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> If attackers ARE in your DC already, you're already hosed, That's a defeatist attitude, and the reason why security companies get away with only selling peri
by awalton 12y ago
> If attackers ARE in your DC already, you're already hosed,
That's a defeatist attitude, and the reason why security companies get away with only selling perimeter defense products. "Well if they get in they can do whatever they want anyways." If servers are properly insulated from one another, violating a single server won't give them complete access to your infrastructure.
An example of this: Valve was infiltrated by a hacker that managed to exploit an ASP server for a random webpage, and was able to get all the way to Valve's perforce servers and steal a copy of a the tree for Half-Life 2. There's no reason in hell a random web exposed server should be on the same network as their Perforce server, but that's what having poor internal network security does for you.
- scott_karana 12y agoI don't think he's advocating that you should have unprotected internal networks; just that the naming scheme shouldn't be confidential, since it is one of the first things that will be exposed in a compromise. Knowing the name "main.prd.example.com" doesn't help if it's got a bastion host, thorough firewall rules, key-only SSH login, et cetera.