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Comments on the Sony Hack
- smacktoward 12y agoThis is the angle on the Sony hack that I find most interesting/troubling/etc. (from http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/12/05/why-its-so-hard-to-calculate-the-cost-of-the-sony-pictures-hack/ http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/12/05...): Jason Spaltro, then executive director of information security at Sony Pictures, called it a "valid business decision to accept the risk of a security breach" in a 2007 interview with CIO Magazine, adding he would not invest "$10 million to avoid a possible $1 million loss." So basically their thinking was that getting hacked was just the cost of doing business. Of course, they are now discovering that the cost of a really serious hack is much higher than they thought it was. Which makes me wonder if, at some point, we're going to have to have some kind of controls on who can legally hold personally identifiable information on their systems and who cannot. Right now pretty much anybody can, regardless of whether they're competent enough to protect it. And as a result there's a huge volume of critical information out there stored on systems that are either poorly secured or whose admins have decided, like Sony's, that the ROI on real security is too poor to justify having any, which creates a target-rich environment for hackers to take advantage of. Attaching serious liability to holding data on systems that aren't secured, or requiring proof of competency/minimum-acceptable-effort in order to avoid such, might shift the ROI calculation on security enough to convince even idiots that it's worthwhile; or, at least, that it's better to outsource holding the data to someone who knows what they're doing (and is willing to back that up by accepting liability) than it is to keep everything in-house on a dusty Windows NT4 box under someone's desk and just cross their fingers. We already sort of do this sort of thing for financial information, via PCI; but the universe of "data that could do serious damage if it got loose" is much larger than that which PCI covers, as this hack demonstrates. So I wonder how many of these types of giant hacks people will be willing to accept before they start calling for some kind of protection.
- deleted 12y ago[deleted]
- zspade 12y agoDo you really think the airing employees private info was legitimatized by Sony's bad karma? For something most of the employees likely had nothing to do with?
- CamperBob2 12y agoYou can take this argument all the way back to Nuremberg.
- bgilroy26 12y agoIt is relatively simple to take the argument about responsibility to Nuremburg at the level of fidelity an internet argument requires. Lets say that after Nuremburg, we are not willing to completely absolve low-level players because we realize after the Holocaust that widespread complicity is the only way such an atrocity can happen. All the same, we aren't assigning the same level of responsibility to the prison guard that we do to Goebbels, etc. We will apply it proportionately. If you take the Sony crimes and relate them to the Holocaust -- for nihilistic internet argument purposes -- you end up with some small fraction. Following the Nuremberg methodology, you take that small fraction and apply it 100% to decisionmakers and proportionately to low-level players. The resulting blame is small enough relative to their breach of privacy that the cyber attackers are in the wrong. Therefore, taking this argument back to Nuremberg does not serve the purpose of justifying the middle managers/analysts breaches of privacy.
- aaron695 12y agoNo, in Nuremberg the war was over. The enemy had been defeated. It was time to move on. But people were being prosecuted (and still are) as a spectator sport. Sony on the other had is a fully functioning company that is by far not defeated. Each employee needs to take fully responsibility for the company they work for. Not sure why people have it in for Sony though.
- debacle 12y agoI think the only thing you can take from that is that Jason Spaltro is an idiot. When you have a billion dollar company, there's no such thing as a million dollar loss. Even the Sony Exchange address book is probably worth millions to the right people.
- toomuchtodo 12y ago> Jason Spaltro, then executive director of information security at Sony Pictures, called it a "valid business decision to accept the risk of a security breach" in a 2007 interview with CIO Magazine, adding he would not invest "$10 million to avoid a possible $1 million loss." Who even hires these people?
- AceJohnny2 12y agoPeople who don't know better, who's expertise is in other fields?
- toomuchtodo 12y agoThis is an exec though! If you're hiring for that position you either: * know what you're doing with regards to hiring * don't know what you're doing, and deferring to someone competent to make that hiring decision for you I know understand why I'm not a CEO.
