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There seems to be a contradiction of his bashing of super-string theorists exploring "what if" theories disconnected from reality, and his elevation of philosop

There seems to be a contradiction of his bashing of super-string theorists exploring "what if" theories disconnected from reality, and his elevation of philosophers who do the same. If anything, the super-string theorists are more like philosophers in the sense that they are working mainly with thought experiments, which they then try and reconcile with reality. If you read stuff written by cognitive philosophers on the mind, they do this all the time, proposing postulates and thought experiments, and then trying to rationalize them with the assumptions about the real world, often, with no reference to actual neuroscience. Krauss et al's statements on philosophy are simply that when you build a particle accelerator, walk into a lab, or start working out mathematical theories, you don't start with philosophy of science. That's a backwards rationalization of how science is done, constructing it's underpinnings/justification after the fact. Most scientists who conducted experiments and proposed hypotheses throughout history did not start by first making sure what they were doing aligned with the Philosophy of Science. And indeed, children conduct scientific investigations all the time blissfully unaware of the philosophical underpinnings justifying it. I'll go one further and say that the idea that you never need to do "what if" theories, but merely explore the existing ones to their ends, can lead to local optima. It is certainly possible you will run into the limits of the conceptual underpinning of the theory in which no iterative refinement can fix it in a way that leads to superior understanding. Philosophy is useful, in the same way that logic and mathematics are useful, to explore formal systems, especially when the real world experiments are impossible or unethical to conduct. But the limits of philosophy are also born out in the assumptions used -- e.g. arguments about free will or consciousness, debates are artificial definitions that do not measurably or provably reflect the real nature of real things. Perhaps a better commentary here: http://whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com/2014/08/23/accommodationism-from-a-physicist/ http://whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com/2014/08/23/accommoda...

