8 ms·
The button that isn’t
- binarymax 12y agoI am reminded of the opening scene in War Games, when the two officers both need to perform a specific series of actions together to launch the missile. It gave an excellent perspective on not only what was probably the actual process, but the ethical dilemma of one of the officers. And then there is the heretical "G.I. Joe: Retaliation", where all the world leaders are in one room with their breifcases containing big red buttons.
- CapitalistCartr 12y agoFunny you mention Wargames. That scene was probably the only realistic scene in the movie. They got that suspiciously good. The one before it, where he arrives at the LCF and it's a disguised farmhouse was idiotic.
- throwaway_xl5 12y agoIn England we have defense facilities disguised as farmhouses. We don't have land-based missiles but this [0] is/was a government bunker from which launch orders could be given. I wondered if you meant idiotic in the sense of unrealistic for America, or as a bad idea tactically? [0]http://www.secretnuclearbunker.com/ http://www.secretnuclearbunker.com/
- CapitalistCartr 12y agoSorry, I meant the US ones are nothing like that. It was totally inaccurate. In the USA, all the farmers/ranchers know where the stuff is. "Excuse me, we're looking for Sierra 7." "Yeah, it's down this road for a mile, then left on 127." And the Soviets wouldn't have been fooled either. So they look like military installations.
- bdamm 12y agoThat may be true in some but certainly not all cases. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/15/us/roswell-new-mexico-missile-silo-for-sale.html http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/15/us/roswell-new-mexico-miss...
- CapitalistCartr 12y agoThat's a decommissioned silo. When it was operational, it would have had the fence and usual such around it. The Northern Tier facilities are mostly underground, too. The actual silos (Launch Facilities) look like basically nothing from the top, were it not for the fence and nasty signage starting "Use of deadly force authorized". Also the Southern Tier silos had the launch control facilities integrated with them.
- maaku 12y agoIt's not about hiding the facilities from locals, it's about hiding them from satellites. Or at least providing enough uncertainty that the enemy doesn't know for certain how many or which installations are where. More morbidly, in a first strike scenario you want the enemy to waste nukes on actual farmhouses it couldn't tell for certain were launch facilities or not. Then even if no facilities are missed (something you would be hoping for), that's still fewer nukes to be dropped on cities and conventional military installations.
- sukilot 12y agoThere is no point dropping a nuke on a single tactical target. Nukes have a blast range of miles and a regular missle can take our a facility just fine.
- CapitalistCartr 12y agoWhatever the reasoning, the USAF didn't do the farmhouse thing. We did the big fence, nasty signs, and heavily armed guards.
- maaku 12y agoWhy is the farmhouse disguise idiotic? I'm pretty sure that sort of thing actually happened -- to disguise the location from satellite surveillance, of course.
- CapitalistCartr 12y agoNot in the USA, where the movie takes place. Funny enough, I was doing that for a living when the movie came out. I still enjoyed it, although, like the rest of Hollywood's masterpieces, it wasn't remotely realistic.
- mynameishere 12y agosuspiciously good They just copied some footage helpfully provided by the air force. (7:50) There must have been a "director's cut" of the same because we see it in "The Day After" where they're turning the keys. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jlPEBROvR9w https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jlPEBROvR9w
- colechristensen 12y agoDid anyone ever actually believe that there was a fire-all-ze-missiles button? Even without specific knowledge, a reasonable person must realize that such things have to consist of complicated logistics and multiple levels of redundant failsafes both human and machine.
- edmccard 12y ago>Did anyone ever actually believe that there was a fire-all-ze-missiles button? Well, a lot of us believed that there were only two possibilities for nuclear war: either no missiles got fired, or they all did -- either in an escalating pattern of strike and counterstrike, or in one big "let's knock them out before they get us" attack. So I guess a "big red button" is as good a metaphor as any for the sort of on/off, all-or-nothing situation we were afraid of.
- smacktoward 12y agoA strategy that nuclear strategist Herman Kahn (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herman_Kahn http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herman_Kahn) memorably described as a "wargasm."
- platz 12y agoI thought there was some russian commander who avoided a direct command to launch missles, and it turned out the command to launch was a mistake made by some other russian entity relying on faulty data. Seems as close to a "button" scenario as one could've had. edit - point being that, at least in this case, in 1983, it contradicts the claim in the article that these "systems aren't centralized", and "requires a lot more activity, spread out across a vast geographical area". I'm sure it's better in current times. *edit - oh, I thought he had the power to launch himself - I guess it changes slightly if his job was only "to report" up the chain of command.
- pacey 12y agoIIRC in the past, there were multiple occassions in which a "button" being pressed in error might have started nuclear war. But I think the guy you are talking about is Stanislav Petrov[1] who is known for preventing nuclear war in 1983[2]. [1]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanislav_Petrov http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanislav_Petrov [2]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1983_Soviet_nuclear_false_alarm_incident http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1983_Soviet_nuclear_false_alarm...