- AceJohnny2 12y agoAlternate proposed requirements: * an inflated sense of your own value * competent enough to make other people believe it Or, as hga proposed: * be a useful mark to take the fall when it comes
- iSnow 12y agoI have seen people promoted to Information Security Officer who did not know the first thing about IT or programming, let alone hacking or things like APTs, server security or the top ten list of exploits. I believe he was promoted because they wanted him away from his previous job, managing a software development department.
- andrewfong 12y agoAlthough he miscalculated the cost here, the general point is somewhat valid I think. There's always going to be a trade-off between security and convenience / productivity / revenue / values / etc. And it's a good thing to think about that trade-off, because not thinking about the trade-off justifies things like mandatory strip searches of everyone boarding a plane (because terrorism!). The bigger issue (which I think you're getting at) is whether this trade-off accurately accounts for externalities. Even if a security vulnerability only costs Sony $1 million, it could cost their customers, credit card companies, and any number of third parties a lot more than that.
- growse 12y agoThe civil legal system is supposed to be the correct way for an injured party to recover losses from the party causing the injury. Sadly, this doesn't always work as effectively as it should. Probably because lawyers.
- dragonwriter 12y ago> The civil legal system is supposed to be the correct way for an injured party to recover losses from the party causing the injury. Sadly, this doesn't always work as effectively as it should. Probably because lawyers. Even if you assume away any problems caused through either ill intent or simple not being perfectly omniscient by lawyers, judges, and jurors (all of whom can cause failures in the civil legal system), the impossibility of that system being a complete mechanism for recompense lies, among other places, in the fact that it is possible for the liable party to have caused harms to the injured party that the liable party is not capable of compensating. The harms a person is capable of doing are not limited by their capacity to pay -- someone with no assets can do an injury causing millions of dollars of property damage.
- rqebmm 12y agoIt's kind of unfair to target lawyers in cases like this. The real problem is combination of a patchwork legal system and powerful people's willingness to exploit it for personal gain. Lawyers are just the _means_ by which those people exploit the system. They're also the means by which people who are wronged can get justice, so they're exploitation agnostic.
- markc 12y ago>Attaching serious liability to holding data on systems that aren't secured That was the intent with Massachusetts PII law 201 CMR 17 which stipulates a $5000 fine per incident. I've always heard this interpreted as "per user record exposed" though apparently that's in dispute. $5k per exposed user could add up, but so far I don't think the law has had much impact. (btw it applies to anyone holding MA resident's data wherever the company is located / data is stored). California has a similar (earlier) law I believe. Perhaps we need this to be adopted at the Federal level.
- SixSigma 12y agoIn the UK a business is required by law to take "reasonable precautions" against data breach. Both customer data and employee data must be held under these rules. https://www.gov.uk/data-protection/the-data-protection-act https://www.gov.uk/data-protection/the-data-protection-act https://www.gov.uk/personal-data-my-employer-can-keep-about-me https://www.gov.uk/personal-data-my-employer-can-keep-about-... You could construe that he would be instructing his employees to act illegally if he was a UK CIO.
- personZ 12y agoYou could construe that he would be instructing his employees to act illegally if he was a UK CIO. I don't think you could construe that at all. While everyone is making great hay about his statement, the truth is that every organization makes the compromises that he mentions. While perhaps duplicating what andrewfong said, if security is supreme- -there is zero worker mobility. Want to work at home, or bring the laptop on the flight? Security threat. -there is zero internet connectivity. Want to browse at your desk? No chance. -email attachments? Filesharing? Heck no. -users have absolutely no rights on their workstation beyond the most rudimentary. -application sets are extremely restrictive and vetted. -Want to work in the conference room? Call the security center to configure the IPSec, MAC and port filtering security to allow you to move your locked down desktop. And on and on. While quite a few on here seem to present the notion that they comply with all best practices, extraordinarily few do (even the NSA doesn't). And those best practices cost in both productivity, worker enjoyment, and direct expenditures. It is never, and has never been, as easy as security versus no security. Against a dedicated, resourced foe, just about anyone and everyone is vulnerable.