Intermernet 12y ago
I hate to say it, but I have a feeling that the non-string-theory camp (Rovelli, Smolin etc.) have a fairly large (probably justifiable) chip on their shoulder regarding the amount of funding and support that string theory research has had over the last few decades, in comparison to "competing" theories. It's a pity to see this come out in some of Rovelli's statements in this interview, because the rest of it is so wonderfully measured and thoughtful.
- grizzles 12y ago
  It needed to be said. Nowadays theoretical physicists are often working on theories 100 years ahead of even the chance of empirical validation. I for one would like to see a greater portion of funding going towards experimental physics. Here is a startup analogy. One is having a dream about building google and writing a paper about it. How it might work, eg. 20% time, etc. The other is actually building google.
  - afafsd 12y ago
    We're already spending vast amounts of money on high-energy experiment, and building ever-larger particle smashers seems to have limited payoff from here on out. I don't know how to figure out quantum gravity. I don't even know how to do an experiment which could distinguish between different models of quantum gravity. But I do know there's plenty of other interesting stuff (much of which is actually useful) we don't know about physics at other scales which we can spend our time and money on.
    - lutusp 12y ago
      > We're already spending vast amounts of money on high-energy experiment, and building ever-larger particle smashers seems to have limited payoff from here on out. This sentiment has a long and storied past. http://patentlyo.com/patent/2011/01/tracing-the-quote-everything-that-can-be-invented-has-been-invented.html http://patentlyo.com/patent/2011/01/tracing-the-quote-everyt... > But I do know there's plenty of other interesting stuff (much of which is actually useful) we don't know about physics at other scales which we can spend our time and money on. Yes, true, but the low-level stuff only describes. Theory formation attempts to explain. Explanations are required for science.
  - Mvandenbergh 12y ago
    >I for one would like to see a greater portion of funding going towards experimental physics. What do you imagine the current portion is? Most funding does go to experimental physics.
mtdewcmu 12y ago
I read Lee Smolin's book on this debate (The Trouble with Physics). I think what happened in theoretical physics -- to the extent that it's spinning its wheels with untestable theories -- is largely that there are too many theoretical physicists and not enough hard experimental data to chase after. When there is nothing much interesting happening in a field, it's always going to be tempting to point the finger at whatever annoys you. But if there were important discoveries to be made, probably string theory would not prevent someone from making them.
abdullahkhalids 12y ago
I can hardly agree with you. 1. On historical science. The process of science has changed drastically over the centuries. To discover the law of gravitation, a few people with telescopes had to tabulate a few thousand data points, do some manipulations and discover the law. For the search of the Higgs, eg. the statistical procedures to be used where established well in advance of data collection to avoid potential biases. The idea is that more advanced science requires more careful procedures and analysis. Rovelli is arguing that we need to change our method yet again towards being more careful and formal to make advances. 2. Your first paragraph is a strawman. There is much more to the philosophy of science than your examples. See [1]. Or consider that "what is probability?" does not have a good answer. This is a question that philosophy struggles with and that has deep relevance to physics - eg. the ontology of quantum mechanics. [1] http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2014/02/24/post-debate-reflections/ http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2014/02/24/post-deb...
- lmm 12y ago
  > There is much more to the philosophy of science than your examples. See [1]. Or consider that "what is probability?" does not have a good answer. This is a question that philosophy struggles with and that has deep relevance to physics - eg. the ontology of quantum mechanics. What is the relevance? We're able to make accurate experimental predictions about probability already - theorising about "what is probability?" could just be meaningless speculation unconnected to reality, which is exactly his problem with String Theory. No?
- loup-vaillant 12y ago
  > Or consider that "what is probability?" does not have a good answer. I have read this awnser¹, and it certainly looks good. Perhaps even kind of obvious. http://bayes.wustl.edu/etj/prob/book.pdf http://bayes.wustl.edu/etj/prob/book.pdf
  - loup-vaillant 12y ago
    Maybe I should explain. One cannot reasonably say that "what is a probability?" doesn't have a good answer without having read at least the first two chapters of "Probability Theory: the Logic of Science". I don't want to enter a Frequentist/Bayesian debate, where I'm right and the Frequentists are insane. But the views presented on this book didn't really surprise or enlighten me¹. Instead, I was more like "of course, why the fuss?" Many of the claims in this book really did felt obvious. "What is a probability?" does have a good answer. Anyone saying otherwise should probably look at it, and explain why it's not good. I personally don't expect strong counter-arguments. (And if one throws me the problem of priors again, I'll crush him under the sheer weight of the hidden priors we can find in Frequentist methods.) [1] With one big exception: the consistency proofs. I didn't know we could derive Probability Theory from so few axioms.
trevelyan 12y ago
I'm not sure you're on solid ground assuming that there is a "real nature of real things" beyond known time and space and sub-light speeds. As a passage in a recent piece I read on Schopenhauer pointed out: Thus, for anything to be empirically real, it must be spatial, temporal, and causal. Yet space, time, and causality cannot be proven to be empirically real themselves! If space is thought of as an empirical entity, the insoluble problem arises whether it is finite or infinite. In the first case, there would have to be something 'outside' space, a metaspace, which is an absurd notion; but in the second case it could never be differentiated of anything and would therefore have no identity. If time is finite, there would have to be something 'before' and 'after' it, which again is absurd; but if it is infinite, it would take an eternity to arrive at the present moment, which therefore could never come about. Finite causality would enhance an unimaginable 'first cause' of all events in the universe, while infinite causality poses, mutatis mutandis, the same problem as infinite time. Given that the very foundations of causal logic (cause --> event) assume our ability to differentiate in time and space, it does seem as if the most interesting aspects of physics are operating in areas where open-mindedness helps.
- jblow 12y ago
  Wow, this Schopenhauer quote is really painful to read. Given basic contemporary abstract thinking, it reads as completely naive. This is not unique; I often feel this way when reading philosophy. So I kind of understand where Hawking / Tyson / et al are coming from. I do think it is a mistake to single-handedly dismiss all of philosophy, and I agree with the sentiment in this article that physicists are following an implicit philosophy that they do not understand, so there's a contradiction there. At the same time, most philosophy is honestly pretty bad.
  - why-el 12y ago
    That quote is anything but naive. Its basically a rephrasing of the findings of Kurl Godel, and I am not sure anyone would call that naive.
Tloewald 12y ago
Some philosophy consists of the exploration of formal systems, and some of it consists of expressing opinions in a weird parody of the above. (Go read Socrates's arguments* and find all the logical flaws and fallacies that his conversants conveniently ignore. We may like some of his opinions, but to believe they're derived with rigor is laughable.) The problem with physicists getting into philosophy is that they're generally only doing the second, less useful thing. * Of course it's just Plato relating what he says are Socrates's arguments, so there's that too.
Shamanmuni 12y ago
I don't think there's a contradiction. Modern philosophy never claimed to be science, while modern Theoretical Physics (science) in many parts strongly resembles philosophy, as you said, while never acknowledging it. Theoretical Physics is supposed to be a complement to Experimental Physics, explaining or predicting things that could later be confirmed by the Experimental branch. I think string theory as a theory of everything is an excellent example. From the outside at first it seemed promising, but nowadays looks more like a very complex mathematical chimera which we don't have a particular way of proving nor disproving. But string theorists insist that these aren't merely thought experiments, this is SCIENCE, even if we have to add dimensions and multiple universes we never experimentally detected to try to make it work. Maybe it works in a blackboard, ¿but how do we know it reflects reality? Philosophy of Science should be useful to check if we are doing science right or are being carried away by beautiful math and thought experiments. Maybe a scientist doesn't need philosophy a priori to do science, as a doctor doesn't need philosophy to cure people, but both epistemology and ethics are useful to contemplate if we are doing it right or something should be improved. At least that's my opinion.

