4 ms·
I agree with one of the commentators below the article ("B.Karn") that there always seems to be a bit of a "Clever Chinaman" undertone in these US/China article
by Kadin 17y ago
I agree with one of the commentators below the article ("B.Karn") that there always seems to be a bit of a "Clever Chinaman" undertone in these US/China articles. The Chinese do not have an enviable position; they're in serious trouble, and quite possibly in deeper trouble than the U.S.
There's some not-well-concealed racism, reminiscent of the old "Crafty Jew" banker stereotypes, in the amount of credit the Chinese get. No matter what happens, it's always part of their master plan or to their advantage, at least as it's reported breathlessly in some quarters.
It looks to me like they're screwed pretty badly, that they bet on the same sort of endless growth that burned everyone else, and their economic advice is the equivalent of the guy in the low-lying end of the boat giving suggestions on how everyone might bail faster.
- jhancock 17y agoThe quotes from Cheng Siwei come across just fine. I read it as pretty honest with a tinge of political cover. There is nothing in these quotes that is incorrect. They played a game that had this as its only outcome. Both the U.S. and China politicians have yet to answer for why they got in this game in the first place. We all know why this international debt bubble happened, greed. So far, there had been little political fallout from it. Not sure there should be. It happened in the open. Both the U.S. and Chinese populous got behind it and pushed forward. The conservative dissenters were a small minority in both countries.
- poutine 17y agoExactly. People have been going on how much the Chinese owe the US but it's that old classic line about "if you owe the bank a billion dollars". One of three things will happen: 1. A US president will stand up in front of the people and tell the country they cannot have schools, health care or the military as they must pay back the Chinese (and other creditors). 2. The US economy will grow faster than the debt. 3. The US will devalue the dollar through printing money until the debt is serviceable (perhaps in combination by some economic growth). Scenario 1 seems absurd. 2 has been the stated approach to debt to date but is no longer reasonable. 3 seems almost inevitable. The Chinese leadership wouldn't much care about the money since it's been an unwilling participant the whole way through, however they do fear the wrath of their people which has the potential to be cataclysmic. And seemingly being played the fool by the US will cause a huge loss of face indeed. It'll be interesting to see how they try to spin it internally.
- gruseom 17y agoI agree with one of the commentators below the article ("B.Karn") that there always seems to be a bit of a "Clever Chinaman" undertone in these US/China articles. B. Karn's comment (unless there's more than one) doesn't say that at all. So not only have you read that sentiment into the article, you've read a pointing-out of it into a comment. (I agree that such a sentiment has existed in such articles in the past, but not in this one. Perhaps I'm missing the radar for it.)
- joe_the_user 17y agoYes, The financial regime that China has been on for the last fifteen years was bound to come to the present bad end. They could have let their currency appreciate more earlier and things wouldn't have been as fragile as they are now. But China felt such a need for industrial growth that they were willing partners in the last fifteen years' increasingly unbalanced growth. China is not necessarily more to blame than the US for this mess but they are one of the entities to blame. They certainly signed up for this program.
- DenisM 17y agoIt's probably less of racism and more of narrative fallacy - people just like to think there is some sort of a plan and a story to go with it. But it's a keen observation.
- fauigerzigerk 17y agoYes, and the more secrecy there is the more everything appears to be part of a grand plan. Another such fallacy is to always assume that what happens is the result of a successful plan, when it's most probably the result of many conflicting plans with variying degrees of success plus a lot of randomness mixed in.