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YouTube requires the RC4 cipher for videos
- lnanek2 12y agoHonestly, I couldn't care less if my YouTube video stream was encrypted or not. So I'm on the side of the original poster. That said, Google obviously is against that. So I guess he should have just pushed for newer cipher support saying RC4 was not legally possible for his organization. Google adding support for newer ciphers and getting more users seems like a clear win for them and probably only takes their equivalent of updating a Chef or other infrastructure recipe since it is just a setting.
- deleted 12y ago[deleted]
- theandrewbailey 12y agoTest one of the content servers that the Youtube player connects to. It's a domain ending in googlevideo.com Disabling all RC4 ciphers breaks the Youtube player, unless your browser supports TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, which isn't widely supported.
- rasz_pl 12y agoits the content servers that require RC4. You probably checked main site, not the server that holds video clips.
- atoponce 12y agoPeople only disable RC4 due to PCI audits, because PCI vendors think RC4 is practically broken. It's not. In practice, it's still secure: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RC4#Security https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RC4#Security. The only way to practically attack RC4 is to obtain a "large number of TLS encryptions". How much? "The number of connections/sessions needed to reliably recover these plaintext bytes is around 2^30, but already with only 2^24 connections/sessions, certain bytes can be recovered reliably." This is even more than what is provided in a YouTube video. You need 16 million connections with 1GB of data, _in_ _each_ _connection_ to practically attack RC4. Sure, treat that as a wakeup call, but let's be realistic about it. RC4 is only _theoretically_ broken, similarly to SHA1. By comparison, OpenSSH still uses MD5 hashes for their private server and client keys. MD5 is practically broken. So, if you want to "do something", fix OpenSSH.
- AlyssaRowan 12y agoUm, no. People disable RC4 because it's rubbish. If I may quote GCHQ - a "surprising [...] cryptologic breakthrough" was obtained a few years ago from NSA. We don't know for certain if that referred to an RC4 break specifically, but from context, I think that is the most probable candidate - a bulk cipher they've never used themselves, but widely-deployed internationally (at the time, and still to a large extent) on a huge number of websites largely because of advice to mitigate the BEAST attack (a tricky, active attack) not by switching to TLS 1.2, but by switching to a stream cipher designed in the late 80s for the 8086 that is showing its age poorly. That was probably not good advice. What we do know for sure is that it's in a poor state; worse than any other cipher deployed in mainstream crypto. RC4 is Considered Harmful. Go back and review what you've encrypted with RC4 previously, and evaluate if an eavesdropper could have recorded it and saved it for later when they do have a practical attack, and if so, if that's a problem - because in the state it's in, that is not a theoretical concern, because we know some Nation State Adversaries (cough) certainly do that en masse as general practice. The IETF TLS Working Group have actually had a big discussion about this already - resulting in a live Internet-Draft not merely deprecating, but actively prohibiting RC4's use in TLS, which obtained strong-to-unanimous support in the Working Group and in my opinion will very probably be adopted as a WG document: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-popov-tls-prohibiting-rc4-02 https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-popov-tls-prohibiting-rc4-... - long story short, you MUST NOT use RC4 in TLS, don't even think about negotiating it, kill it with fire. If you're still using it in anything else, consider this your I-told-you-so warning. If you want a replacement, consider ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 or - if you want a modern stream cipher that's actually 256-bit secure yet faster in software than RC4 (unless you're on an 8086...) - ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305: coming to an AEAD stream near you, and already with a draft implementation live in Chrome and on most of Google's properties thanks to agl's patches that more recently have become BoringSSL - but sadly not YouTube's video CDN yet, as the article notes. I couldn't speak for OpenSSH, but I also think your information, or your software, may be out of date. SSHFP DNSSEC records, in particular, have had SHA256 on the Standards Track RFC for two years and change - https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6594 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6594
- Someone1234 12y ago> By comparison, OpenSSH still uses MD5 hashes for their private server and client keys. MD5 is practically broken. So, if you want to "do something", fix OpenSSH. Did you mean to say OpenSSL there? OpenSSH uses PAM. PAM can use MD5 but OpenSSH has no control or oversight over that, the distribution you're using normally determines the hashing algorithm. You can also trivially reconfigure PAM to use something stronger if you so wish. If you meant to say openSSL then your point is still quite confusing. MD5 is used in a few places around OpenSSL (e.g. digests, signatures, etc) none of which are weakened by MD5's weaknesses.
