7 ms·
U.S. Proposes Ban on ‘Flash’ Trading on Wall Street
- Estragon 17y agoWall St has too much political power for the government to stop this. If they can get the Glass-Steagal act repealed, they can squash an inconvenient policy initiative.
- steveklabnik 17y agoMaybe it's my programmer's mindset... I never really understood why flash trading is such a problem. If I buy a stock, and you buy a stock the next hour, is it a problem? What if I buy half an hour before you? A minute? A second? A us? Where do you draw the line? Why would you draw the line? To me, it seems like a scrub argument. Note the usage of 'cheating' and 'fair' in this thread and article. > Critics say flash orders favor sophisticated, fast-moving traders at the expense of slower market participants. Why shouldn't someone who moves fast have an advantage?
- quant18 17y ago"When buy and sell orders come into an exchange, they are first flashed to those paying to see them for 30 milliseconds — 0.03 seconds — before they are available to everyone else." One thing I don't understand about "flash trading", and what I've never seen an explanation of in the media: How does this interact with price-time priority? In a regular old auto-matching system, if the spread is two ticks wide and a buyer sends an order to lift best offer (instead of just improving best bid): 1. If you had a sell order at best offer in the front of the queue the time the buy came in, you're matched, and it doesn't matter if you try to cancel your sell a nanosecond later. 2. If you had no sell order, it doesn't matter if you improve the sell price a nanosecond later --- you're not matched. So does "flash trading" change either of these? Or is it just a fancy name for "getting market data real fast" --- similar to what you'd get by colocation, but artificially enforced (e.g. they delay everyone else's data by 30ms so the "flashers" can see it first)? (edit - formatting and grammar)
- Devilboy 17y agoI found this article useful: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/24/business/24trading.html?_r=2 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/24/business/24trading.html?_r... It has a timeline diagram which explains it well.
- quant18 17y agoThanks. So the exchange really are messing with price-time priority in exchange for cash? Wow ... But then why would any non-flasher ever place a single order on these exchanges? Couldn't a boycott could solve this problem without any legislation --- they could just go to an alternative venue which wasn't selling them out in exchange for more fees? --- Appendix: Bear with me while I think out loud so anyone can point out mistakes I'm making. Time n-1, Order #0: Some seller posts an offer of size N > 5000 at $21.00. (It has to be $21.00, otherwise Order #2 would have nothing to buy at that price). Time n, Order #1: Mutual fund sends buy 5000 "at market" (i.e. fill me at any price from here to the moon). Time n+1, Order #2: Would-be flasher sends buy N at $21.00. Time n+2, Order #3: Would-be flasher sends sell 5000 at $21.01 (and prays that no other flasher beats him to it). Time n+3: Repeat from time n-1. Under normal price-time priority, #1 matches #0, #2 matches #0 and becomes best bid, #3 doesn't match anything, and your new market is $21.00 / .01. The total traded volume is N. (The would-be flasher is now long N - 5000 and has to trade out at a loss of fees + stamp duty, so the first time around the total traded volume is 2N - 1, but that doesn't happen again: he either stops doing this shit or goes out of business). With "flash trading", #2 matches #0 (despite #1 having time priority) and #3 matches #1 (despite not even being in the market at the time #1 arrived). The total traded volume is N + 5000. The exchange earns some extra fees, the flasher gets the arbitrage profits, the mutual fund gets screwed, and the sellers (#0) don't care either way because they were willing to trade at $21.00 all along. Weird.
- frig 17y agoYeah, we're getting ever closer to the era in which: - you step out to home depot to buy a $20 hammer - when you get there "The Flash" (of dc comics fame) figures out you're looking to buy a hammer and buys all the $20 hammers - he leaves a post-it note saying "if you want a hammer meet me in aisle 7" - you get there and he offers to sell you a $20 hammer for $21 - either you buy it or you don't; once you've made your decision he returns either (N-1) or (N) hammers back to the store (30 day return policy and all that) - if you head over to lowe's instead well he is "The Flash" Not an exact metaphor for "flash trading" (as sketched it's riskless) but it's imho a relevant thought experiment. At the individual level the winners and losers are pretty obvious. At the systemic level it's unclear any actual efficiency is gained; differentiating between actual "efficiency gains" and "red queen" scenarios is tricky.
- newsdog 17y agoAbout time. It's total cheating and should never have been allowed. http://bellringer187868.wordpress.com/2009/07/25/the-bingo-bin/ http://bellringer187868.wordpress.com/2009/07/25/the-bingo-b...