- gizmo686 12y agoIts not entirely clear that Petrov prevented a nuclear war. His job (which he choose not to do) was to report detected missiles up the chain of command. In theory, the Soviet Union policy was to require multiple-source warnings before retaliating, in which case they still would not have launched anything. In practice, they very well might neglected to follow this procedure and proceed to retaliate.
- pacey 12y agoI remember an interview (will try to find a source) where they told an anecdotal story about Petrov. Some years after the incident, Petrov told he believed that the system at his station was showing a false alarm and wanted to wait for a confirmation from other stations. He is cited with not wanting to sting a bee-hive. After being introduced the information present at the other stations (most if not all were seeing the same false-alarm) he told the interviewer that if he would have had this "information" at the time of the incident he'd probably decided otherwise.
- mkrdouble 12y agoIf you're into this kind of thing, then I cannot recommend the group blog, "Arms Control Wonk" enough! http://armscontrolwonk.com/ http://armscontrolwonk.com/ It contains some seriously in-depth analysis of both current and historic nuclear weapons development, with a strong bend toward the diplomatic and political side of things.
- captainmuon 12y agoReminds me of a large particle physics experiment I worked on. One of the detectors had a critical flaw, IIRC the output voltage of the detector modules was proportional to the number of particles passing through it. At every readout, it was reset to 0. Now, if you didn't read out the modules often enough (every few seconds), they would fry themselves. The problem wasn't noticed until the readout system crashed and a couple of modules were destroyed. When the bug was presented in a meeting, there was one guy who insisted that we install a big red button to shutdown the system. There was even discussion on whether it should have a little lid or not. When that guy left the meeting early, they briefly considered to install a fake button. In the end, what happened is that they built a "heartbeat" system that just zeros out the modules every second or so. The information in the modules is lost, but since there are millions of collisions each second, this had virtually no impact on data taking. But it prevented damage when the readout system crashed again. They also made a little GUI in the control room showing a beating heart probably just to calm people down :-).
- antognini 12y agoInteresting. I've observed at a number of telescopes and they all have a big red STOP button that will shut down the telescope immediately. I've only had to use it once. The telescope was poorly designed and it was possible to run it into its hard limit (you could basically run it into the ground). If you do that you have to stop it because the tracking motors will continue to try to drive the telescope into the ground. The only exception was the Large Binocular Telescope, which is one of the largest telescopes around (even the largest, depending on how you define it). But there a lot more thought was put into the design so you wouldn't be able to run the telescope into the ground even if you tried. (It also helps that they have a dedicated night assistant whose job it is to point the telescope and make sure that the observers don't do anything stupid.)
- madaxe_again 12y agoThe soviet setup for launch control is similar to the US - decentralised, manual actions all over the place to make it happen. Visited a soviet silo just outside of Pervomais'k, Ukraine (thoroughly recommend a visit if you find yourself in that neck of the woods, you can sit atop a Satan missile and wave your cowboy hat until a burly Ukrainian tells you to get off before he shoots you) - it's a two-key system, with two buttons, on opposite sides of, well, a really tiny room. While one could reach both buttons and keys simultaneously, the idea was that the keys would be carried by separate people - however in practice, they both hung from a peg on the back of the chair, meaning that someone could have theoretically initiated a launch singlehandedly. Theoretically, because the other fun fact revealed was that most of the time they were nothing like launch ready, and perennially struggled with equipment failure. Oh, and don't forget that the super-secret launch code for minuteman missiles across the US was... uh, 00000000, for several decades.
- Phlarp 12y ago>Oh, and don't forget that the super-secret launch code for minuteman missiles across the US was... uh, 00000000, for several decades. I believe this was the combination to the locks on the launch bunker access doors, not the actual launch codes. Either way-- laughable security for the military's crown jewels.
- mikeash 12y agoAccording to this article, the all-zeroes code was on the Permissive Action Links, which are the locks on the bombs themselves: http://web.archive.org/web/20120511191600/http://www.cdi.org/blair/permissive-action-links.cfm http://web.archive.org/web/20120511191600/http://www.cdi.org...
- Phlarp 12y agoYou are indeed correct, I'll leave my comment to stand as a testament to my wrongness. The bunker doors were "fixed" with metal plates after it was shown they could be easily shimmied with a credit card.
- nabla9 12y agoAnother misconception is that it's impossible to launch nukes without nuclear launch codes U.S president carries with him. The president's emergency satchel (nuclear football) or cold codes (plastic card called the biscuit) contain codes to identify the president and __authorize__ nuclear attack. They are codes for authorization. They don't contain codes that are needed to execute the attack. There is also two-man rule in place. Secretary of Defense must confirm the authorization.
