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Software vendors shouldn't list CAs as trusted when they prove they can't be trusted - but removing a CA from the trust store breaks things for innocent website
by michaelt 12y ago
Software vendors shouldn't list CAs as trusted when they prove they can't be trusted - but removing a CA from the trust store breaks things for innocent websites who just chose a crappy CA.
Every CA should be required to publish a signed, public list of every certificate they have issued that is currently valid; and no certificate should be considered valid if it isn't on a CA's public list of certificates.
That way, when a CA fucks up like this, vendors could remove their certificates from the root stores, but could grandfather in all their previous certificates so the CA's customers have a few months to get a certificate from a decent CA. We could even use the list to contact all the CA's customers and advise them of the upgrade deadline.
If this CA isn't removed from the root store, it sends a message to other CAs: You can issue bad certificates with impunity, and there will be no negative consequences.
- agl 12y agohttp://www.certificate-transparency.org/how-ct-works http://www.certificate-transparency.org/how-ct-works
- bdamm 12y agoIf only there was a blockchain for this.
- jdfellow 12y agoDon't know about this Certificate Transparency thing but Namecoin does allow a certificate fingerprint to be associated with a domain, without using a CA, and it works rather well.
- ryan-c 12y agoThat does work for domains within Namecoin, but it cannot be used for ICANN TLDs. People have suggested pairing schemes to allow domains under other TLDs to be associated with Namecoin records but I have yet to see one that is secure (they all rely on honest miners).
- schoen 12y agoThere's a growing literature and conversation about the tradeoffs between blockchains and the approach that CT takes. They are actually historically related to one another. http://www.aaronsw.com/weblog/squarezooko http://www.aaronsw.com/weblog/squarezooko Ben Laurie (a co-inventor of CT) had some particular objections to blockchains, partly to do with the problem that the total computational power that is or will be brought to bear on mining is unknown and maybe unknowable. http://www.links.org/files/decentralised-currencies.pdf http://www.links.org/files/decentralised-currencies.pdf http://www.links.org/files/distributed-currency.pdf http://www.links.org/files/distributed-currency.pdf I'd like to actually make a web page that talks about the historical relationship between blockchains and other decentralized append-only data stores, as well as the points of debate and trade-offs between different designs, and the space of proposals that achieve consensus about the contents of an append-only record.
- mike_hearn 12y agoThe CT approach is a lot more efficient assuming a closed network of pre-registered "miners" (logs, in CT parlance). This works ok for CT because CT does not place such a large emphasis on decentralisation, nor does it need to. Ultimately the power in the SSL system lies with browser and OS vendors, in turn that means only a handful of people really. Having a super fancy ultra-decentralised system that will only be used by a handful of OS services and browsers doesn't make a whole lot of sense.
- higherpurpose 12y agoYou mean like this? https://github.com/okTurtles/dnschain https://github.com/okTurtles/dnschain
- ryan-c 12y agookTurtles is one of several middleware options that runs on top of Namecoin, implementing the domain record spec. It advocates using someone else's trusted server as a data source, but does not at this time implement any integrity protection for data in transit. http://www.freespeechme.org/ http://www.freespeechme.org/ is a more mature and more secure. Edit: DNSChain does not appear to provide certificate validation for .bit domains in common browsers at this time. It can serve DANE records, but the browsers don't currently verify them and the existing browser extensions for adding DANE support require DNSSEC which DNSChain does not provide, unless I'm missing something.
- higherpurpose 12y agoI think DNSchain offers some compatibility with .bit domains, but the real innovation happens with .dns domains?
- itistoday2 12y agoFreeSpeechMe is not practical for use because it requires running Namecoin locally. DNSChain is just as secure as FreeSpeechMe when connected to a trusted DNSChain server. > It advocates using someone else's trusted server This is misleading. You and Jeremy keep repeating this line and it honestly feels like a vendetta at this point (I hope it's not). It advocates connecting to your DNSChain server (or a close friend's). This is security that is either on par with FreeSpeechMe (without the baggage), or orders of magnitude better than what's provided by HTTPS today.
- itistoday2 12y agoCertificate Transparency does not work. It does not, as it claims, always provide a log of issued certificates and it does not stop MITM attacks: - http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg00233.html http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg00233.... - http://okturtles.com/#oktvs http://okturtles.com/#oktvs It also does nothing to fix the non-functioning certificate revocation problem (which is not a problem with the blockchain).
- jewel 12y agoA compromise that wouldn't hurt innocent websites would be to remove the CA's ability to issue new certificates. CAs knew that the stakes were high when they signed up to be a CA, so I think it'd be fair to remove them permanently. Eventually, only the truly paranoid would be left. It may cost a bit more to run a fully secure CA, and that would be reflected in the cost of a certificate from those that remain, but that'd be a price that everyone should be willing to pay.
- deleted 12y ago[deleted]
- gtaylor 12y ago> It may cost a bit more to run a fully secure CA, and that would be reflected in the cost of a certificate from those that remain, but that'd be a price that everyone should be willing to pay. I don't know, this could really discourage the adoption of HTTPS. We need to be making it easier for sites to adopt it. Ideally we could lessen our dependence on CAs. Sure, a "fully secure/expensive" CA would validate a certificate's authenticity with high confidence, but we'd be excluding tons of hobby projects and small shops who wouldn't want that expense.
- michaelt 12y agoSeems to me a CA that can't avoid issuing bad certificates is a bad thing for security, no matter how cheap they are.
- marcosdumay 12y agoWhat good does widespread HTTPS use do if you can not trust it? I'm all for reducing our dependence on CAs, and, reducing the number of CAs we trust for signing a site, like putting the keys in DNSSEC. But until we do that, we must not trust bad apples.
