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Blow up the Cert Business
- plorkyeran 12y agoWhile I suppose I trust Google to be a well-behaved CA more than many of the current CAs, I still don't like the idea of a single company utterly dominating the CA business no matter how well-intentioned they may be.
- smacktoward 12y agoYeah, this is my concern too. The closer we get to being able to have a Google-only Internet experience (Google DNS, SPDY vs HTTP, Chrome as the browser, etc.) the more nervous I get. It's just a lot of power to concentrate in one place.
- adestefan 12y agoDon't forget Google as the ISP (Fiber).
- michaelt 12y agoDon't forget the search engine, the webmail provider, the ad network, the analytics service, maps, sign in with google, youtube, docs, javascript library CDN, fonts, Android, social network, translation system, and blogging network.
- smacktoward 12y ago"But other than THAT, how was the play, Mrs. Lincoln?"
- macinjosh 12y ago100% agree. Google has way too much power over the Internet and web already. Just try blocking google.com in your hosts file and see how far you get online.
- quesera 12y agoI agree, but: the existing CAs are some of the most sketchy companies I see running Internet infrastructure. Domain registrars give them some competition (and are sometimes same same). Tim writes: > The only other companies with comparable scale and reach at the moment are, in my opinion, Facebook and (maybe) Microsoft. I think it would make perfect sense for either of them to get into the biz as well. I'd imagine that Facebook is poised (as poised as Facebook gets) to enter the personal certificate/identity provision space, but It's hard to imagine them doing server certs. Micro-who?
- alex_duf 12y agoI would NOT trust any US company holding a root certificate. Just because of the patriot act. So no thank you. Giving that power to very little actors is a very bad idea and security should not rely on few actors. We should just be able to revoke certificates more easily.
- quesera 12y agoI don't disagree. The US has some work to do if they care about trust. But easy revocation is not the answer. It scales tremendously poorly. There might not be an answer.
- mey 12y agoI was recently pulling together the wide variance in SSL Cert providers. I have an incomplete list available here https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1jzZqGzvtHe4egYNnp1L4-df_avGjEqMZiv0FWFP4d4E/edit?usp=sharing https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1jzZqGzvtHe4egYNnp1L4... The real work is figuring out which CA cert your cert will be issued on, then determining device/software package compatibility. (Chrome on Windows uses Windows CA store, Firefox on Windows uses it's own, Java uses its own, and all of those stores may or may not be routinely updated)
- michaelbuckbee 12y agoA real issue with the cert business is that phishers have really screwed up the economics of it. They are desperate to get SSL certs for domains that are almost that of legitimate companies and charities as much of the general internet populace has absorbed that "the green lock" means "safe". This has kicked off two responses by CA's and Browser makers. Certificate issuers putting in place a mix of automated and manual approval mechanism for what used to be "automatic" certs (from my own experience [1] - around 10% of certificate requests fall into this category). Browser makers have started to de-value the UI/UX of the "cheap and easy" certs that Tim is advocating be issued. Case in point Tim's URL is just gray (no green at all) in FF, but you can see a definite trend across the board in making the SSL presence of non EV certs less prominent [2] Taken together, I think this makes it really tough for Google to step in with a 'cheap' solution. 1 - I run https://addons.heroku.com/expeditedssl https://addons.heroku.com/expeditedssl 2 - https://www.expeditedssl.com/pages/visual-security-browser-ssl-icons-and-design.html https://www.expeditedssl.com/pages/visual-security-browser-s...
- veesahni 12y agoIt would be nice if we could store SSL certificates on DNS records, like how email signing (domankeys/DKIM) works. Looks like there's already some effort for this: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4398 http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4398 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=672239 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=672239
- peterwwillis 12y agoRFC6394 and RFC6698 are the useful bits here. The problem is they don't really offer much except a minimization of the attack footprint; instead of attacking one of 650 CAs you're attacking the dns root servers, which aren't impenetrable. The protocol itself has numerous flaws and basically nobody is implementing DNSSEC. If you combined it with a CA system it would potentially increase security for a given domain and DNSSEC users, and add onto that a Convergence-style decentralized system and you get another layer. Of course, that is a hell of a lot of extra complication just to prevent a state actor from easily circumventing your HTTPS connection, so I doubt anyone will go for it.
