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This is the angle on the Sony hack that I find most interesting/troubling/etc. (from http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/12/05/why-its-so-har
by smacktoward 12y ago
This is the angle on the Sony hack that I find most interesting/troubling/etc. (from http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/12/05/why-its-so-hard-to-calculate-the-cost-of-the-sony-pictures-hack/ http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/12/05...):
Jason Spaltro, then executive director of information security at Sony Pictures, called it a "valid business decision to accept the risk of a security breach" in a 2007 interview with CIO Magazine, adding he would not invest "$10 million to avoid a possible $1 million loss."
So basically their thinking was that getting hacked was just the cost of doing business. Of course, they are now discovering that the cost of a really serious hack is much higher than they thought it was.
Which makes me wonder if, at some point, we're going to have to have some kind of controls on who can legally hold personally identifiable information on their systems and who cannot. Right now pretty much anybody can, regardless of whether they're competent enough to protect it. And as a result there's a huge volume of critical information out there stored on systems that are either poorly secured or whose admins have decided, like Sony's, that the ROI on real security is too poor to justify having any, which creates a target-rich environment for hackers to take advantage of.
Attaching serious liability to holding data on systems that aren't secured, or requiring proof of competency/minimum-acceptable-effort in order to avoid such, might shift the ROI calculation on security enough to convince even idiots that it's worthwhile; or, at least, that it's better to outsource holding the data to someone who knows what they're doing (and is willing to back that up by accepting liability) than it is to keep everything in-house on a dusty Windows NT4 box under someone's desk and just cross their fingers.
We already sort of do this sort of thing for financial information, via PCI; but the universe of "data that could do serious damage if it got loose" is much larger than that which PCI covers, as this hack demonstrates. So I wonder how many of these types of giant hacks people will be willing to accept before they start calling for some kind of protection.
- deleted 12y ago[deleted]
- zspade 12y agoDo you really think the airing employees private info was legitimatized by Sony's bad karma? For something most of the employees likely had nothing to do with?
- CamperBob2 12y agoYou can take this argument all the way back to Nuremberg.
- bgilroy26 12y agoIt is relatively simple to take the argument about responsibility to Nuremburg at the level of fidelity an internet argument requires. Lets say that after Nuremburg, we are not willing to completely absolve low-level players because we realize after the Holocaust that widespread complicity is the only way such an atrocity can happen. All the same, we aren't assigning the same level of responsibility to the prison guard that we do to Goebbels, etc. We will apply it proportionately. If you take the Sony crimes and relate them to the Holocaust -- for nihilistic internet argument purposes -- you end up with some small fraction. Following the Nuremberg methodology, you take that small fraction and apply it 100% to decisionmakers and proportionately to low-level players. The resulting blame is small enough relative to their breach of privacy that the cyber attackers are in the wrong. Therefore, taking this argument back to Nuremberg does not serve the purpose of justifying the middle managers/analysts breaches of privacy.
- aaron695 12y agoNo, in Nuremberg the war was over. The enemy had been defeated. It was time to move on. But people were being prosecuted (and still are) as a spectator sport. Sony on the other had is a fully functioning company that is by far not defeated. Each employee needs to take fully responsibility for the company they work for. Not sure why people have it in for Sony though.
- CamperBob2 12y agoSony is a pretty terrible company. That doesn't mean that their rank-and-file employees deserve what happened, but you don't have to search very far to come to the realization that the Sony conglomerate is one of the most anti-consumer organizations in the business world. Examples: http://boingboing.net/2005/11/14/sony-anticustomer-te.html http://boingboing.net/2005/11/14/sony-anticustomer-te.html http://arstechnica.com/uncategorized/2005/08/5165-2/ http://arstechnica.com/uncategorized/2005/08/5165-2/ http://www.techhive.com/article/240213/sonys_no_sue_playstation_network_use_clause_is_anti_consumer.html http://www.techhive.com/article/240213/sonys_no_sue_playstat... https://defectivebydesign.org/sony https://defectivebydesign.org/sony
- debacle 12y agoI think the only thing you can take from that is that Jason Spaltro is an idiot. When you have a billion dollar company, there's no such thing as a million dollar loss. Even the Sony Exchange address book is probably worth millions to the right people.
