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The Sony Breach Demonstrates the Importance of Moving Beyond Perimeter Defense
- e40 12y agoOK, but the article is light on solutions. In fact, I don't see any solutions.
- snowwrestler 12y ago1) Make it difficult for bad guys to move around inside your network. This includes employing strict and disciplined use of access controls to manage where each employee can go in the network. That way if some assistant's account gets compromised, the bad guy can't just log into the email server or file share root. It also includes keeping every machine's software patched and up to date. That makes it more difficult for bad guys to use known exploits to escalate privileges within the network. It also includes enforcing strong password policies--and giving every employee a secure password management solution. (So they don't use Excel.) 2) Keep an eye on the internal network. Network admins and security folks can use software tools (example: Netwitness) to know what traffic typically looks like on the network, and to detect anomalies. For example, if a lot of data starts flowing from a file share to a computer that typically does not access that share. Or if a lot of data starts heading out of the firewall to an address that no one has ever connected to before. Or if a VPN account authenticates at a weird hour or from a new address. For example, at my employer, if I VPN in after about 10pm, I get an email or phone call from Net Sec asking if that is really me. If I connect to IRC from within the LAN--same thing. Any file transfer larger than a certain size gets flagged for follow up. Etc.
- walterbell 12y agoAlong these lines, overlay VPNs can be used behind the firewall to segment the internal network, e.g. to isolate developers -- finance -- task workers. This limits the scope of any breach and makes it easier to contextualize activity.
- higherpurpose 12y agoHere are some: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/webcast/bh-wb-May12-Making_Life_Difficult_for_Malware.pdf https://www.blackhat.com/docs/webcast/bh-wb-May12-Making_Lif...
- slyfox117 12y agoI work for a company, ExtraHop Networks, that is starting to see some use in cases like this. We do passive packet analysis from L2 to L7. Things like network traversal, odd tunnelling behaviors (DNS, reverse SSH, etc), even nmap scans can be investigated with our platform. ExtraHop doesn't position itself as security company, but is focused on application and network visibility using the communication itself, and security starts with visibility after all.
- bane 12y agoOrganizations with very valuable networks that are completely disconnected from the internet and have strong policies and procedures about sneakernetting data back and forth. For example, I might work at a R&D company working on some kind of new magic technology. All of the R&D work happens on the disconnected LAN (call it R-NET) and that's our daily driver. All the computers have software on them to prevent USB drives and other removable media from being plugged in, and no wireless anything, and if I have to move data onto the R-NET from the internet, there's a designated security admin person who does the move. They do it with a physical drive, sneakernetting the data between the networks. Their process is to get the data, scan with every kind tool known and toss out certain prohibited files (executables, scripts etc.) If you need an executable or script on the R-NET, you go through another procedure that does a full security audit on that software, and only once it's approved and added to a special list of installable things can it be put on your machine. Going from the R-NET to the Internet requires a reverse of the process, but everything getting moved out gets reviewed, every document, piece of data, etc. to make sure it doesn't contain anything that shouldn't be sent out. Everything on R-NET is logged. Everything, log ins, log outs, what software you opened, what libraries that software used, everything. There might be a security team who monitors the R-NET and the moment they see something suspicious they have a "kill switch" to disable the network and all the machines that are one it until the problem is sorted out. It sounds extreme, and it is, but it can be reasonably effective. Some places even have different networks for different projects to provide further isolation.
- arkem 12y agoI'm a security guy and I've worked in these kinds of environments and it really sucked. These days whenever someone proposes creating an air gapped network for a secret project I spend a lot of time enumerating the extreme costs of this configuration. Some of these costs are lowered development productivity, additional hardware and the extra people required for the more intense monitoring. Air gapped networks are unpleasant to work on but can be a good security mechanism if you truly appreciate the costs.
- bane 12y agoYeah, it's a classic risk/cost assessment. You can weigh what a scheme like this costs to implement vs. how valuable your information is and make a decision. I think it's a good idea for some places to do this, but not all. It really depends.
- pibefision 12y agoHow much if this problem is solved when you have only accept Linux and Apple workstations in your network? Years ago, Google discovered some kind of intruders inside their network, and mandated everyone to leave Windows and accept only Mac or Linux desktops. This has a cost of course, but I think something to think about. I'm not telling that Linux or Macs has no malware/security problems, but is a very small problem compared with Windows today.
- pavel_lishin 12y agoI imagine that this would prevent casual attackers, but probably wouldn't seriously deter someone who's specifically looking to attack you.