- SixSigma 12y agoSorry, no. He cannot under UK law "accept the risk of a security breach" unless a UK Judge deemed it unreasonable to spend "$10 million to avoid a possible $1 million loss." A judge may well agree that it is unreasonable but he cannot use the financial loss to the company as the only metric to make that decision.
- tedunangst 12y agoWhat should the liability for the hackers be? Do people still believe that copying some files is a victimless crime? Do people still believe that "unauthorized access" is impossible because accessing a computer by definition implies authorization otherwise it wouldn't happen? What's the appropriate punishment? A public apology? Restitution? 100 hours community service teaching kids to program?
- pjc50 12y agosome kind of controls on who can legally hold personally identifiable information on their systems and who cannot Like EU data protection legislation? This has the added benefits of discouraging speculative accumulation of personal data by all and sundry.
- OWaz 12y agoFrom the article linked above it seems like people at Sony were exploiting the security budget, they had eight managers for three analysts: ”documents leaked after the recent attack show the company had just 11 people assigned to its information security team: ‘Three information security analysts are overseen by three managers, three directors, one executive director and one senior-vice president.’”
- LastZactionHero 12y agoA team of three analysts with eight bosses. That's a new circle of hell right there.
- plinkplonk 12y agoI once worked on a team with 22 managers and 3 developers.
- milesskorpen 12y agoIt could be just title inflation. "Managers" at lots of companies are individual contributors who need a higher title to get higher pay.
- _mgr 12y agoComputer security in the business world consists of security groups in AD and a password policy based on 8 characters and asking staff to nicely not share their passwords. It's a huge joke and will continue to be because the technology isn't there and senior managers are not going to jail when these hacks happen and it comes out that they were incompetent and thought they knew what they were doing because they were nominated for a CISSP. I'm about to walk away from the corporate IT world because I'm over beating my head against the desk while people who literally can not turn a computer on without a 1 hour demonstration tell me they know better.
- pentelkuru 12y agoHere's the article, entitled "Your Guide To Good-Enough Compliance": http://www.cio.com/article/2439324/risk-management/your-guide-to-good-enough-compliance.html http://www.cio.com/article/2439324/risk-management/your-guid... where he basically advocates cutting corners and doing the bare minimum. It shouldn't be the security executive's job to save a buck and brag about it, yet this is probably the precise mentality that allowed him to move up the ladder. How'd that work out for you, Sony?
- higherpurpose 12y agoI would love to see such regulation appear. The recent chip and pin law also states that the one liable is the one with the least security. I also think that's a brilliant way to do it. Don't want to be liable? Then you better have the more modern security system. I also like the idea of outsourcing the security/storing of data. Then we'd have companies that become real experts at that, and all the "idiots" would default to using those companies, instead of doing it themselves, poorly.