- toomuchtodo 12y ago> Jason Spaltro, then executive director of information security at Sony Pictures, called it a "valid business decision to accept the risk of a security breach" in a 2007 interview with CIO Magazine, adding he would not invest "$10 million to avoid a possible $1 million loss." Who even hires these people?
- AceJohnny2 12y agoPeople who don't know better, who's expertise is in other fields?
- toomuchtodo 12y agoThis is an exec though! If you're hiring for that position you either: * know what you're doing with regards to hiring * don't know what you're doing, and deferring to someone competent to make that hiring decision for you I know understand why I'm not a CEO.
- AceJohnny2 12y agoAlternate proposed requirements: * an inflated sense of your own value * competent enough to make other people believe it Or, as hga proposed: * be a useful mark to take the fall when it comes
- iSnow 12y agoI have seen people promoted to Information Security Officer who did not know the first thing about IT or programming, let alone hacking or things like APTs, server security or the top ten list of exploits. I believe he was promoted because they wanted him away from his previous job, managing a software development department.
- andrewfong 12y agoAlthough he miscalculated the cost here, the general point is somewhat valid I think. There's always going to be a trade-off between security and convenience / productivity / revenue / values / etc. And it's a good thing to think about that trade-off, because not thinking about the trade-off justifies things like mandatory strip searches of everyone boarding a plane (because terrorism!). The bigger issue (which I think you're getting at) is whether this trade-off accurately accounts for externalities. Even if a security vulnerability only costs Sony $1 million, it could cost their customers, credit card companies, and any number of third parties a lot more than that.
- growse 12y agoThe civil legal system is supposed to be the correct way for an injured party to recover losses from the party causing the injury. Sadly, this doesn't always work as effectively as it should. Probably because lawyers.
- dragonwriter 12y ago> The civil legal system is supposed to be the correct way for an injured party to recover losses from the party causing the injury. Sadly, this doesn't always work as effectively as it should. Probably because lawyers. Even if you assume away any problems caused through either ill intent or simple not being perfectly omniscient by lawyers, judges, and jurors (all of whom can cause failures in the civil legal system), the impossibility of that system being a complete mechanism for recompense lies, among other places, in the fact that it is possible for the liable party to have caused harms to the injured party that the liable party is not capable of compensating. The harms a person is capable of doing are not limited by their capacity to pay -- someone with no assets can do an injury causing millions of dollars of property damage.
- rqebmm 12y agoIt's kind of unfair to target lawyers in cases like this. The real problem is combination of a patchwork legal system and powerful people's willingness to exploit it for personal gain. Lawyers are just the _means_ by which those people exploit the system. They're also the means by which people who are wronged can get justice, so they're exploitation agnostic.
- markc 12y ago>Attaching serious liability to holding data on systems that aren't secured That was the intent with Massachusetts PII law 201 CMR 17 which stipulates a $5000 fine per incident. I've always heard this interpreted as "per user record exposed" though apparently that's in dispute. $5k per exposed user could add up, but so far I don't think the law has had much impact. (btw it applies to anyone holding MA resident's data wherever the company is located / data is stored). California has a similar (earlier) law I believe. Perhaps we need this to be adopted at the Federal level.
- SixSigma 12y agoIn the UK a business is required by law to take "reasonable precautions" against data breach. Both customer data and employee data must be held under these rules. https://www.gov.uk/data-protection/the-data-protection-act https://www.gov.uk/data-protection/the-data-protection-act https://www.gov.uk/personal-data-my-employer-can-keep-about-me https://www.gov.uk/personal-data-my-employer-can-keep-about-... You could construe that he would be instructing his employees to act illegally if he was a UK CIO.
