
- alcari 12y agoThe ZFS crypto implementation (which isn't really available outside Oracle's Solaris) uses AES-GCM, which solves the authentication problem.
- tptacek 12y agoIf you have filesystem encryption, block-level encryption is probably unnecessary. Filesystem encryption is in most ways superior to block-level crypto.
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- static_noise 12y agoYou want a full disc encryption which adds plausible deniability in the case the KGB sees you have an encrypted file named "Nuclear Launchcodes_2016_final2.docx" on your USB drive. Truecrypt has that - who else has it?
- LLWM 12y agoNo you don't. The scenario you have concocted is ridiculous.
- emiliobumachar 12y agoThe specific scenario is unlikely, but hiding file and folder names is definitely a great feature. A lot can be inferred from file and folder names in industrial espionage scenarios.
- LLWM 12y agoIf you're worried about someone inferring data from seeing files with leading names like "potential microsoft buyout.ppt", perhaps you should give your files less conspicuous names? Pretty much every organization concerned with security has figured this out long ago.
- Dylan16807 12y agoFrankly I find the suggestion that I manually give every single file on my computer an inconspicuous name even more ridiculous than a document of nuclear launch codes. Metadata is data too. It should be protected.
- tptacek 12y agoFilename metadata absolutely does deserve protection! I'm not sure why it's become a ground truth that filesystem-level crypto must leak filenames.
- JoshTriplett 12y agoI've read that page before. It does a good job of explaining why you don't (just) want full-disk encryption, and explaining why developers might want to use application-level crypto in their own application. However, what it doesn't explain is "what should users (developer or otherwise) do to encrypt all the random files on their system?". Full disk encryption has the advantage of being transparent and not application-specific, so you don't have to teach every random application to do application-level crypto. Sure, if you have a few specific files you want to encrypt, you could run gpg. You could even teach specific tools to understand gpg, such as text editors that can decrypt to memory, edit, and re-encrypt before writing to disk. But what about a source tree, stored in a git repository, regularly manipulated with git and various command-line utilities, and edited with a variety of editors? How would you store that, securely, other than on a block device encrypted with full-disk encryption? Would you suggest a file-level encrypting filesystem instead, similar to eCryptFS? Would you suggest integrating encryption into ext4 (currently being worked on) and other filesystems?
- kngspook 12y agoI spent all last night searching for an answer to this question. I couldn't find one.
- belorn 12y agoApplication-level crypto work great when the target surface is small and known, but fails badly otherwise. Take a email you have received on a unix mail server, and lets assume it was sent encrypted. Is the search term database encrypted, the one that was created while the mail was decrypted? Is the reply you sent encrypted while resting in the sent directory? Are there logs, metadata, offline caches and similar leakage of data? One should start with full-disk encryption, then add application-level encryption for defense in depth.
- lurkinggrue 12y agoI can imagine all the ways an os can leak information if it isn't fully encrypted at a sector level. Just having the filnames is an serious risk.
- diminoten 12y agoWho said anything about full disk encryption? Certainly not the comment you replied to.
- tptacek 12y agoTruecrypt is full disk encryption.
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- diminoten 12y agoNo it's not, I use TrueCrypt all the time but not to encrypt my disk. Are you talking about the volume-level encryption TrueCrypt offers? Are you really trying to suggest the world shouldn't have a tool like TrueCrypt out there?
- tptacek 12y agoI have no idea why you think it's productive to litigate the difference between "block-level encryption" and "full-disk encryption", but if it makes you feel better we can just pretend we switched the terms, because my point applies equally to them --- they're synonyms. I also have no idea where the "I'm telling the world there shouldn't be a tool like Truecrypt" came from. I think you've misread me.
- diminoten 12y agoI changed my comment somewhat, because you're being very squirmy, as per usual. Do you think something like TrueCrypt shouldn't exist?
- 12y ago
- wyager 12y agoFor me, the much-increased convenience of mountable encrypted disks vastly outweighs the slightly-increased security of application-level encryption.
- th3m 12y agoVeraCrypt seems a successful fork, cross platform and supporting truecrypt containers.
- dogma1138 12y agoOn which OS? Unless your adversaries are state actors BitLocker on Windows works just fine for both the internal and any removable drives. Yes it's not perfect and if you use it and let your devices to go to sleep rather than power off you are vulnerable to various memory access and coldboot attacks. However with TPM/USB Storage for the keys, with secure boot enabled Bitlocker offers one of the better data encryption capabilities out there. Yes MSFT might have backdoored it, TPM is an oxymoron and all that might be true. However if the only thing you are worried about is what happens to your data if your device gets lost or stolen you are probably more than fine with using this setup. If you are worried about the NSA having your files well then probably there isn't much you can do about it if they want them they'll get them. Whether its by backdooring your OS, internet connection, or by sending intelligence support activity assets to your home to tap into it while you sleep :)
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- mhogomchungu 12y agoThere is TrueCrypt,the binary application and TrueCrypt,the on-disk format. TrueCrypt,the binary application is the one that is dead but its on-disk format will probably live on as a cross platform on-disk format as there are other projects out there that are supporting it and more projects will probably follow. tcplay[1] is one of the projects that have full support for TrueCrypt,the on-disk format. If you already have a TrueCrypt volume and you dont want to use TrueCrypt,the binary application,then you can search for these alternatives and start using them. [1] https://github.com/bwalex/tc-play https://github.com/bwalex/tc-play