- quant18 17y ago"Then we divide all the incoming orders into discrete time chunks called quantums. All the orders in one quantum will be processed independently of the rest of the world and before the next quantum is processed." Taiwan's stock and futures exchanges have a vaguely similar trading mechanism. This isn't really well-discussed on the internet in English. Best I could find at short notice was these papers (first one free, second one not): http://www.kfunigraz.ac.at/sor/Downloads/SS2009/ExpVerfahren/Paper1/Literatur%20Exp.%20Verfahren/Comerton_Rydge.pdf http://www.kfunigraz.ac.at/sor/Downloads/SS2009/ExpVerfahren... http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/116327547/abstract http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/116327547/abstrac... Basically, instead of having continuous trading (which could mean huge amounts of market data every second), they just do 30-second auctions all day long. You get an order book update, send in your orders, and they figure out who matched whom 30 seconds later. At which point they send out the next order book update, consisting of all the orders which didn't match in the last auction. Time priority still applies within the 30-second chunks. So if you have a trading algorithm, it only has to wake up once every 30 seconds ... but when it does, it has to be fast. (However, time priority doesn't apply in the opening auction --- the priority for orders at any given price is randomised and has nothing to do with who got their orders in first.) Of course the little local brokers loved this mechanism, and the big foreign banks all hated it (and probably lobbied against it behind the scenes). Maybe they lobbied so hard that they don't have this mechanism anymore; I've been out of the industry for a few years now so I'm way behind the times ...
- gaius 17y agoWell no because this is how exchanges have always worked. You can look anywhere and see this, TV, the web, stock prices are delayed by 20 minutes. Market participants get them without this delay and no-one's ever had a problem with this. So the principle of paying a fee in order to get faster access to pricing is well-established. This is just taking it to the next level. Secondly, anyone who wants to can do this, they just need to pay the fee. There is zero evidence of a cartel.
- nearestneighbor 17y agoWill this leave a bunch of C++ and OCaml programmers unemployed?
- justin_vanw 17y agoSimply force purchasers to hold stock for at least 6 months, or some other long period, so that fundamentals will have to be carefully looked at. Buying a stock signals confidence in a companies stock price for the duration you expect to hold the stock. If you make people hold it longer, the signal becomes more meaningful. Finally, market manipulation becomes much less rewarding, since you can only flip your money twice a year (profit from manipulation is % gained each time * capital * number of manipulations), and you can't foment at all really. Perhaps it would also be helpful to put a 5 (or more) day delay on any sell orders. I would personally be in favor of a 2 year delay or more. Currently, if you get really bad news (like a companies only drug was not approved, making the company worthless) you can sell the stock immediately via a market sell order, and get whatever the highest offer is. This is no different than collecting pre-signed contracts to buy your house, then signing the best one when you see smoke coming out of the windows. The person offering to buy the stock has obviously not had time to adjust their order based on the news, and so you are selling them something they weren't bidding on. If you give buyers time to adjust, selling on a panic would be completely retarded, since you will either lose all value (selling into a market with buyers who have adjusted their offers way down), or the panic will subside and you will get a fine price, but then could have just held it as you were planning before the panic anyway. Discouraging panic selling makes prices more stable (does anyone honestly think that the best estimate of the value of a large company could possibly vary 50% in a few days??) Also, automated trading triggers would be eliminated, which would be great. If a firm can setup computers to sell a stock if it drops 5% in 1 minute, then they are taking much less risk than someone who has to hear news, find a computer, put in login information, etc. However, the firm's buy order signals the same confidence as the careful stock researcher, while in reality they can buy stock with far less confidence since they are taking less risk. Both of these measures would reduce market volatility, if not effectively eliminate it over short periods. This would mean that corporations could borrow money on much better terms, since their stock prices would be more stable, meaning that stock is better collateral. It would also mean shareholders would insist on things like dividends and long term profitability and planning, since they are going to be holding the bags if things aren't good in the long term.
- anigbrowl 17y agoI'm against flash trading but 6 months (or even 6 days) is throwing the baby out withthe bathwater. Look, I'm broke - lend me $10/ thanks. OK, I paid my rent and got paid, here's $11, thanks a lot. That's what liquidity is, and it's important - with your suggestion everything would become glacially slow and tiny credit hiccups would become hugely amplified. You should be able to buy when you see an opportunity and sell when you need cash, even if your need of cash is to finance another buy. The problem with flash trading is that its practitioners are in effect paying the exchanges for the right to join in on a trade after it's been proposed and they can see whether it has profit potential or not. Sure, they are making tiny margins of a fraction of 1%, so they say it's not greedy. Good point. But you can only afford to do that if you've got fat money to participate and to make up for those tiny margins they're putting up big money on every deal that does show profit potential. I find it hard to believe it's been legal up to now. Every time I study it, I'm reminded of some old movie where a gangster has paid out money for a private telegraph line to get the results of the horse race while the betting is still open at a remote location. I think the long-term quantities you propose like 6 months and 2 years are absurd, but I agree with your basic premise that too much speed trading undermines the market's price discovery function and evaluates arbitrage over considerations of fundamental value. It would be interesting to model this behavior with an agent-based simulation of a virtual market.
- known 17y agoFlash Trading = http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Front_running http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Front_running