- xorcist 12y agoThat is not fair criticism. The DNS root servers do not hold the keys to the root zone and have no ability to sign records. Neither do their operators. Please also do look up the list of successful attacks on the root zone infrastructure. It is a very, very short list. Not imprenetrable of course; nothing is. But it does not need to be. The fact that authoritative servers can not sign records is central to the design.
- rakoo 12y agoThat already exists and is called DANE [0]. The issue with DANE is that you must make sure the records you receive are the good ones; unfortunately bare DNS as we know it doesn't provide any integrity or security, so we need a way to make sure there is no spoofing... and this is exactly what DNSSEC [1] aims to provide. The problem here is that while DANE is straightforward, DNSSEC is a massive pain to implement and, most crucially, maintain, especially for domain owners. Oh and the whole security relies on a hierarchy of key signatures that takes its root in the ICANN. So, instead of having a "decentralized" world of CAs, we go back to a hyper-centralized domain where everyone depends on the good actions of the ICANN. That sucks. [0] http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6698 http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6698 [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System_Security_Extensions https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System_Security_Ex...
- cpeterso 12y agoWhat is the minimum (useful!) level of trust for a certificate? If someone like Google handed out free (leaf) certs using the domain ownership verification process they use for Google Apps [1], is that any less useful than what other CAs do today? [1] https://support.google.com/a/answer/60216 https://support.google.com/a/answer/60216
- Someone1234 12y agoThe problem with that concept is: Bad guys steal your domain (e.g. break into the DNS provider and change the A records). They go to Google, request a cert, and Google checks the domain for the verification code (like Google Apps). Google generates you a new certificate, you then install the certificate, and now users are even less suspecting that the domain has been compromised. It even defeats a Strict Transport Security policy.
- nucleardog 12y agoAs opposed to something like RapidSSL which would require an MX record change? Point the MX record to an intermediary server which forwards all non-RapidSSL e-mail (so no one notices an interruption) and captures the RapidSSL messages for you. Generate certificate. Once you have the certificate, you can swap the A record over to your own machine and no one would be any wiser.
- deleted 12y ago[deleted]
- wtbob 12y agoTrusting Google to certify the world's systems hardly seems wise. What _does_ seem wise would be for each certificate to certify multiple independent chains of identity: each certificate should certify hostname, IP address and national identity at a minimum, and possibly also things like BBB status, trade association status &c. How could this work? Imagine the case of HTTPS at 74.125.227.241 (of of the IPs www.google.com resolves to). My browser would have public keys from the IANA and from the US federal government (and possibly others); it would trust IANA to vouch for IP addresses and DNS, and would trust the US to trust for national identity. The IANA would sign a certificate stating that ARIN are permitted to assign their various blocks of addresses; ARIN would sign a certificate for the block 74.125.227.241 is in themselves, or a middleman if there is one. Google would sign a certificate for the machines behind 74.125.227.241, stating that they are permitted to use that IP address (wildcards could be used in the probably case that one machine actually responds to more than one IP address). My computer, talking to 74.125.227.241, would receive this certificate chain and can see IANA->ARIN->(middleman)->Google->...->machine, and can verify that there is no spoofing. I think that some of this is theoretically possible with IPsec, but I don't know if it's used anywhere. Meanwhile, IANA would also have signed certificates stating that Verisign are allowed to vouch for holders of .com names. Verisign could sign a certificate stating that Google are allowed to vouch for holders of google.com names, and Google could sign certificates stating that various subunits are permitted to sign certificates for various subdomains of google.com. This is similar to the current CA structure, only with the addition of delegation and subdomains, which is really, really key. Because of this, there would be no way for, e.g., INRegistry to vouch for google.com, or any .com, because they