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How to Swiftly Destroy a $370 Million Dollar Rocket with Overflow "Protection"
- dalke 12y agoI don't think the author has read the Ariane crash report, which says: > Although the source of the Operand Error has been identified, this in itself did not cause the mission to fail. The specification of the exception-handling mechanism also contributed to the failure. In the event of any kind of exception, the system specification stated that: the failure should be indicated on the databus, the failure context should be stored in an EEPROM memory (which was recovered and read out for Ariane 501), and finally, the SRI processor should be shut down. > It was the decision to cease the processor operation which finally proved fatal. Restart is not feasible since attitude is too difficult to re-calculate after a processor shutdown; therefore the Inertial Reference System becomes useless. The reason behind this drastic action lies in the culture within the Ariane programme of only addressing random hardware failures. From this point of view exception - or error - handling mechanisms are designed for a random hardware failure which can quite rationally be handled by a backup system. > ... An underlying theme in the development of Ariane 5 is the bias towards the mitigation of random failure. The supplier of the SRI was only following the specification given to it, which stipulated that in the event of any detected exception the processor was to be stopped. The exception which occurred was not due to random failure but a design error. The exception was detected, but inappropriately handled because the view had been taken that software should be considered correct until it is shown to be at fault. The Board has reason to believe that this view is also accepted in other areas of Ariane 5 software design. The Board is in favour of the opposite view, that software should be assumed to be faulty until applying the currently accepted best practice methods can demonstrate that it is correct. There were also questions about why the code was even still in operation. The functionality was useful under Ariane 4 but not Ariane 5, the code "serves no purpose" after launch, analysis was done to check some variables for overflow but not all variables, and the component's functional requirements weren't updated to reflect the new launch trajectory data. To say it's only because of an exception during type conversion ignores the whole, very important context, which says that the exception wasn't the real problem.
- mpweiher 12y agoYes, the author did read the report, did the esteemed critic? "It was the decision to cease the processor operation which finally proved fatal." Which is exactly what the author argues against: don't terminate the process on integer overflow.
- zvrba 12y agoDon't terminate a mission-critical process. Garden variety software: yes, PLEASE, DO kill it. You don't seem to realize that many of SW practices that are adequate for "normal" software, are NOT applicable to mission-critical, fault-tolerant scenarios.
- mpweiher 12y agoWhat's mission critical depends on the mission, it's not the language's job to decide what is or is not mission critical. Please tell me why killing my spreadsheet program is OK because the cat walked on the keyboard.
- pohl 12y agoIf it's the case that your spreadsheet program can tolerate overflow on addition, shouldn't that program be using the &+ operator instead of the + operator? If, instead, detecting and responding to the overflow is what you want, then someone has already filed a rdar on that and Chris Lattner has replied saying: "It would be straight-forward for us to provide arithmetic functions that return the result as an optional (i.e., nil on overflow). We'll take a look, thanks for filing a bug!" https://devforums.apple.com/thread/232791 https://devforums.apple.com/thread/232791
- mpweiher 12y agoSorry, I'd rather have a language with sensible defaults. In this case, the sensible solution would be to have a proper Numeric tower like, for example, Smalltalk, where such overflows simply don't matter. The default "Int" type should be part of that system. You can then add Int32/Int64 or maybe IntNative to get to the built-in processor types, which then have built-in processor behavior, and possibly arithmetic overflow traps as an extension. The current defaults are just nuts, IMHO.
- zvrba 12y agoThe author argues against crashing on integer overflow by drawing an example from a totally different domain for which Swift is not at all intended. Integer overflow has been a source of numerous exploits, and I'd prefer the software on my desktop machine / phone / tablet to crash instead of giving unlimited access to the intruder. The story changes radically if we start talking about mission critical systems, like car control.
- mpweiher 12y agoLooking at https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Integer_overflow https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Integer_overflow the consequences of integer overflow by itself either crashes/infinite loops. Crashing on overflow is not an improvement in these cases. To get into exploitable access, you need buffer overflows, which can and should be protected against separately. Once you protect against buffer overflows, crashing on integer overflows gets you exactly nothing. (Might be OK as an optional, assert-like debugging tool).
- zvrba 12y ago> To get into exploitable access, you need buffer overflows, which can and should be protected against separately. Or you can use overflow to make the program to allocate too small buffer thus obtaining the buffer overflow you need to proceed further.
- mpweiher 12y agoYou're not making any sense: I already wrote "protect against buffer overflow instead of integer overflow" and your response is "buffer overflow".
- zvrba 12y agoInteger overflow can be a causal cause of buffer overflow. Like this for example: read(fd, &header, sizeof(header)); int total_len = header.data_len + header.code_len; char *data = malloc(total_len); read(fd, data, total_len); Now, the attacker crafts the file and.. there's your buffer overflow which is a direct consequence of undetected integer overflow [i.e., the program being allowed to proceed].
- deliminator 12y agoOverflow protection is fail-fast behaviour, similar to array bounds checking. It allows you to more quickly find the source of errors. I believe everybody agrees it's a good thing, at least in the array bounds checking case. > Optimization flags in general should not change visible program behavior, except for performance. The only behavior you would be able to observe before, that you wouldn't after disabling overflow behaviour, is a crash, and you would have fixed that anyway as soon as you observed it. Of course, if there is $370 Million on the line, maybe just disable it and hope for the best :-)