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email addressess are frequently public information anyway, and often get leaked through other methods like giant CC list emails. Unless you have a specific reas
by vacri 12y ago
email addressess are frequently public information anyway, and often get leaked through other methods like giant CC list emails. Unless you have a specific reason to conceal email addresses, I'd argue that the cost of keeping that tiny nugget of information secret is too high for the level of security it adds.
And as they say in the article, that information is already leaked by the password reset process: "No email by that name available".
- GrinningFool 12y agoWould the argument then be to change the password reset process to something like, "After we verify that this address exists in our records, a password reset email will be sent to it."
- Rapzid 12y agoYes, absolutely.
- vacri 12y agoIs the user supposed to sit on their hands, wondering whether the email is still coming? Email is far from instant, especially 'password reset' emails, which I've received hours later in some cases. At what point does the user decide to try another of their email addresses? Or do they just try them all (also painful) and just wait to find out which one return a result? What if the user misspells their own email, a common occurrence? They'll never get an email, and never get an indication that they failed.