only have the right for *.in. Even more important, the holder of each certificate could further subdelegate the authority he received, either in whole (in order hold a secure, ultimately-trusted offline key), or to grant limited privileges to different units. Thus apps.google.com might be delegated to one group and www.google.com to another. Some of this is done via DNSSEC currently. The US federal government would sign a certificate granting the state of Delaware the ability to vouch for corporations under its jurisdiction; Delaware would sign a certificate stating that 'GOOGLE INC' is indeed a Delaware corporation. The US federal government could _also_ sign a certificate for Google, vouching for their tax identification and whatever. The BBB could do the same thing, indicating that the Delaware corporation 'GOOGLE INC' holds a particular level of recognition. MasterCard could issue a certificate indicating that Google is permitted to charge credit cards for amounts up to whatever. So, the browser trusts IANA to certify DNS names & IP address; it trusts the US government (and possibly others) to certify corporate identities; it trusts the BBB to say nice things about companies; it trusts MasterCard (and others) to say that Google are permitted to receive my credit card info. So the browser bar might show green, because DNS & IP addresses are good; it might show the flags of the US & Delaware, because GOOGLE INC is a Delaware corporation (a foreign subsidiary of Google might show its local nation's flag as well); it might show a C- for Google's BBB rating; it might show a MasterCard logo, or just a '$' or local currency sign. The browser might outright refuse to display a page where IP & DNS authorisations did not exist, and might display warnings on pages with IP & DNS authorisations but lacking legal identities. Of course, in reality each of these entities would probably have an offline key which is what was vouched for; that offline key would then be used on, say, an annual or monthly to certify online secure keys, which might then be used on an hourly basis to certify endpoint keys. You what's really cool? All of the work required to efficiently represent & calculate on (e.g sign & verify not just a single certificate, but an entire chain) the certificates need to do this has already been done, almost 15 years ago. It was a standard called SPKI, and it knocks the current X.509-based XPKI dead. An efficient binary representation; easily-parsed human-readable certificates; trust calculus; it was all there. A lot of folks say that SPKI died because it eliminated the need for CAs, but if you look at all the above there are more, not less authorities; there'd clearly be a space to market certificate services, to offer insurance &c. Granted, I don't see a lot of room for the current model where a company pays someone to vouch for them, and I trust that voucher, despite there being no relationship of trust between mee and the vouching entity.
- weddpros 12y agoJust an idea... should we consider the problem is not with the first visit, but with subsequent visits? If I sign-up on a website (bank, Google, etc), all I want to ensure after that is that when I go back to that site, I will sign-in to the right website and not a phishing one. CAs don't provide this guarantee, when a simple self signed certificate would! Certs signed by CAs provide some kind of identity, while a self signed ad-hoc cert would provide strong identity! Let's imagine 3 factor auth: something I know, something I have, something they GAVE me. In the case of Google, I would gladly install a Google CA cert for all of Google's services. Okay, I just checked and Google is already its own issuing CA :) When SSL was born, the "problem" was to send your credit card number to an authenticated website (web store). Nowadays, we're loyal returning customers, and we want to sign-in without any ambiguity. Maybe we should kill generic CAs? and favor self signed certs after all. I could trust any self-signed cert, if the only guarantee I need is that I'll always return to the same website where I opened my account. Remember, that was just an idea, please tell me where I'm totally wrong!
- michaelbuckbee 12y agoCA's don't provide this security, but there's a new security mechanism called HTTP Strict Transport Security - [1] HSTS - which (along with some certificate pinning [2]) would. 1 - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security 2 - http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/29988/what-is-certificate-pinning http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/29988/what-is-ce...
- weddpros 12y agoI wasn't aware of it. Cert pinning is definitely a good solution!