- AlyssaRowan 12y agoIt's always better than plaintext HTTP. Nothing is worse than plaintext. TLSv1.2 with good ciphersuites using ECDHE with a named curve like secp256r1 [murky origins I know, but we know of nothing else wrong with it, though Curve25519 is superior in my opinion], and an AEAD like AES-128-GCM or CHACHA20-POLY1305, properly implemented with no TLS compression at least comprehensively prevents Eve from spying on the contents of your connection in most cases, even if you're using self-signed certificates with no pinning and are entirely unprotected from Mallory. A browser shouldn't call it secure or the endpoint trusted, but it should transparently replace all uses of unencrypted HTTP worldwide, including internal ones. That should not be discouraged, and will hopefully be actioned with HTTP/2 - that was the plan, anyway. Even if the encryption is crap (Export ciphers... RC4?) I guess it does take some more work for Eve, which knocks out a few of the lower-capability adversaries.
- AnthonyMouse 12y ago> Software vendors shouldn't list CAs as trusted when they prove they can't be trusted - but removing a CA from the trust store breaks things for innocent websites who just chose a crappy CA. It seems like the way to fix this is to phase out bad CAs over time. And since certificates already have expiration dates and CAs typically don't issue certificates for longer than a couple years this should be easy: You don't trust any certificate signed by that CA which expires after a date two years from when you blacklist them. So the certificate some website got six months ago keeps working until it expires in a year and a half, but the certificate someone gets from them tomorrow fails immediately because it expires two years and a day after you removed the CA, which the site operator will discover in their testing and use a different CA before it reaches production.
- richardwhiuk 12y agoThat's useless. A compromised CA could create a certificate for an arbitrary start and expiration date. So this only penalises users who have had a certificate legitimately, and doesn't work at all if the CA's crown jewels are stolen.
- AnthonyMouse 12y ago> That's useless. A compromised CA could create a certificate for an arbitrary start and expiration date. Sure, next month they could still be issuing certificates that expire in 23 months and they would be valid. But a year from then they'll only be able to issue certificates that expire in 11 months, and after two years they'll only be able to issue certificates that are already expired.
- pyre 12y agoAn arbitrary start and end date means that you could post-date the certificate to be good for two years starting from 1 year ago, even though you created it today. That's what the parent post is talking about. [edit: You're right. Even w/ arbitrary dates, end dates crossing the threshold will still not be accepted.]
- peterwwillis 12y ago> That way, when a CA fucks up like this, vendors could remove their certificates from the root stores, but could grandfather in all their previous certificates so the CA's customers have a few months to get a certificate from a decent CA. You cannot grandfather in old certificates because you have no idea what else may have been tampered with. If they have a security hole, it could have been there for a long time. There is almost no way to know if a certificate was improperly issued unless you're the domain owner. All of them have to be invalidated to stop any other potentially invalid certificates. This is why the CA model is so stupid. It relies on humans at over 650 institutions "doing the right thing" every time, and when the inevitable happens, destroying a large number of innocent certificates. In terms of sending a message, we already know that you can issue invalid certificates with impunity. Exploit a CA, make your fake cert, use it, get found out eventually, repeat. It doesn't work as well for pinned certificates but there's more than one way to skin that cat.
- x1798DE 12y agoI'm not sure that you actually want to avoid punishing people for choosing crappy CAs. That causes moral hazard, because you're not risking anything yourself by choosing a crappy CA, you're just spreading the risk among everyone else on the internet, because to avoid punishing you, they're accepting certificates issued from a known bad actor. Doing it this way is actually a good way to handle product differentiation, because generally people won't make browsing choices based on certificate brand name, but commercial website owners will choose a better CA if it means that CA is less likely to get de-certified.
- 0x0 12y agoOn the other hand, you want to make sure CAs will keep disclosing problems like these when they become aware of them, or they will certainly do anything in their power to keep breaches silent to avoid a certain death of the company.
- x1798DE 12y agoWell, that was kinda a big difference between Diginotar and Comodo. Diginotar got hacked, knew about it, then tried to mitigate without telling anyone. Comodo got hacked and disclosed what they knew ASAP. Diginotar was pulled from the trusted root stores and went out of business and Comodo wasn't. There were probably other reasons for the differential treatment (the scope of the Diginotar hack was bigger, for example), but I think that a lot of them are essentially strong correlates of the disclosure policy (i.e. if you have other responsible security practices, you're more likely to have a good disclosure policy).
- michaelt 12y agoOnce the death-of-the-company option is on the table, it gives the CA a reason to comply with any lesser punishment. For example fines, changes to procedures, mandatory security audits, agreeing not to issue certain types of certificate etc - the CA is going to do their best to comply if the alternative is to be put out of business. Whether we want browser vendors / an industry standards committee to have that much power is another matter, of course.
- jpollock 12y agoIf more than one signature was allowed on a certificate, then sites would be able to have more than one path to the root. Then it wouldn't matter if any single CA was removed, giving people time to obtain new signatures.
- graylights 12y agoAgreed, but I think it should go a step further. Browsers should require 2 signatures from different regions. That way a government can't pressure a single CA within their borders to issue rogue certs. 2 signatures would be minimum with 3 for redundancy.
- AlyssaRowan 12y agoAgreed: this is a major operational flaw with deployed PKIX. It has many unintended consequences, for example it's especially a pain with UEFI Secure Boot.
- InclinedPlane 12y agoIf there are no consequences then there's no value to the CA system. Why bother with it then?
- grymoire1 12y ago> Every CA should be required to publish a signed, public list of every certificate they have issued that is currently valid; A LIST??? This will be much MUCH larger than a list of revocations, take a LONG time to verify, and frankly, would never be up to date.