- ufmace 12y agoThe linked blog usually has great in-depth content, but I think this one could be TLDR'ed as "No, for obvious reasons, there isn't actually a big red button that launches a mass nuclear strike. There's a massive infrastructure devoted to making sure they can be launched when they're needed, but won't ever be launched accidentally." We could at least make an attempt to get into how making a strike would require planning exactly what targets to attack, what weapons to attack them with, and exactly when to launch which weapons, all depending on the political situation and what we're actually trying to accomplish. The idea of a big button on the President's desk to launch a strike is then pretty absurd.
- mikeash 12y agoNote that until 1962, there was a single nuclear attack plan that was to be followed in the event of all-out war, with no variations available. That meant that, for example, China would get a full nuclear strike no matter what the political situation was at the time, and if China had declared neutrality, the only options were to bomb the crap out of them regardless, or come up with a completely new plan on the fly, which was just about impossible. Since 1962, the plans had built in variations, so that e.g. it would be possible to call for an all-out strike with a hold on China, and all the participants knew what to do for that case. But still, all the planning was done in advance. US nuclear war planning assumed that we'd be retaliating for a strike on us, and thus time was of the essence. Strategic Air Command had a goal of getting all of their strike bombers airborne within 15 minutes of a warning, and they could do it. There was, of course, no actual big red button, but conceptually it was pretty close. Ordering an attack would have been a matter of authenticating the order-giver, and saying, launch the pre-planned attack. Edit: I should probably link to Wikipedia's treatment of said plan: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single_Integrated_Operational_Plan http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single_Integrated_Operational_P...
- ufmace 12y agoThanks, that's actually some interesting info. I was under the impression that the SIOP was a list of pre-planned strike patterns/plans, and whoever had the authority to order a strike would select one based on the political circumstances. Is that not the case? It's also a little surprising, though believable, that there was only one dedicated emergency attack plan up to 1962.
- ck2 12y agoThere is also rampant cheating by the people being trained to be in charge of nuclear weapons, both air force and navy: https://www.google.com/search?q=nuclear+cheating+scandal https://www.google.com/search?q=nuclear+cheating+scandal Nice warm comforting thought. Even better is how they solved cheating - they stopped giving them grades: http://www.npr.org/2014/07/28/334501037/to-stop-cheating-nuclear-officers-ditch-the-grades http://www.npr.org/2014/07/28/334501037/to-stop-cheating-nuc... Yes, those are the people in charge of nuclear weapons, how safe do you feel now?
- Karunamon 12y agoUnchanged. The job required to fire a missile is somewhat prestigious but relatively simple - the command comes in, execute a pre-planned sequence of events that have been drilled into you by that point. At that point it's no different from following the assembly steps for a hamburger at a fast food restaurant.. though with much greater consequences than a stomachache afterwards :)
- ck2 12y agoIf they don't have the morals not to cheat in the MILITARY, what makes you think they are trustworthy to consider the consequences of pushing the button on a nuclear missile? Or are they just going to belittle the "enemy" in their minds like they are taught and then an hour later twice the number of nuclear warheads come crashing down on us from overseas in return. Not their problem because they were "just obeying orders" and they are under a hardened site. Kind of like how armed drone operators don't think about what they are are doing until months later when they get PTSD when they find out they killed innocent people
- smacktoward 12y agoThe problem is that none of those people in the silos expect they'll ever be called upon to actually launch those missiles. Ever since the Soviet Union collapsed, they've been a weapon without a plausible mission. This has two pernicious effects. First, it leads the people in the silos to think to themselves: if none of this really matters, why not cheat? It's all theater anyway, right? Why put your career prospects at risk over something that's pure theater? And second, it means that the best and the brightest Air Force servicemembers, the ones who want to wear stars on their shoulders someday, don't want to serve in the silos to begin with. Promotions in the military flow from service in real wars, not imaginary ones. So the people who end up in the silos are the ones who can't get stationed somewhere (anywhere!) else -- and that's exactly the type of person who's going to be tempted to cheat to get ahead in the first place.
- shawabawa3 12y agoWhy did the title get changed? It used to be the article title "The button that isn’t"
- felipesabino 12y agoAm I the only one that immediately remembered radiolab's Buttons Not Buttons episode [1] ? They had a nice bit about the "cut the heart out" part and how it contrasts with how easy it is today to start a nuclear attack [1] http://www.radiolab.org/story/buttons-not-buttons/ http://www.radiolab.org/story/buttons-not-buttons/
- coldpie 12y agoIt's mentioned in like the third paragraph of the article...
- jacquesm 12y agoNukes or nurse? http://500daysasunder.files.wordpress.com/2012/10/screen-shot-2012-10-04-at-12-17-56-pm-e1349368088807.png?w=694 http://500daysasunder.files.wordpress.com/2012/10/screen-sho...
- fubarred 12y agoMeta: automate things that are frequent, not things that are risky; hence: no WOMPR, Wing Attack Plan R or "Big Red Button."