- rasz_pl 12y ago>executive director of information security at Sony Pictures > > >So basically their thinking was that getting hacked was just the cost of doing business This isnt their thinking. Industry wide belief is that CIOs role is minimizing financial liability, NOT maximizing security. something like this: http://www.washington.edu/research/centers/126 http://www.washington.edu/research/centers/126 http://www.pce.uw.edu/certificates/information-security-risk-management.html http://www.pce.uw.edu/certificates/information-security-risk... Where professors are >50 year old bumbling fools proudly proclaiming they know f'all about technology, and whole thing revolves around staying compliant (on paper) with federal law (SOX etc) and industry standards (PCI). I wasted time taking online versions of those courses. Wrote about it previously here https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7353205 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7353205 "CIOs are actively discouraged from possessing any IT background. Just look at the retardation UW is teaching: https://www.coursera.org/course/inforiskman https://www.coursera.org/course/inforiskman https://www.coursera.org/course/inforisk https://www.coursera.org/course/inforisk https://www.coursera.org/course/infosec https://www.coursera.org/course/infosec Those "people", they call themselves teachers/professionals in the field, will tell you that Information Security is ALL about covering your ass and shifting blame to a third party. All three courses are about getting a slip of paper that says you delegated responsibility clearing your company from any lawful obligations in case of a breach. Not a single peep about technical aspects or real security of data/infrastructure. Its all about getting that "we paid company X to do it for us" waiver. There was (deleted now) a huge thread on Coursera forum titled Disappointment covering this topic and demonstrating total lack of professionalism or any real world knowledge. Whole UW program is a government funds skimming scheme. Just look at this garbage: "Center of Information Assurance and Cybersecurity at the University of Washington, designated by the NSA/DHS as a Center for Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education and Research" I highly encourage you to check out those courses (I think there is preview available for old lectures) if you are in need of a laugh, or reality check concerning state of CIO education."
- aaron695 12y ago>So basically their thinking was that getting hacked was just the cost of doing business. Of course, they are now discovering that the cost of a really serious hack is much higher than they thought it was. The HN hive mind victim blaming at it's best. If you bother to read the proper statement it's specifically about one 'hypothetical' database getting breached. "The cost to harden the legacy database against a possible intrusion could come to $10 million, he says. The cost to notify customers in case of a breach might be $1 million. With those figures, says Spaltro, “it’s a valid business decision to accept the risk” of a security breach. “I will not invest $10 million to avoid a possible $1 million loss,” he suggests." And it's a fair statement. You can spend ever spare dollar on IT security and still not be 100% secure, just poor with a crippling system that grinds productivity to a halt. You can see this with the auditor living in gaga land asking employees have passwords with "random letters, numbers and symbols" It is about risk analysis as he had the courage to say out loud and it is what everyone in real world IT security knows.
- code_duck 12y agoHis statement assumes that the only cost of a database breach is notifying customers.
- Rantenki 12y agoHis statement was about a single hypothetical database server that would cost more to secure that it was worth. Budgets are finite. That's a fact of life. The trick is balancing the risks and hardening the important things so that, on the balance, you have the most security possible for that budget. Not spending as much money hardening the (hypothetical) legacy DB with a noncritical data of some sort, so that you have more budget to harden the financials database; that is the right decision. Of course, it doesn't look like that balance was struck effectively very often at Sony Pictures, but the theory is sound :)
- code_duck 12y agoI think that potential damage to a company's reputation and possible harm to customers is worth counting. If it's something you'd have to notify customers about... It just be somewhat sensitive data, not public information?
- chrismcb 12y agoWhy do you have a problem with the comment? Do you spent $100 on a lock to protect a $10 object? Of course it is just a business decision. The problem is the cost is much much greater than they thought.
- GotAnyMegadeth 12y agoAfter you have bought 10 replacements that lock starts to look like it was a good idea.
- mobiplayer 12y agoI don't know how it works in other countries, but in Spain you're liable for any leak of 3rd party's personal information you hold: National ID, Driving license, name, phone number, address, etc: https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ley_Orgánica_de_Protección_de_Datos_de_Carácter_Personal_de_España https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ley_Orgánica_de_Protección_de_... and it is actually enforced by the Spanish Agency of Data Protection.
- deleted 12y ago[deleted]
- click170 12y agoI have no sympathy for Sony, but I feel deeply for the honest people who are just trying to earn a living working there. More so after reading about how some of them were openly complaining internally about things they saw as problems - many of these people were trying to make the company better from within. I'm torn. On one hand, I want to see Sony the company suffer, but it still feels unfair to attack and expose the people who work there - the folks who are just trying to pay their bills. I wonder at what point it becomes necessary for a person to judge the risk that joining a company with a questionable history will have on their privacy and personal security. I think the sad fact is though, in all likelihood Sony didn't have especially poor security, they likely had moderate to good security but failed when facing a persistent threat. I get the impression many other companies (large to small) would have failed a lot sooner. Is there anything employees can do to protect themselves from these kinds of breaches? Is the answer to sue our employers who fail to protect this info?
