3 ms·
Hopefully/presumably the gpg-signing key wasn't on the box (no reason for it to be) -- so the only way to compromise the debs would/should be by uploading/using
by e12e 12y ago
Hopefully/presumably the gpg-signing key wasn't on the box (no reason for it to be) -- so the only way to compromise the debs would/should be by uploading/using a new gpg-key -- which apt would warn the user about.
Now, if anyone followed only part of the instructions:
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:deb.haskell.org&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&gws_rd=cr&ei=fzXiVKr5NuvXyQPe9oKoCA
They would be owned:
Repository keys
To avoid warnings, you might want to install
the key used to sign these repositories:
GET http://deb.haskell.org/deb.haskell.org.gpg-key | \
apt-key add -
Unless they paid attention to:
The key is signed using a key from the Debian keyring,
in case you want to verify it first.
This is of course backwards: it should list instructions for verifying the key before instructions on how to add it to apt...
- e12e 12y agoGetting the gpg-key via http and not verifying it is batshit crazy anyway. I'm perfectly fine with anchoring trust in Debian's keyring -- after all, you implicitly trust that key with root access to all servers running apt. Sadly, Debian's support for trusted (by the user, and which Debian can vouch for the key, if not the software) third party repositories is still somewhat sketchy -- it'd be nice if there was a "apt-get-me-a-key-for-this-url-only-if-signed-by-the-debian-keyring <apt-url>"-command. That would of course imply that Debian becomes a bit of a CA for apt-repositories -- which it already is in the case of deb.haskell.org. See also: https://www.debian.org/doc/manuals/securing-debian-howto/ch7.en.html#s7.5.3.8 https://www.debian.org/doc/manuals/securing-debian-howto/ch7... [ed: changing link to use https!]