- khaki54 12y agoRC4 is faster and less cpu intensive -- Leading to a better user experience, and lower costs which is probably why they force it. I know a lot of times we prefer arcfour (RC4) for backend "trusted" ssh connections because it is faster the other ciphers.
- billyhoffman 12y agotldr: AES-NI is faster than RC4 on Intel processors > 2009. 170% faster actually [5] "The RC4 is fast" meme is true, because RC4 uses simple math operations like modulo and bitwise AND. [1]. CPUs have always done these operations fast. Other crypto algorithms used by SSL, like 3DES, were deliberately designed to be slow in software. [2]. However, modern Intel chips have dedicated instructions for perform AES, called AES-NI [3]. For these chips, an AES operation is not broken down into a series of opcodes the CPU executes. The CPU just does it. AES-NI is actually faster than RC4. [4] We need to kill the RC4 is fast, everything else is slow myth. "TLS has exactly one performance problem: it is not used widely enough." [5] 1- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RC4#Implementation http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RC4#Implementation 2- DES was designed around bit swapping, not byte swapping, which is super easy to do in hardware and much slower to do in software. 3- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AES_instruction_set http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AES_instruction_set 4- http://zombe.es/post/4078724716/openssl-cipher-selection http://zombe.es/post/4078724716/openssl-cipher-selection 5- https://istlsfastyet.com/ https://istlsfastyet.com/
- 0x006A 12y agois AES-NI available for ssh connections? Would be interesting to see an updated benchmark like http://blog.famzah.net/2010/06/11/openssh-ciphers-performance-benchmark/ http://blog.famzah.net/2010/06/11/openssh-ciphers-performanc... if it is.
- billyhoffman 12y agoAES-NI is an extension of the instruction set of the CPU just like x64 extensions, or the older MMX, MMX2, SSE style extensions. They are opcodes that are hardwired into the CPU itself. Software has to be compiled to take advantage of these additional instructions. Much like how you can compile software for say, i586 instead of i386, and get code that executes faster. so it all depends on how OpenSSH is compiled (and, to some extent, whether the OpenSSH source code has extract compiler flags/code sections)
- timothya 12y agoInteresting. It looks like the page itself is encrypted with more standard crypto using AES [0], but the video itself is served from a connection using RC4 [1]. As far as I can tell from this article [2], attacks on RC4 are only theoretical at this point, but it seems reasonable that they should upgrade the video serving domain to be consistent with the page itself (though maybe it's done for performance reasons - either encrypting a large video stream costs a lot of CPU time or decrypting it on the client is too slow or CPU intensive for watching video smoothly, so perhaps they are sticking with RC4 for a good reason). Still, as my old crypto prof said, "Attacks only get better over time. They never get worse." [0]: http://i.imgur.com/OcpziFa.png http://i.imgur.com/OcpziFa.png [1]: http://i.imgur.com/57T8bay.png http://i.imgur.com/57T8bay.png [2]: https://community.qualys.com/blogs/securitylabs/2013/03/19/rc4-in-tls-is-broken-now-what https://community.qualys.com/blogs/securitylabs/2013/03/19/r...
- EthanHeilman 12y agoAttacks on RC4 are publically theoretical but people have come forward to say that the NSA[1], and likely other intelligence agencies, can break RC4 in real time. Given what we know about the theoretical attacks, this does not stretch the imagination. [1]: https://twitter.com/ioerror/status/398059565947699200 https://twitter.com/ioerror/status/398059565947699200
- tptacek 12y agoThe attacks are not "theoretical". They are in fact trivial to implement. What you mean to say here is that the attacks are difficult to launch in practice. That is true: while the code to attack RC4 is simple, the attack generates a huge amount of bandwidth.
- mahouse 12y agogooglevideo.com is a CDN. Up to what point do they control it?
- theandrewbailey 12y agoMost (if not all) other Google properties have no trouble supporting better encryption. This is probably an oversight.
- drzaiusapelord 12y agoOr its for performance reasons. Grandma's computer might have issues decoding flash video in whatever codec it now uses (h264 I assume) that's also wrapped in 128/256-AES coming to her at HD quality.