- personZ 12y agoYou could construe that he would be instructing his employees to act illegally if he was a UK CIO. I don't think you could construe that at all. While everyone is making great hay about his statement, the truth is that every organization makes the compromises that he mentions. While perhaps duplicating what andrewfong said, if security is supreme- -there is zero worker mobility. Want to work at home, or bring the laptop on the flight? Security threat. -there is zero internet connectivity. Want to browse at your desk? No chance. -email attachments? Filesharing? Heck no. -users have absolutely no rights on their workstation beyond the most rudimentary. -application sets are extremely restrictive and vetted. -Want to work in the conference room? Call the security center to configure the IPSec, MAC and port filtering security to allow you to move your locked down desktop. And on and on. While quite a few on here seem to present the notion that they comply with all best practices, extraordinarily few do (even the NSA doesn't). And those best practices cost in both productivity, worker enjoyment, and direct expenditures. It is never, and has never been, as easy as security versus no security. Against a dedicated, resourced foe, just about anyone and everyone is vulnerable.
- SixSigma 12y agoSorry, no. He cannot under UK law "accept the risk of a security breach" unless a UK Judge deemed it unreasonable to spend "$10 million to avoid a possible $1 million loss." A judge may well agree that it is unreasonable but he cannot use the financial loss to the company as the only metric to make that decision.
- tedunangst 12y agoWhat should the liability for the hackers be? Do people still believe that copying some files is a victimless crime? Do people still believe that "unauthorized access" is impossible because accessing a computer by definition implies authorization otherwise it wouldn't happen? What's the appropriate punishment? A public apology? Restitution? 100 hours community service teaching kids to program?
- pjc50 12y agosome kind of controls on who can legally hold personally identifiable information on their systems and who cannot Like EU data protection legislation? This has the added benefits of discouraging speculative accumulation of personal data by all and sundry.
- OWaz 12y agoFrom the article linked above it seems like people at Sony were exploiting the security budget, they had eight managers for three analysts: ”documents leaked after the recent attack show the company had just 11 people assigned to its information security team: ‘Three information security analysts are overseen by three managers, three directors, one executive director and one senior-vice president.’”
- LastZactionHero 12y agoA team of three analysts with eight bosses. That's a new circle of hell right there.
- plinkplonk 12y agoI once worked on a team with 22 managers and 3 developers.
- milesskorpen 12y agoIt could be just title inflation. "Managers" at lots of companies are individual contributors who need a higher title to get higher pay.
- _mgr 12y agoComputer security in the business world consists of security groups in AD and a password policy based on 8 characters and asking staff to nicely not share their passwords. It's a huge joke and will continue to be because the technology isn't there and senior managers are not going to jail when these hacks happen and it comes out that they were incompetent and thought they knew what they were doing because they were nominated for a CISSP. I'm about to walk away from the corporate IT world because I'm over beating my head against the desk while people who literally can not turn a computer on without a 1 hour demonstration tell me they know better.
- pentelkuru 12y agoHere's the article, entitled "Your Guide To Good-Enough Compliance": http://www.cio.com/article/2439324/risk-management/your-guide-to-good-enough-compliance.html http://www.cio.com/article/2439324/risk-management/your-guid... where he basically advocates cutting corners and doing the bare minimum. It shouldn't be the security executive's job to save a buck and brag about it, yet this is probably the precise mentality that allowed him to move up the ladder. How'd that work out for you, Sony?
- higherpurpose 12y agoI would love to see such regulation appear. The recent chip and pin law also states that the one liable is the one with the least security. I also think that's a brilliant way to do it. Don't want to be liable? Then you better have the more modern security system. I also like the idea of outsourcing the security/storing of data. Then we'd have companies that become real experts at that, and all the "idiots" would default to using those companies, instead of doing it themselves, poorly.