- VieElm 12y ago> I have no sympathy for Sony, but I feel deeply for the honest people who are just trying to earn a living working there. I don't understand this statement. Sony is not a person, it's a company comprised of the people who are earning a living working there. This is true from CEO down to the temp workers. Did you mean just the executive team? The employee roster in any company is a state that is constantly shifting as people leave and join new places. There has been a lot change in who works at sony since 2005. Do you have no sympathy for the people who did not leave after 2005? Do you have no sympathy for new executives? Like what are you even saying? Maybe you just dislike all executives and managers.
- _delirium 12y agoStrongly equating a company and its employees only really makes sense if the employees also control the company, and therefore in some significant sense the company's decisions and interests can be said to be the aggregate of its employees' decisions and interests. Except maybe in a workers' cooperative, that's not usually the case.
- freehunter 12y ago
- debacle 12y agoNo one should have any expectation of privacy for anything they put on the Internet. Privacy is something you have to work for, and unless you have those controls (PGP, encryption at rest) in place, privacy doesn't exist. Even if you have those things in place, your privacy is only as strong as the privacy of the people you are communicating with. We should work towards strong privacy as a default, but the service delivering targeted ads is not incentivized to protect your privacy.
- click170 12y agoWhat about privacy when applying for a job? When I apply for a job, I'm not putting my content online. But that's all the Sony employees have done, and now they're directly in the crossfire.
- freehunter 12y agoAnd a lot of this wasn't even "online", where online is defined as "internet-facing". Once someone it in your network, it doesn't matter what is internet-facing anymore.
- deleted 12y ago[deleted]
- state 12y agoThank you for saying this. Events like this make it clear how much everyone exercises extreme wishful thinking in these situations. Nothing about these systems is secure, and no one should have that expectation. It's unfortunate, but it's true.
- bdamm 12y agoThere has to be a range of options. Strong privacy is simply expensive to do well and not everyone cares to do it well. We should expect strong privacy from institutions that need it (any government, including municipal, and organizations such as AT&T) and give out pseudonyms to others. Your employer should be competent to keep your personal data secured as well, and they likely will have to do that by selecting a reputable provider for HR operations services. Yes, we should "work towards" strong privacy by default, but since we'll never get there we need to accept alternative models.
- joshstrange 12y agoAm I blind or does the article linked in relation to the DDOS attack by Sony not mention DDOS at all? I found did this: http://www.zdnet.com/article/sony-strikes-back-at-data-thieves-tackles-torrent-downloaders/ http://www.zdnet.com/article/sony-strikes-back-at-data-thiev... and this: http://www.zdnet.com/article/amazon-denies-sony-counterattack/ http://www.zdnet.com/article/amazon-denies-sony-counterattac... that mentions the DDOS attack.
- jamesbrownuhh 12y agoAlso, am I blind or can ZDnet honestly not tell the difference between their headline saying that Amazon denied AWS was being used by Sony in a DDOS, and Amazon's actual statement saying that such an attack was "not currently happening" ? I am not currently asleep. That does not mean that I was not sleeping earlier, or that I have never, ever slept.
- bashinator 12y ago"We are not currently tapping Angela Merkel's cell phone, nor will we going forward." I think the press takes a pass on the obvious follow-up question because they want to be invited back in the future.
- thyrsus 12y agoThanks for the links; I too couldn't find that in the cited article. I read the point 3 sentence and was just gob-smacked, and wanted to see if my model of reality was broken.
