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A) Have the initial connection give the client all the domain verification info it needs for the future. Now secure connections can be established with or witho
by peterwwillis 12y ago
A) Have the initial connection give the client all the domain verification info it needs for the future. Now secure connections can be established with or without a CA. Upside: independence, only one time you can exploit the connection. Downside: anyone can mitm the connection forever from the first connect onwards.
B) Use a third party to register the information to secure the initial connection. This is what CAs were created for, and now people are suggesting DNS (and I would wager somebody might recommend whois at some point) as central trusted authorities for this data. Upside: no initial connection mitm, attack surface is minimized compared to number of CAs, distributed model. Downside: still a 3rd-party central authority, and due to smaller attack surface one successful attack could have much wider-ranging consequences, and it adds complication.
C) Decentralized network of 3rd party peers to share authority information. Upside: decentralized, loosely organized, requires a bigger attack surface to disable. Downside: peers not held to as high a security standard, not necessarily businesses so no guarantees of integrity.
D) Require the user get out-of-bounds information to verify the integrity of initial connection, and after that any connection between the source and destination is secured in any number of ways. Upside: total security not dependent on 3rd parties, no man in the middle. Downside: incredibly inconvenient and totally unscalable.
E) All of the above. Support all possible schemes and allow the domain and the users to determine which of them they will use. Layer all different forms of verification so that the number of successful exploits to achieve a fake cert is so complicated that only a few dedicated state actors or elite hackers would spend enough time on it to be successful. Upside: users have choice, domain owners have choice, increased security overall. Downside: browsers have to figure out how to explain to the users what the fuck is going on when they get a warning about a cert now.
- me1010 12y agoThe problem is that a CA is issuing two things: 1. An identity. 2. A secure communications certificate. These do not need to be the same thing or issued by the same entity. I propose to modify the system as follows: 1. Register a domain name using an email address and a PGP key. 2. The registrar verifies that the applicant has the private key by requiring a clicked link in an encrypted mail. 3. A phone number is required for "full trust". 4. Thus with a private PGP key and a phone, trust that the applicant is the applicant has been established. It really doesn't matter who or what that applicant is -- just that the applicant and only that applicant has the required items. 5. The registrar passes the public key and the top domain to DNS servers. DNS validates against the registrar. And trust in the domain as an entity is now established. 6. Secure communications with the domain can now be established through the use of certs issued by the top level domain. And the domain becomes it's own authority. Any changes to registrar/domain information requires decrypting an email and answering a phone. Expensive and compromised CA's go away - Domain records become secure - Trust becomes decentralized - And domain owners hold all the keys... The only thing anyone else has is the domain holder's public key... SSL itself remains in place as is... Sure, if you lose your private key - you're screwed -- but that's just owning up being a responsible domain owner.
- marcosdumay 12y agoBasically, TLS over DNSSEC. Yes, it's better because you now only trust one party [1] what's much better than 600 random companies around the world. But it's not a panacea, that still puts too much power into governments hands, and still relies too much on a third party that can be hacked, bribed, threatened. I'd still like it better if browsers pinned the key of every site I access, and issued a warning if it changed without the new key being signed with the old. [1] Ok, a few, because you don't contact ICANN directly when you get a domain.
- peterwwillis 12y agoFirst off, a phone call is not full trust. A copy of your driver's license, power bills, social security card, etc are closer to full trust. Second, all you've described is a certificate authority that works inside DNS. Instead of a CA validating your certificate and the client blindly believing whatever the CA tells it, now it's the DNS validating your PGP key and the client blindly believing whatever DNS tells it. It's the same, only now you've got more eggs in one basket to get owned. So no, any changes to DNS do not require any key from a domain owner. If the client implicitly trusts the DNS it means the DNS can make any change it wants and the client will believe it. This is the whole reason nobody likes the CA model, because the CA can decide at any time to issue a certificate for any domain and any client will just blindly believe it.
- me1010 12y agoYou misunderstand. You're defining trust as trust that the entity is who the entity claims to be in societal space. But this is unnecessary. All that needs to be trusted is that the claimed domain owner is the domain owner. It doesn't matter who that entity is in societal space - just cryptographic space. Each domain is its own CA. And the registrar doesn't need to be trusted at all. All it is doing is dolling out domain names to public keys. There is no need for "true" personal identity to be established - since the only entity that can decrypt the PGP encrypted verification email is the owner of the associated private key. I've drawn a very rough diagram for you... http://s26.postimg.org/daz5u1izd/replacement_CA.png http://s26.postimg.org/daz5u1izd/replacement_CA.png