11 ms·
Is TLS Fast Yet?
- smnrchrds 12y agoDo you know why I don't use TLS? Because getting a certificate is almost impossible for me and definitely not worth the hassle. I live in Iran, which as you may know is subject to financial and technological sanctions. It makes it impractical for us to buy anything from foreign countries because: 1. Because of the financial sanctions, it's nearly impossible to send money abroad. We can't have a wire transfer from our bank account to another country. We can't open an account in a foreign bank. We can't get an international credit card or open a PayPal account (as a matter of fact, PayPal has banned Iranian IPs. We can't even open the website). 2. Even if we somehow manage to send the money, we cannot expect a reliable service. More than once have tech companies, especially hosting providers, closed the account of all Iranian customers citing regulations. We try to stick to .ir domains or at least have one as fail-safe, use primarily Iranian hosting providers despite their much higher prices and avoid relying on foreign services at any cost. I've seen here on HN that some people say cost is not prohibitive in adoption of TLS. It's only <single digit number> dollars on <CA name> after all. The cost is not the problem here. The act of paying is a barrier to entry for many people. That's why my university has a supercomputer, but you'll get an SSL error when you visit its website because it's self-signed.
- danbee 12y agoStartSSL offers free class 1 certificates. Don't know if that's any use to you.
- smnrchrds 12y agoI'm aware of that, but because revoking the certificate is not free, it would be impossible for us to do. Not very good security-wise.
- Alupis 12y agoIf you are not capable of affording at least a cheap-almost-free ssl cert in order to protect your site's users, and given your site actually requires SSL (such as secure account login, transactions, etc) you probably should not be running the site. SSL certs can be found for $1.99 per year sometimes from companies (that's cheaper than it costs to run your server). Sure they are not the "name brand" ssl certs like from Verisign that cost $300 a year -- but to a browser, SSL is SSL (so long as the browser recognizes the trust chain). If your country prohibits SSL's use -- then you really should consider not hosting your site from within your country. Security is not a joke.
- zampano 12y agoI don't think he was saying he couldn't pay because he couldn't afford to pay, I think he was saying he couldn't pay because he doesn't have the option of paying with the economic sanctions against Iran.
- Alupis 12y agoThat does not change the spirit of my comment. If your server requires SSL due to security reasons, and you are not capable of using SSL for one reason or another, then I'd rather you don't run that server at all. Besides, if it's not an cost-prohibitive problem, but rather one can't get an SSL cert due to sanctions, etc... well, that argument doesn't hold water either. Not every country holds sanctions against Iran for example. You may not be able to get an SSL cert from a USA company, but there are many other countries who have CA's available that probably have no sanctions. In the end, security is not a joke. If your server requires itself to be secure, you'd better do it.
- JohnTHaller 12y agosmnrchrds isn't saying they don't have the money to pay for it. They're saying they can't pay for it. Because they're in Iran, they can't get PayPal, a foreign credit card, etc. So, while they could get this SSL for free, it would be a security risk for them since they'd be unable to revoke it if it were compromised because they have no way to carry out the transaction.
- Someone1234 12y agoThey're only usable for non-commercial purposes. So for an *.ir business, it remains problematic.
- dspillett 12y agoThough be wary of the "non commercial use" clause on the free certificates. I have no idea how, or indeed if, they enforce that (revoking the certificate if they find you using it for commercial purposes?) but it is there.
- cnst 12y ago> StartSSL offers free class 1 certificates. Don't know if that's any use to you. No, that doesn't work. 0. Once you go https, you're basically hooked. What if StartSSL stops offering free certs tomorrow? They've been offering free certs for ages now, yet still have no competition! So much for the free market. 1. What if you have a good dozen of different domains? The cheapest multidomain certificates seem to start 50$+/domain/year, that's a pretty hefty price tag for non-commercial projects. We need something like STARTTLS in smtp/xmpp/etc for http, which just protects the traffic from eavesdropping and passive attacks. Because right now as it is, from the user's experience, having a self-signed https is WORSE than not having any https at all. Do you get any warnings on http web-sites? What about self-signed https? WTF? I don't live in Iran, but I completely agree with the OP that TLS is not ready yet, by not being affordable and dependable. I'll adopt TLS for http as soon as, (1), I can guarantee that existing users won't suffer, (2), I won't be required to update certificates all the time (when was the last time you've updated your ssh certs?), (3), I won't be required to pay hundreds/thousands of dollars (per year) to secure all my domains.