Intermernet 12y ago

I hate to say it, but I have a feeling that the non-string-theory camp (Rovelli, Smolin etc.) have a fairly large (probably justifiable) chip on their shoulder regarding the amount of funding and support that string theory research has had over the last few decades, in comparison to "competing" theories. It's a pity to see this come out in some of Rovelli's statements in this interview, because the rest of it is so wonderfully measured and thoughtful.

grizzles 12y ago
It needed to be said. Nowadays theoretical physicists are often working on theories 100 years ahead of even the chance of empirical validation. I for one would like to see a greater portion of funding going towards experimental physics. Here is a startup analogy. One is having a dream about building google and writing a paper about it. How it might work, eg. 20% time, etc. The other is actually building google.
- afafsd 12y ago
  We're already spending vast amounts of money on high-energy experiment, and building ever-larger particle smashers seems to have limited payoff from here on out. I don't know how to figure out quantum gravity. I don't even know how to do an experiment which could distinguish between different models of quantum gravity. But I do know there's plenty of other interesting stuff (much of which is actually useful) we don't know about physics at other scales which we can spend our time and money on.
  - lutusp 12y ago
    > We're already spending vast amounts of money on high-energy experiment, and building ever-larger particle smashers seems to have limited payoff from here on out. This sentiment has a long and storied past. http://patentlyo.com/patent/2011/01/tracing-the-quote-everything-that-can-be-invented-has-been-invented.html http://patentlyo.com/patent/2011/01/tracing-the-quote-everyt... > But I do know there's plenty of other interesting stuff (much of which is actually useful) we don't know about physics at other scales which we can spend our time and money on. Yes, true, but the low-level stuff only describes. Theory formation attempts to explain. Explanations are required for science.
- Mvandenbergh 12y ago
  >I for one would like to see a greater portion of funding going towards experimental physics. What do you imagine the current portion is? Most funding does go to experimental physics.

mtdewcmu 12y ago

I read Lee Smolin's book on this debate (The Trouble with Physics). I think what happened in theoretical physics -- to the extent that it's spinning its wheels with untestable theories -- is largely that there are too many theoretical physicists and not enough hard experimental data to chase after. When there is nothing much interesting happening in a field, it's always going to be tempting to point the finger at whatever annoys you. But if there were important discoveries to be made, probably string theory would not prevent someone from making them.

abdullahkhalids 12y ago

I can hardly agree with you. 1. On historical science. The process of science has changed drastically over the centuries. To discover the law of gravitation, a few people with telescopes had to tabulate a few thousand data points, do some manipulations and discover the law. For the search of the Higgs, eg. the statistical procedures to be used where established well in advance of data collection to avoid potential biases. The idea is that more advanced science requires more careful procedures and analysis. Rovelli is arguing that we need to change our method yet again towards being more careful and formal to make advances. 2. Your first paragraph is a strawman. There is much more to the philosophy of science than your examples. See [1]. Or consider that "what is probability?" does not have a good answer. This is a question that philosophy struggles with and that has deep relevance to physics - eg. the ontology of quantum mechanics. [1] http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2014/02/24/post-debate-reflections/ http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2014/02/24/post-deb...

