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Theres a link very near this one on the homepage of HN by the Eames which talks about how dissimilar the brain actually is from a computer. Given the complexity

by debt 12y ago

Theres a link very near this one on the homepage of HN by the Eames which talks about how dissimilar the brain actually is from a computer. Given the complexity of the brain, I believe any parallels you may find between brain and computer are purely coincidental and in no way indicates how it actually works.

joe_the_user 12y ago
I don't need to claim the brain has any similarity to a computer. All I'd claim is that the qualities Chalmers cites aren't evidence that consciousness is "unexplainable". Me: "An intelligent being having internal representations seems very logical - computer programs often build a variety of representation of the things they modeling. " - sure, the brain may be utterly different than a computer program but there isn't anything in that difference that implies there couldn't be an internal representation. If a computer program can do that, sure something far more intelligent could also. The brain may indeed be well beyond we human's ability to explain. But that fact hardly provides evidence for "consciousness" being an element of all reality, akin to space or time. Indeed, the vast physical complexity of the brain is evidence that other parts of reality aren't that likely to share it's properties, which is the exact opposite of what Chalmers argues - remember he's arguing that because consciousness is "unexplainable" we have to attribute conscious to all matter to wind-up with the brain having consciousness ("a photon has a small amount of consciousness").
- cristianpascu 12y ago
  I referenced Chalmers for saying that we don't yet know what causes consciousness. He points in some possible directions, but they're not yet conclusive. There's plenty of literature on why phenomenal experiences are fundamentally different from mechanic devices or even zombies, bodies that do what we do but have no feeling of anything they do. Just like computers that see yellow because they're programmed to react by means of logical circuits to a narrow frequency range around whatever yellow radiation is.
  - joe_the_user 12y ago
    I referenced Chalmers for saying that we don't yet know what causes consciousness. He points in some possible directions, but they're not yet conclusive. There's a big difference "we don't yet know the cause" and "we cannot know the cause, let's give up and just call it a fundamental constituent of the universe". I'm pretty his video is arguing the latter point. There's plenty of literature on why phenomenal experiences are fundamentally different from mechanic devices Maybe there is but Chalmers even give a very plausible argument. There's lot of literature on theology too. I am aware "philosophical zombies" are a common topic in contemporary philosophy but I feel entitle to demand references to such things in the context of neurology give at least plausible logical arguments rather than arguing from authority or popularity.
  - deleted 12y ago
    [deleted]

by debt 12y ago

joe_the_user 12y ago

I don't need to claim the brain has any similarity to a computer. All I'd claim is that the qualities Chalmers cites aren't evidence that consciousness is "unexplainable". Me: "An intelligent being having internal representations seems very logical - computer programs often build a variety of representation of the things they modeling. " - sure, the brain may be utterly different than a computer program but there isn't anything in that difference that implies there couldn't be an internal representation. If a computer program can do that, sure something far more intelligent could also. The brain may indeed be well beyond we human's ability to explain. But that fact hardly provides evidence for "consciousness" being an element of all reality, akin to space or time. Indeed, the vast physical complexity of the brain is evidence that other parts of reality aren't that likely to share it's properties, which is the exact opposite of what Chalmers argues - remember he's arguing that because consciousness is "unexplainable" we have to attribute conscious to all matter to wind-up with the brain having consciousness ("a photon has a small amount of consciousness").

cristianpascu 12y ago
I referenced Chalmers for saying that we don't yet know what causes consciousness. He points in some possible directions, but they're not yet conclusive. There's plenty of literature on why phenomenal experiences are fundamentally different from mechanic devices or even zombies, bodies that do what we do but have no feeling of anything they do. Just like computers that see yellow because they're programmed to react by means of logical circuits to a narrow frequency range around whatever yellow radiation is.
- joe_the_user 12y ago
  I referenced Chalmers for saying that we don't yet know what causes consciousness. He points in some possible directions, but they're not yet conclusive. There's a big difference "we don't yet know the cause" and "we cannot know the cause, let's give up and just call it a fundamental constituent of the universe". I'm pretty his video is arguing the latter point. There's plenty of literature on why phenomenal experiences are fundamentally different from mechanic devices Maybe there is but Chalmers even give a very plausible argument. There's lot of literature on theology too. I am aware "philosophical zombies" are a common topic in contemporary philosophy but I feel entitle to demand references to such things in the context of neurology give at least plausible logical arguments rather than arguing from authority or popularity.
- deleted 12y ago
  [deleted]