- Alupis 12y agoYou do know TLS and SSL can be on the same server? In fact, if you are on a modern browser, look at the SSL cert HN is using -- it should show you are using TLS 1.2. -- so no users "suffer". Some SSL certs have become bloated in price (without good reason), such as the VeriSign certs, etc. No SSL cert should cost $300 a year... that's absurd. However, they can't be free... someone has to pay for the infrastructure that not only signs certs, but provides the trust backbone that SSL rides on.
- cnst 12y ago> In fact, if you are on a modern browser, look at the SSL cert HN is using -- it should show you are using TLS 1.2. -- so no users "suffer". No, once you go SNI and people start sharing https links, you basically cut off all users who have older browsers. Which is complete bullshit -- they should just be getting the non-encrypted web-site, just like what happens with smtp and STARTTLS. > No SSL cert should cost $300 a year Yet you won't find a cert for a dozen different domains cheaper than 600$/year. And what if you want to wildcard each of those domains, too? > someone has to pay for the infrastructure that not only signs certs, but provides the trust backbone that SSL rides on. And I should care about the trust backbone for my personal web-site and non-commercial projects why exactly?
- castorio 12y agoself-signed is as good as CA-based from a security-POV. it's just that the browsers complain.
- Nursie 12y agoIt absolutely is not. With CA based you have an existing trust relationship to build on. It may be a flawed one but it is there. Asking a client to accept self-signed is asking for a MITM attack.
- castorio 12y agousing the CA-model in its current way doesnt protect you from MITM either. diginotar anyone? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DigiNotar http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DigiNotar
- Someone1234 12y agoIt absolutely does protect you from MitM. Does it offer full proof protection? No. But it adds a barrier between you and being trivially hit with a MitM. To use an analogy: One could make the statement that a kevlar vest doesn't protect you from bullets, then cite an example when a military grade round went through one and killed a cop. However this statement would be equally misleading to yours, as we all know a kevlar vest is better than nothing and that it will stop a typical street bullet (e.g. handgun round).
- Karunamon 12y agoThe likelihood of any one user to be the target of a MITM is vanishingly small. Once that certificate has been accepted, they will be notified if it changes anyways. Furthermore, the "trust relationship" between a user and a CA is based on nothing more than the CA's sayso. Do you personally trust every cert that your browser does? What about your OS? Trust that they'll never issue a cert they shouldn't? Trust that their operations are secure? And finally, the self signed CA still protects against passive monitoring and eavesdropping, which I'd say is a much more clear and present threat.
- y0ghur7_xxx 12y agoWe should really work towards eliminating the need for CAs (or any central authority for that matter). http://convergence.io/ http://convergence.io/ is (was?) a great idea and technical implementation of it, I installed two notaries on two different servers I own, and it worked great. It seems dead now. Don't know why.
- higherpurpose 12y agoMoxie has said they are waiting on browsers to implement TACK.io, but not entirely sure why tack is needed for Convergence.
- sedachv 12y agoTACK is supposed to be a backwards-compatible standard, Convergence is a replacement.
- AnthonyMouse 12y agoIn theory DNSSEC should replace the CAs for domain validated certificates. The problem is that most clients don't support it (and there are currently some nontrivial reasons for that). What would be great is if somebody (I'm looking at you, Google or Mozilla) with the clout to get their CA cert trusted could set up a free website that would validate DNS TLSA records with DNSSEC (or DNSCurve if you like) and then automatically sign the certificate from the DNS record with the CA key. That should be at least as secure as domain validation with email, and a lot easier to do. Then you could put that cert on your server and use it for all the clients that don't support DNSSEC, and relegate DNSSEC and all its problems to just providing strong proof to the CA that it's signing the right certificate. Combine that with certificate pinning and it should pretty well solve the problem, and leave CAs to the job they should have had all along, which is providing extended validation certificates for banks and the like.
- y0ghur7_xxx 12y ago> In theory DNSSEC should replace the CAs for domain validated certificates. DNSSEC still has a central trust anchor that signs the records. Convergence is completely distributed.
- higherpurpose 12y agoYou should create .dns or .bit domains and encourage Iranian users to use DNSchain servers for DNS: https://github.com/okTurtles/dnschain https://github.com/okTurtles/dnschain
- comex 12y agoNot that it's as good a solution as replacing the CA system, but you could try mining one of the cryptocurrencies (not Bitcoin, since it's dominated by ASICs) on a GPU - I guess at significant loss compared to the cost of electricity these days, but allowing you to get a little money without having to deal with financial regulations. And then buy services anonymously through Tor.
- deleted 12y ago[deleted]
- mrb 12y agoFinancial sanctions? Buy a certificate from Namecheap and pay using Bitcoin (yes they officially accept it!) In Iran, you can obtain coins through https://localbitcoins.com/country/IR https://localbitcoins.com/country/IR or http://www.coinava.com/ http://www.coinava.com/ This is a very concrete example demonstrating how Bitcoin is resistant against censorship, sanctions, etc.