- mahouse 12y agoIt's probably for performance reasons.
- AlyssaRowan 12y agoI think I've had a word about this before. It's a completely separate CDN from 1e100, often colocated, and purely software.
- PeterGriffin 12y agoIs this me, or does the linked thread read like a warning about the brain damage bureaucracy can do to people? tl;dr - A company wants to be PCI compliant. - PCI forbids using RC4 encoding. - YouTube now requires encryption and uses RC4 for the actual video stream (I guess for performance reasons). - Company employee thinks that opening YouTube somehow damages their PCI compliance, because the site uses RC4. - The company employee would rather have YouTube serve its site with no encryption, rather than use RC4, as somehow this would be better for their PCI compliance. What am I missing here that makes this less absurd?
- saidajigumi 12y agoThe OP in that thread made it quite clear in a subsequent post: We don't have a requirement to encrypt Youtube video because Youtube videos are outside the scope of the policies we have that mandate encryption. Those policies prohibit the use of RC4 and because browsers don't allow varying the cipher support on a per-site basis, the result is nothing may use RC4. Because we don't have to encrypt the video and because Google doesn't support anything we can use we're left with the options of either finding a way to allow Youtube videos without encryption, or block Youtube on secure subnets.
- deleted 12y ago[deleted]
- scott_karana 12y agoIt sounds more like it's a practical sysadmin stuck in an impractical pointyhead-caused hell. 1. Youtube needs to work 2. It's not considered sensitive by the business (and I hope to god nobody uses Google credentials) 3. He can't change PCI-relevant settings or he'll get fired (and the business could potentially lose some sort of financial accreditation, or endanger a business partnership) 4. He can circumvent the requirements by disabling SSL for Youtube, which seems to be a loophole in PCI's laughable "security" requirements. Sucks, but it happens. I'm sure he's polishing up his resumé.
- danudey 12y ago1. PCI compliance is a requirement for some types of business 2. PCI compliance requires that some connections are encrypted 3. PCI compliance requires that encrypted connections follow a set of guidelines, including no RC4 cipher 4. Rule #3 is not limited to encrypted connections mandated in rule #2; this allows people in the organization to assume that all encrypted connections are at least minimally 'secure', rather than 'some connections are secure but some are more secure than others'. PCI compliance doesn't care about unencrypted connections, because they mandate that sensitive data travel over encrypted connections, so unencrypted connections aren't relevant to them at all. So basically, PCI says 'no RC4 ciphers in your enterprise' (for stupid reasons) and does not allow for exceptions (for sane reasons). Google is using RC4 only (for what I assume are practical, if stupid, reasons). It's kind of surprising, since Google (or at least, large swaths of Google) must be PCI compliant considering that they do payment processing, etc.
- mrb 12y agoFor the record, Google has been working on adding support for more secure ciphers [1] and the fix is being (has been?) pushed as we speak. Users already reported seeing support for AES-GCM (see Jas Per's scan[2]). [1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7775052 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7775052 [2] https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=r4---sn-uxaxovg-5goz.googlevideo.com https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=r4---sn-uxaxo...
- harshreality 12y agoIt looks like one AES-GCM and one RC4 ciphersuite, but with RC4 preferred? "Support" for AES-GCM doesn't mean much if an RC4 ciphers is enabled and preferred by the server. 1. There are production servers that are still using RC4 only. 2. Consequently, clients can't disable RC4 3. Consequently, servers that prefer RC4 but offer better ciphersuites are insecure because they will negotiate RC4 even with better ciphers available. Client workarounds might be possible (involving multiple handshakes for rc4-only servers) but aren't implemented?
- FiloSottile 12y ago> My guess is someone at Google read an outdated, incorrect blog post about the BEAST attack and saw the recommendation to force RC4. They then did so without bothering to learn anything about what they were doing. Oh, well, no. Really, this is not something that can happen at Google. The security people working there are for sure not clueless and a similar decision is not taken so lightly at that scale. What happened is that they looked into it more than OP, benchmarked it and decided that the performance overhead of a cipher different from RC4 was not acceptable for the video streams. Or they have hardware streaming those videos that only supports RC4. It's not small play as OP seems to believe. I'm actually amazed that they enabled AES-GCM as a fallback. Btw, RC4 remaining preferred points more in the direction of performance reasons.