- rasz_pl 12y ago>executive director of information security at Sony Pictures > > >So basically their thinking was that getting hacked was just the cost of doing business This isnt their thinking. Industry wide belief is that CIOs role is minimizing financial liability, NOT maximizing security. something like this: http://www.washington.edu/research/centers/126 http://www.washington.edu/research/centers/126 http://www.pce.uw.edu/certificates/information-security-risk-management.html http://www.pce.uw.edu/certificates/information-security-risk... Where professors are >50 year old bumbling fools proudly proclaiming they know f'all about technology, and whole thing revolves around staying compliant (on paper) with federal law (SOX etc) and industry standards (PCI). I wasted time taking online versions of those courses. Wrote about it previously here https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7353205 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7353205 "CIOs are actively discouraged from possessing any IT background. Just look at the retardation UW is teaching: https://www.coursera.org/course/inforiskman https://www.coursera.org/course/inforiskman https://www.coursera.org/course/inforisk https://www.coursera.org/course/inforisk https://www.coursera.org/course/infosec https://www.coursera.org/course/infosec Those "people", they call themselves teachers/professionals in the field, will tell you that Information Security is ALL about covering your ass and shifting blame to a third party. All three courses are about getting a slip of paper that says you delegated responsibility clearing your company from any lawful obligations in case of a breach. Not a single peep about technical aspects or real security of data/infrastructure. Its all about getting that "we paid company X to do it for us" waiver. There was (deleted now) a huge thread on Coursera forum titled Disappointment covering this topic and demonstrating total lack of professionalism or any real world knowledge. Whole UW program is a government funds skimming scheme. Just look at this garbage: "Center of Information Assurance and Cybersecurity at the University of Washington, designated by the NSA/DHS as a Center for Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education and Research" I highly encourage you to check out those courses (I think there is preview available for old lectures) if you are in need of a laugh, or reality check concerning state of CIO education."
- aaron695 12y ago>So basically their thinking was that getting hacked was just the cost of doing business. Of course, they are now discovering that the cost of a really serious hack is much higher than they thought it was. The HN hive mind victim blaming at it's best. If you bother to read the proper statement it's specifically about one 'hypothetical' database getting breached. "The cost to harden the legacy database against a possible intrusion could come to $10 million, he says. The cost to notify customers in case of a breach might be $1 million. With those figures, says Spaltro, “it’s a valid business decision to accept the risk” of a security breach. “I will not invest $10 million to avoid a possible $1 million loss,” he suggests." And it's a fair statement. You can spend ever spare dollar on IT security and still not be 100% secure, just poor with a crippling system that grinds productivity to a halt. You can see this with the auditor living in gaga land asking employees have passwords with "random letters, numbers and symbols" It is about risk analysis as he had the courage to say out loud and it is what everyone in real world IT security knows.
- code_duck 12y agoHis statement assumes that the only cost of a database breach is notifying customers.
- Rantenki 12y agoHis statement was about a single hypothetical database server that would cost more to secure that it was worth. Budgets are finite. That's a fact of life. The trick is balancing the risks and hardening the important things so that, on the balance, you have the most security possible for that budget. Not spending as much money hardening the (hypothetical) legacy DB with a noncritical data of some sort, so that you have more budget to harden the financials database; that is the right decision. Of course, it doesn't look like that balance was struck effectively very often at Sony Pictures, but the theory is sound :)
- code_duck 12y agoI think that potential damage to a company's reputation and possible harm to customers is worth counting. If it's something you'd have to notify customers about... It just be somewhat sensitive data, not public information?
- chrismcb 12y agoWhy do you have a problem with the comment? Do you spent $100 on a lock to protect a $10 object? Of course it is just a business decision. The problem is the cost is much much greater than they thought.
- GotAnyMegadeth 12y agoAfter you have bought 10 replacements that lock starts to look like it was a good idea.
- mobiplayer 12y agoI don't know how it works in other countries, but in Spain you're liable for any leak of 3rd party's personal information you hold: National ID, Driving license, name, phone number, address, etc: https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ley_Orgánica_de_Protección_de_Datos_de_Carácter_Personal_de_España https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ley_Orgánica_de_Protección_de_... and it is actually enforced by the Spanish Agency of Data Protection.