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A passive observer that is as big as NSA/GCHQ etc. can correlate traffic to de-anonomise some traffic, some very small amount of the time. It is extremely unlik

A passive observer that is as big as NSA/GCHQ etc. can correlate traffic to de-anonomise some traffic, some very small amount of the time. It is extremely unlikely that a single ISP would ever have enough information to do that though.

majke 12y ago
a) http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/10/04/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-nsa-and-tor-in-one-faq/ http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/10/04... > "With manual analysis we can de-anonymize a very small fraction of Tor users." > "We will never be able to de-anonymize all Tor users all the time" b) https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/10/how_the_nsa_att.html https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/10/how_the_nsa_a... > Tor is a well-designed and robust anonymity tool, and successfully attacking it is difficult. The NSA attacks we found individually target Tor users by exploiting vulnerabilities in their Firefox browsers, and not the Tor application directly.
tedks 12y ago
Even the NSA has to deal with the base rate fallacy. You can't just magically "correlate" traffic.
- RachelF 12y ago
  It is hard, perhaps, but a good attack for the NSA would be to run many of the exit nodes. The intelligence gathered this way would be very valuable, as the traffic on the TOR network is has a much higher intelligence value. This is because it is used by those trying to hide something, something which the NSA may like to know.
  - aroman 12y ago
    > This is because it is used by those trying to hide something, something which the NSA may like to know. Sounds like a great reason for more people to use Tor!
  - majke 12y ago
    Have you considered contributing to organizations that make sure no single entity controls too many exits: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2013-September/002824.html https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2013-Septe... https://www.torservers.net/ https://www.torservers.net/
    - e12e 12y ago
      If I wanted to support the NSA, I'm sure I'd do volunteer work for those organizations -- and if I ran an intelligence agency, I'm sure I'd recruit assets off university campuses across the globe. Just saying.
  - tedks 12y ago
    > It is hard, perhaps, but a good attack for the NSA would be to run many of the exit nodes. It definitely doesn't control most of the exit bandwidth, unless the TorServers and blutmagie guys have been conning us for maybe a decade now. >TOR network Tor, not TOR. >This is because it is used by those trying to hide something, something which the NSA may like to know. This is a rather strong statement about the average Tor user.
  - deleted 12y ago
    [deleted]

majke 12y ago

a) http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/10/04/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-nsa-and-tor-in-one-faq/ http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/10/04... > "With manual analysis we can de-anonymize a very small fraction of Tor users." > "We will never be able to de-anonymize all Tor users all the time" b) https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/10/how_the_nsa_att.html https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/10/how_the_nsa_a... > Tor is a well-designed and robust anonymity tool, and successfully attacking it is difficult. The NSA attacks we found individually target Tor users by exploiting vulnerabilities in their Firefox browsers, and not the Tor application directly.

tedks 12y ago

Even the NSA has to deal with the base rate fallacy. You can't just magically "correlate" traffic.

RachelF 12y ago
It is hard, perhaps, but a good attack for the NSA would be to run many of the exit nodes. The intelligence gathered this way would be very valuable, as the traffic on the TOR network is has a much higher intelligence value. This is because it is used by those trying to hide something, something which the NSA may like to know.
- aroman 12y ago
  > This is because it is used by those trying to hide something, something which the NSA may like to know. Sounds like a great reason for more people to use Tor!
- majke 12y ago
  Have you considered contributing to organizations that make sure no single entity controls too many exits: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2013-September/002824.html https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2013-Septe... https://www.torservers.net/ https://www.torservers.net/
  - e12e 12y ago
    If I wanted to support the NSA, I'm sure I'd do volunteer work for those organizations -- and if I ran an intelligence agency, I'm sure I'd recruit assets off university campuses across the globe. Just saying.
- tedks 12y ago
  > It is hard, perhaps, but a good attack for the NSA would be to run many of the exit nodes. It definitely doesn't control most of the exit bandwidth, unless the TorServers and blutmagie guys have been conning us for maybe a decade now. >TOR network Tor, not TOR. >This is because it is used by those trying to hide something, something which the NSA may like to know. This is a rather strong statement about the average Tor user.
- deleted 12y ago
  [deleted]