- aaron695 12y agoI think, what it really was was they messed with the torrents? Which technically is not ddos, or perhaps it technically is but not commonly called that. But I too thought that's a hell of a statement, then when the links didn't match thought something was confused.
- hisabness 12y agowhere can one read these emails?
- deleted 12y ago[deleted]
- steven2012 12y agoI wish people would stop calling this a hack. It's not a hack, it was a cyberwarfare. I know someone who was working on the team trying to recover from this attack, and Sony Pictures is basically fucked. Their IT infrastructure has been utterly destroyed, meaning they can't even pay their employees, pay their vendors or take orders from customers. They don't even want to use computers anymore, people call and text now to avoid any sort of central infrastructure that can be hacked. They had to switch to all-manual processes, and it will take months or likely years before their infrastructure is back within some sort of semblance. But by then Sony Pictures as an entity may no longer exist. From all of the emails being released ridiculing their own talent, to their employees having their privacy destroyed and financial accounts hacked, who could work for this company again? The thing this attack does is raise the bar as to what to expect. The worst we had heard until now was credit cards being stolen for quick gains, maybe some business secrets being stolen. But in my mind it started with lulzsec a couple of years ago where the attitude was for anarchy and cyberwar. But if the new trend is for companies to get destroyed, then cybersecurity will go to the next level where every company has to assume if they get hacked, they will get destroyed, so it becomes probably even more critical than other business processes.
- tomp 12y agoJust because the damage to the company was huge, it doesn't mean it was anything else than an ordinary hack in a less-than-secure computer network. I can totally imagine hackers deleting data/disabling systems/leaking emails just for the lulz!
- the_real_bto 12y agoAre there any online sources for this? I'm looking through google news, but everyone is focused on what information was leaked...
- vernie 12y agoSo was it a hack, an attack or a cyberwarfare? Even you seem to use the terms interchangeably.
- 12y ago
- pistle 12y agoThe messages from GOP seem more like desperate attempts to not sound like English first kids. It's awkward in places where maybe a translator service would use the wrong word, but with language structure for sentences that would not come from such a tool. Someone wouldn't structure sentences as they do AND make word mistakes like they do. The structure is too "good" to make mistakes on terminology. It's like a bad Chinese accent in a cartoon.
- justaman 12y agoGOP are South Korean hackers. And I base that on absolutely nothing.
- spacefight 12y agoI really have no idea why they keep unreleased feature films not on an airgapped network before the release date.
- TillE 12y agoAn unreleased film is valuable property, but it's not a matter of life or death. Ease of distribution probably outweighs the small possibility of a hack if you're doing security right. And if you're not, well, you're also not going to consider measures like an air gap.
- pjc50 12y agoProperly airgapped systems are really tedious to work with. You can only install software from physical media. In a world of digital distribution that's a huge inconvenience; what do you do when you want an update to Adobe Premiere? And if you don't airgap all the editing systems you might as well not bother.
- mprovost 12y agoThere are a lot of other companies that need access to those films. For example, the people doing subtitles, or printing the film, or doing digital distribution. I doubt the systems that stored these movies were hacked directly, but once the password files leaked out from the main attack they were simply downloaded from their distribution servers. That's why there haven't been any leaked work in progress films, because they are being worked on from airgapped networks. It's only when a film is close to release that it is put on a system connected to the internet so that it can be distributed to partner companies.
- waterlesscloud 12y agoI wonder. Dailies get passed around to execs, so you'd think those would have been stolen as well. Maybe Sony has a system for that that's airgapped, but I kinda doubt it.
- influx 12y agoWhat's most surprising to me about this attack, is the journalists who are digging through this illegally gotten material and then creating stories and spreading the details even further. That doesn't strike me as the right thing to do.
- k-mcgrady 12y agoIt's interesting that this is treated differently the the celebrity photo leak earlier this year. In both cases personal, private information has been leaked (photos, emails) but for some reason it's ok to post the emails on legitimate news websites.
