3 ms·
FWIW, their threat model assumes that Alice can't subvert the software with hardware-based attacks. Relying on this system for DRM would be pretty shortsighted
by jude- 12y ago
FWIW, their threat model assumes that Alice can't subvert the software with hardware-based attacks. Relying on this system for DRM would be pretty shortsighted, since (1) Alice obviously has physical access to her hardware, and (2) Alice could emulate the hardware in software, and mount "physical" attacks against it without any dedicated equipment or electrical engineering know-how. A simple screen-grabber would circumvent this.
- kevin_b_er 12y agoThat point of remote attestation. If you have the hardware module signs all software and the processor, coupled with an unblockable secure mode that only runs if the TPM authorizes it, then you have created a secure zone in the processor of which only TPM-authorized software can run. This defeats (1) and (2), with (2) having the obvious exception of human-observable components being observable anyways. This does serve DRM nicely. They don't care if you put a camera in front of a monitor for the purposes of DRM. They coupled this with an OS and driver that is formally verified to eliminated security bugs.