lmm 12y ago
> There is much more to the philosophy of science than your examples. See [1]. Or consider that "what is probability?" does not have a good answer. This is a question that philosophy struggles with and that has deep relevance to physics - eg. the ontology of quantum mechanics. What is the relevance? We're able to make accurate experimental predictions about probability already - theorising about "what is probability?" could just be meaningless speculation unconnected to reality, which is exactly his problem with String Theory. No?
loup-vaillant 12y ago
> Or consider that "what is probability?" does not have a good answer. I have read this awnser¹, and it certainly looks good. Perhaps even kind of obvious. http://bayes.wustl.edu/etj/prob/book.pdf http://bayes.wustl.edu/etj/prob/book.pdf
- loup-vaillant 12y ago
  Maybe I should explain. One cannot reasonably say that "what is a probability?" doesn't have a good answer without having read at least the first two chapters of "Probability Theory: the Logic of Science". I don't want to enter a Frequentist/Bayesian debate, where I'm right and the Frequentists are insane. But the views presented on this book didn't really surprise or enlighten me¹. Instead, I was more like "of course, why the fuss?" Many of the claims in this book really did felt obvious. "What is a probability?" does have a good answer. Anyone saying otherwise should probably look at it, and explain why it's not good. I personally don't expect strong counter-arguments. (And if one throws me the problem of priors again, I'll crush him under the sheer weight of the hidden priors we can find in Frequentist methods.) [1] With one big exception: the consistency proofs. I didn't know we could derive Probability Theory from so few axioms.

trevelyan 12y ago

I'm not sure you're on solid ground assuming that there is a "real nature of real things" beyond known time and space and sub-light speeds. As a passage in a recent piece I read on Schopenhauer pointed out: Thus, for anything to be empirically real, it must be spatial, temporal, and causal. Yet space, time, and causality cannot be proven to be empirically real themselves! If space is thought of as an empirical entity, the insoluble problem arises whether it is finite or infinite. In the first case, there would have to be something 'outside' space, a metaspace, which is an absurd notion; but in the second case it could never be differentiated of anything and would therefore have no identity. If time is finite, there would have to be something 'before' and 'after' it, which again is absurd; but if it is infinite, it would take an eternity to arrive at the present moment, which therefore could never come about. Finite causality would enhance an unimaginable 'first cause' of all events in the universe, while infinite causality poses, mutatis mutandis, the same problem as infinite time. Given that the very foundations of causal logic (cause --> event) assume our ability to differentiate in time and space, it does seem as if the most interesting aspects of physics are operating in areas where open-mindedness helps.

jblow 12y ago
Wow, this Schopenhauer quote is really painful to read. Given basic contemporary abstract thinking, it reads as completely naive. This is not unique; I often feel this way when reading philosophy. So I kind of understand where Hawking / Tyson / et al are coming from. I do think it is a mistake to single-handedly dismiss all of philosophy, and I agree with the sentiment in this article that physicists are following an implicit philosophy that they do not understand, so there's a contradiction there. At the same time, most philosophy is honestly pretty bad.
- why-el 12y ago
  That quote is anything but naive. Its basically a rephrasing of the findings of Kurl Godel, and I am not sure anyone would call that naive.

Tloewald 12y ago

Some philosophy consists of the exploration of formal systems, and some of it consists of expressing opinions in a weird parody of the above. (Go read Socrates's arguments* and find all the logical flaws and fallacies that his conversants conveniently ignore. We may like some of his opinions, but to believe they're derived with rigor is laughable.) The problem with physicists getting into philosophy is that they're generally only doing the second, less useful thing. * Of course it's just Plato relating what he says are Socrates's arguments, so there's that too.

Shamanmuni 12y ago

I don't think there's a contradiction. Modern philosophy never claimed to be science, while modern Theoretical Physics (science) in many parts strongly resembles philosophy, as you said, while never acknowledging it. Theoretical Physics is supposed to be a complement to Experimental Physics, explaining or predicting things that could later be confirmed by the Experimental branch. I think string theory as a theory of everything is an excellent example. From the outside at first it seemed promising, but nowadays looks more like a very complex mathematical chimera which we don't have a particular way of proving nor disproving. But string theorists insist that these aren't merely thought experiments, this is SCIENCE, even if we have to add dimensions and multiple universes we never experimentally detected to try to make it work. Maybe it works in a blackboard, ¿but how do we know it reflects reality? Philosophy of Science should be useful to check if we are doing science right or are being carried away by beautiful math and thought experiments. Maybe a scientist doesn't need philosophy a priori to do science, as a doctor doesn't need philosophy to cure people, but both epistemology and ethics are useful to contemplate if we are doing it right or something should be improved. At least that's my opinion.