- walterbell 12y agoIf this were a movie, news outlets posting the leaked information would constitute the second round in economic infowar attacks.
- totony 12y agoI would argue that this is a very bad analogy. One is only a photo of yourself (okay, in a setting you might not like, but still just a picture), while the other is something someone can use to fuck you up: put you in financial trouble, break your credit, your name (see other posts in this thread). This is in no way like leaked photos. I agree both might be troublesome, but the level of this leak is incredibly worse.
- clarkmoody 12y agoYour expectations of journalists must be very high to be surprised by this sort of thing... Look at the reporting of any breaking news, especially emergency situations: the talking heads will repeat any rumor or scrap of news like it's truth, just to keep eyeballs glued to their station/site/Twitter/etc. And afterwards there is no accountability whatsoever. I agree with you that it's not the right thing to do.
- eyeareque 12y agoI feel bad for the sony employees that are affected.. but I can't help but think that attacks like this just give me more job security.
- deleted 12y ago[deleted]
- RexRollman 12y agoConsidering that they spread a Windows rootkit and screwed people over in regards to PS3/Linux, I consider this corporate karma.
- EpicEng 12y agoI'm pretty sure Sony pictures had nothing to do with running Linux on your PS3, but regardless, many people being hurt here are just regular employees, not executives who made the decisions you/we don't like.
- throwawayaway 12y agothe entertainment arm is dominant. to protect the content, they strongarmed the hardware arm. they had everything to do with it.
- louhike 12y agoI think you misunderstand the organization of Sony. Sony Pictures has nothing to do with video games, being the hardware or the games themselves. It is just an american subsidiary producing movies.
- EpicEng 12y agoThat's a pretty specific claim. Do you have some sort of citation or insider information to support it, or are you just making assumptions?
- throwawayaway 12y agoPS: the majority of the income comes from the games, because developers must pay Sony to publish a game on their platform. Sony also develop and sells their own games and services. Sony Pictures: part of the same org. i am just making assumptions that because content is where the money is, they call the shots. this is my peeve with the entertainment aspect of sony: http://www.scribd.com/doc/22131876/Underground-Resistance-vs-Sony-BMG-tobias-c-van-Veen http://www.scribd.com/doc/22131876/Underground-Resistance-vs... i think they make great hardware, but boy do they know how to alienate people.
- nostromo 12y agoIs it legal to DDOS websites that are hosting your stolen documents? It seems like vigilantism that sets a bad precedent.
- BillFranklin 12y agoAnother reason for companies to start using zero-knowledge systems http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jul/17/edward-snowden-dropbox-privacy-spideroak http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jul/17/edward-sno...
- santacluster 12y ago> They just showed up. They sent the same banal workplace emails you send every day Yeah, no, I have a bit of a problem with this. There is a lot of stuff coming out of this hack that should never, ever have been on corporate IT systems in the first place. Stuff that doesn't come out of regular HR data where people should have a reasonably expectation of privacy and security, but stuff people have put there themselves. And I don't think this should ever be considered normal behavior, to use corporate IT systems to store such private data. Yes, these people are victims, but I think it sends the wrong message to say that their own role in this was completely normal behavior. It should be possible to be critical of this without drifting into blaming the victim territory, and I'm kind of missing that from the whole Sony hack discussion.
- cyorir 12y agoI had an internship at a company where all email was scanned, labeled, and encrypted based on the type of content in the email. Access to email was restricted when not using the corporate network. The information policy was strictly enforced; no personal emails on the network, except when work is affected (ex: "my relative is getting married, so I'll miss the meeting"). The net effect of the company's measures would have protected employees from the situation Sony Pictures employees find themselves in; unfortunately most companies are not so stringent, so they are vulnerable like Sony Pictures. I think that, yes, people should not expect privacy on a corporate network, and yes, people should distinguish corporate from private email. However, the employee's attitude is impacted by the corporate attitude, and many companies are not nearly as strict as they should be with information policy.