- freehunter 12y agoIt would, however, make it a bit more difficult. Windows has more valid attack vectors than Unix-like systems do. Windows simply has more known vulnerabilities. It's not impossible to break into a Unix-like system, but for a dedicated attacker, it's almost trivial to break into a Windows environment. I can send someone an EXE that they can double click and install and I'm in. On Linux, that's much more rare of an occurrence. Try convincing someone to compile your malware from source...
- alex_anglin 12y agoThe fact that most Windows users run as Administrator doesn't help. Using root in Unix-like systems is frowned upon unless absolutely necessary is one of the basic security advantages Unix-like systems have.
- unscaled 12y agoThat hasn't been true for the vast majority Enterprise environments for the last decade or so, and even before for places which dumped the the Windows 9x lineage earlier. Even home users on anything beyond XP rarely run with default Administrator privileges anymore, although they're still a click away for most users, through UAC. Curiously enough, while Linux power users frown upon running as root, in Windows it's usually the power users who choose to disable UAC, although it's less bothersome than sudo (no password needed).
- boracay 12y agoHm. I think the most important lesson here is that we need to treat "communication data"[0] more like we treat financial or medical data. If there isn't already there should be a rule in security that says that anything that's actively being used can't also be secure. They had year and year of data just lying around that people had mentally filed under "communication". It's kind of like web security where you lock down all your servers and then some developer leaks all the credentials on pastebin. [0] There's probably a better word for this. A basically mean volatile data i.e. e-mail, working documents, logs etc.
- wlesieutre 12y agoEasier said than done. I routinely pull up emails from a year and a half ago for reference, and it'd be a giant pain if I had to request access to some sort of secure archive for them. Maybe it's necessary to move in that direction (and maybe emails stick around only if you've specifically flagged them?), but you're going to have to drag people kicking and screaming into that kind of system. Gmail search has spoiled us.
- thirdtruck 12y agoMy proposition: Anything worth referencing later is worth filing properly. That may mean transcribing instructions into a stand-alone checklist, writing up formal user stories, or the like. However, those acts also clear away a lot of cruft that can otherwise make it nigh-impossible to find the needed info. I've run many a Gmail search, only to find that a valuable email was buried under innumerable "Not quite what I wanted" ones.
- boracay 12y agoFor a lot of internal data it's having and using the appropriate systems in the first place. It's like VCS. You don't e-mail someone code anymore. You make a branch or whatever and then reference that in your communication.
- boracay 12y agoYou do need a good alternative systems of course. But once those old e-mails isn't around anymore you would have to use the other system to still have access to the data. I'm not even sure current e-mail systems are such a good tool. I would think chat for internal things and some CRM type system (leveraging e-mail) would be better. But yes as you said, easier said than done.
- sargun 12y agoSo, I commented elsewhere on HN: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8819389 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8819389 about the move away from the current network security rules we have. I think that network-oriented defenses are not the right semantic for modern applications, as modern applications are no longer tied to physical semantics, or the semantics that modern hardware filters on. ----- I have a different view on security. A lot of people are talking about defense in depth, and security being enforced by the network. I think although that kind of works, it's largely a mistake. Security, as enforced by middleboxes is fundamentally flawed, especially as we see the proliferation of systems that are too complex, and rapidly changing for middleboxes to understand. Although, they can be a tool in laying defensive trenches, they are nothing more than a simple barrier. I think that endpoint security is what needs to be enhanced. Looking at what's been disclosed about malware recently (APTs: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_persistent_threat https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_persistent_threat), we need to focus on a few things: 1) Isolating components: Components, and processes themselves should be isolated from one another, and the operating system. A web server should be able to run malicious code without fear of it easily getting root access. We have tools to make this possible today, like Apparmor, and SELinux. The fact that distributing Apparmor, or SELinux profiles with applications today isn't normal, makes me sad. This also probably means more unikernels, and lightweight hypervisors. 2) Modularization: We should do our best to split the components of a system up into small, well-understood pieces. Rather than trying to combine multiple components into one monolithic process, breaking up components into their individual components. I think Cloudflare's work around Keyless SSL was great, but we've had HSMs for years -- that could have easily avoided such disasters as Heartbleed. 3) Decent abstractions: With the advent of further distributed systems, and modularization, we're going to see more and more interfaces between systems crop up. Largely, CISOs are limited to what the systems, and networking team can do. These limits typically manifested themselves at layer 4 on the network side of the house, and limited layer 7 capabilities like URL filtering, and file system ACLs. I think we need better stories around resource access and authorization. For years, we've had systems like Kerberos which would have been a great building block, but yet goes unused. I hope we see X509, and GPG become more ubiquitous for access management, and encryption.
- walterbell 12y ago