- _delirium 12y agoWouldn't Namecheap still refuse the transaction? Afaict, Namecheap is a U.S.-based company, and would be violating the law if they did business with an Iran-based company (regardless of the medium of payment).
- wyager 12y agoIt's worth pointing out that we have viable technical solutions to Zooko's triangle (allowing for secure, decentralized, human-friendly web security). I hope sooner or later, solutions like namecoin are actually widely implemented.
- cm2187 12y agoThe main problem isn't speed, it is the prohibitive cost of certificates and the low adoption rate of SNI (Win XP still isn't compatible).
- pornel 12y agoI'm paying for certificates about as much as for domain names, and it's a small fraction of what I'm paying for hosting. Win XP with non-IE browser supports SNI.
- cm2187 12y agoThat's right. I remember that wikipedia was saying all browsers under XP but I just made a test and chrome is compatible. Still I suspect that most users who are still using XP either don't have a choice of browser (locked down corporate environment) or aren't sophisticated enough to worry about changing browser. And XP usage is still shockingly high. The cheapest wildcard certificate I can find is £99 per annum. No matter the security requirements I just do not believe it costs that much to run this service. I suspect that we have a bit of a cartel there.
- michaelt 12y agoThe cheapest wildcard certificate I can find is £99 per annum. Best I can find is [1] which is $61=£36/year, or [2] which is $42=£25/year but with lots of typos on their web page. [1] https://cheapsslsecurity.com/comodo/positivessl-wildcard.html https://cheapsslsecurity.com/comodo/positivessl-wildcard.htm... [2] https://www.ssl2buy.com/cheap-wildcard-ssl-certificates-ads https://www.ssl2buy.com/cheap-wildcard-ssl-certificates-ads
- gaadd33 12y agoAlphaSSL resellers tend to be even cheaper: http://www.garrisonhost.com/ssl-certificates/alphassl.html http://www.garrisonhost.com/ssl-certificates/alphassl.html $45/year (£26.42/year)
- 12y ago
- d0ugie 12y agoWhat about somehow incorporating QUIC into this? Could that possibly cut down on a round trip or two here? Seems there is a lot of promise to that protocol, but not much news about it.
- AlyssaRowan 12y agoResults are currently mixed: ask Google. More work needed on UDP flow-control versus state-of-the-art TCP, and it seems to suffer badly on some ISPs without any clear clue why (probably anti-P2P throttling, is my guess?). Might end up influencing a future DTLS, but there's no roadmap that far ahead and the WG isn't chartered to discuss overhauls or big changes, according to the chairs: if we need a TLS 2.0, we're probably going to need a tls-ng Working Group with a more open-ended remit. We're doing our best to get rid of the worst baggage from TLS 1.3: only forward-secure ciphersuites using AEADs (AES-GCM, ChaCha20-Poly1305 which is in CFRG consensus call now, etc), a... lively discussion about renegotiation, client authentication, key rollovers and plain DHE given the "triple handshake" vuln... a better PRF and handshake, maybe (Triple-DH?)? Still in progress. It's mostly going to be a big tidy-up I reckon, much like LibReSSL is for OpenSSL! Curve25519 for ECDHE has a draft and is being discussed right now. I'm ready to implement and looking forward to it - big speed boost! PKIX lags behind, however, and is one of the more dangerous parts to implement (ASN.1 and friends). Certificate handling is a real bitch to get perfect, and there's a lot of inertia: Ed25519 would be wonderful, but even ECDSA certs are rare as hen's teeth right now (not that I'm a fan of ECDSA as it's a nightmare to get right - see recent BoringSSL patches). A wholesale replacement is unfortunately way out of scope: too much baggage.
- youngtaff 12y agoThere are some lessons from QUIC that are being incorporated into TLS e.g. it was proved that one round trip could be removed (will see if I can find the actual detail)
- thegeomaster 12y agoI'm currently writing a server-client secure architecture, an alternative to using HTTPS APIs that should work particularly well with mobile apps. You acquire apps from a store (a trustworthy source) so you can assume that data hasn't been tampered with. Hence you can include with the app files a server certificate and a fallback certificate, and you can use that to securely authenticate with the server. I'm trying to keep the overhead far lower than TLS (currently, for session resumption only ~210 bytes need to be exchanged for a functional connection), and alleviate the financial burden of TLS certificates (you pay the cost of secure delivery to the store, anyway). RESTful APIs should be pretty straightforward to translate to this model. Apps today use HTTPS for secure calls to the API, and I think it's highly unnecessary to have the overhead of certificate presentation, cipher negotiation, and even the HTTP header for what is often as few as 40 bytes of request/response data. Currently the server seems to perform extraordinarily well: I'm running a PHP backend and have a request-response model, like HTTP does, and I'm working on optimizing it to the levels of lighttpd, because I know it's possible. My point is that a reasonably secure specialized protocol can be made more efficient than TLS, especially when you know what you are always connecting to.