- deleted 12y ago[deleted]
- scotty79 12y ago> That we live in the world where we aren't sure if any given cyberattack is the work of a foreign government or a couple of guys should be scary to us all. Actually that's absolutely awesome. Especially in the light of what Assange recently wrote: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/opinion/julian-assange-on-living-in-a-surveillance-society.html?_r=0 http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/opinion/julian-assange-on-... I am more impressed with another of his oracles: the 1945 essay “You and the Atomic Bomb,” in which Orwell more or less anticipates the geopolitical shape of the world for the next half-century. “Ages in which the dominant weapon is expensive or difficult to make,” he explains, “will tend to be ages of despotism, whereas when the dominant weapon is cheap and simple, the common people have a chance ... A complex weapon makes the strong stronger, while a simple weapon — so long as there is no answer to it — gives claws to the weak.” Hacking is a cheap weapon with no answer to it, what was proven over the recent years and therefore it is democratizing force for good against the tyranny of the powerful.
- AnimalMuppet 12y agoI have a really hard time looking at what was done to Sony and thinking "that was a force for good in action".
- mpyne 12y ago> Hacking is a cheap weapon with no answer to it Hacking does have answers (things like DDoS are harder to defend against though). However, those answers tend to require significant resource investment (formal verification, use of software engineering processes that are cost-prohibitive, etc.). The evil despots and states are much more likely to be able to bring these resources to bear if need be than the common people. After all, think back to when cheap weapons were available to all about equally and there weren't much better weapons available even to the rich... it was awful. You couldn't even go from one city to the next without being preyed on by "highwaymen". Seeing the same thing happen on the Internet (where skilled hackers and not "common people" are really in charge) doesn't seem to be as uplifting to me as it seems to be for you.
- Scramblejams 12y agoI don't see how this sort of thing can be realistically prevented with today's software. I just don't. Yes, the damage can be limited through better IT practices, but at some point everyone needs to have access to their relatively recent email and access to their files germane to their projects, and that need won't go away. And as long as our laughably porous networks and operating systems and application software can be penetrated at will by a targeted attack, those emails and files will be vulnerable. We need to start over. From the kernel on up. Until then, all we can hope for is band-aids like Qubes. And after we get there, we'll mostly have the hardware to fear. Not sure how addressable that part is, but it would be better than where we are now.
- perlgeek 12y ago> We need to start over. From the kernel on up. We need to start over. From the language that the kernel is written in, for starters. Doing it all in C sounds like a rather stupid idea, because we tried that already. I have high hopes that Rust, and the language that it will inspire, will be a big help here. (Yes, I know, you probably can't write the whole kernel in a memory-safe language, but I guess at least 95% of the current linux kernel could be. Probably 99% or more).
- Scramblejams 12y agoYes. There need to be wholesale architectural changes as well. If there's a convincing argument that a monolithic kernel can be made secure, I haven't seen it. Device drivers are simply too dangerous to be running in kernel space, for example, along with much of the rest of what we usually get in the kernel (filesystems, TCP and UDP stacks, etc). No binary should ever be run without the kernel imposing an appropriately restrictive set of policies on what it can do. And there needs to be more sophistication in approaching how applications work. For example, a good argument can be made that binaries shouldn't be allowed to open their own file handles under most conditions. Your word processor shouldn't be the one putting up an open dialog and opening anything you point to in your directory tree because that's how it can be talked into dumping your entire home directory to a foreign server. It should have to ask the OS to put that dialog up, and then accept the file handle(s) it's handed by the OS. And then there are protocols that are broken by design, which we haven't even touched on. Everything, from top to bottom, needs to be rewritten with security in mind. Not sure how that could realistically happen, unfortunately.
- Michaelbellamy 12y agoIf companies like Sony would hire seasoned engineers like me, instead of new young college graduates then they would never be hacked.