- jacquesm 12y agoAre you going to open the source on this?
- thegeomaster 12y agoYes, sure, I'm thinking a BSD-like license. I'm using libuv for the event loop and sockets on the server and OpenSSL for cryptography. So far (besides the server and client running on Linux) I have a proof-of-concept client app for Android, but as soon as I get my hands on an iPhone or Windows Phone device, those ports will be done, too.
- e12e 12y agoAre you aware of: http://curvezmq.org/ http://curvezmq.org/ ?
- danepowell 12y agoI don't think the biggest hurdle with TLS adoption is performance- it's the added complexity of integration with load balancers, reverse proxies, mixing of HTTP/HTTPS content, having to manage certificate passwords and enter them whenever you (re)start a web frontend, etc...
- Someone1234 12y ago> manage certificate passwords and enter them whenever you (re)start a web frontend People do this? First I've ever heard of it. In fact most of the software I've ever used doesn't even support PKI passwords and instead will just tell you the certificate store is corrupted.
- porpoisemonkey 12y agoI think by "certificate passwords" the poster was referring to the private key associated with the TLS certificate and not the certificate itself.
- jwarkentin 12y ago> mixing of HTTP/HTTPS content This is ALWAYS a bad idea. A few points: - The only purpose of HTTPS and encrypting communications in general is to prevent MITM attacks. - If your server is even willing to serve unencrypted requests it exposes your users to sslstrip attacks (http://www.thoughtcrime.org/software/sslstrip/ http://www.thoughtcrime.org/software/sslstrip/). In reality you still should serve HTTP requests but only to force a redirect to HTTPS. In addition you should use the 'Strict-Transport-Security' header. It's the ONLY way to prevent future sslstrip attacks. - Even worse, if you don't set the 'secure' flag on session cookies at a minimum (thus forcing logged in users to HTTPS only) you expose your users to session hijacking without even putting up a fight. - If you aren't going to bother with forcing HTTPS all the time then there's not much point as you've opened up your users to simple sslstrip attacks followed by session hijacking or even worse, script injection or redirects. One fundamental concept many people seem to forget as well is that the dangers of not encrypting communications extends beyond snooping. Attackers can actually modify the data stream to inject and/or replace content or even redirect users entirely. Also, even if you only serve secure content yourself but you include insecure content on your page it exposes security vulnerabilities. Let's say you include unencrypted images on your site and you have users that are using a client with an image rendering engine vulnerability that allows remote code execution (this has happened in about every browser). All a MITM has to do is replace the requested image with different content that exploits the vulnerability. Now imagine if you included unencrypted JavaScript that actually does execute on your site (like from a CDN). The possibilities are endless.
- higherpurpose 12y agoCan We Replace TLS Yet?
- Someone1234 12y agoSure! With what?
- higherpurpose 12y agoNoise or MinimaLT. Noise is mostly concept right now, though, but MinimaLT implementation is coming later this year: https://github.com/trevp/noise/wiki/Noise-properties-and-protocol-comparisons https://github.com/trevp/noise/wiki/Noise-properties-and-pro... http://cr.yp.to/tcpip/minimalt-20130522.pdf http://cr.yp.to/tcpip/minimalt-20130522.pdf CurveCP also already exists. And there's this, too: http://tcpcrypt.org/ http://tcpcrypt.org/
- castorio 12y agowhat do you mean by "Fast"? from what i've learned with webservers it depends on implementation: cipher-suites, keep-alive, session-ticket-reusage etc. this pic shows the perfomance for a webserver w/ different cipher-suites: https://8ack.de/static/bimages/ssl_perftest_r1.jpg https://8ack.de/static/bimages/ssl_perftest_r1.jpg speaking of webservers, if you use the usual performance-tweaks you wouldnt see a big performance-drawback from userperspective (YMMV)
- cnst 12y agoNot fast enough yet: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hoffman-httpbis-minimal-unauth-enc-01 http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hoffman-httpbis-minimal-una... http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-nottingham-http2-encryption-03 http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-nottingham-http2-encryption... http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7258 http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7258 So, it turns out, someone IS finally seriously working on opportunistic encryption for HTTP like STARTTLS is to SMTP! Looking very forward to when it'll hit the streets!