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>Fooling people into mistaking a submarine for a whale doesn't show that submarines really swim Why not? Presumably part of the act of fooling would involve 's

>Fooling people into mistaking a submarine for a whale doesn't show that submarines really swim Why not? Presumably part of the act of fooling would involve 'swimming' submarines. I think passing a __strong__ Turing test actually does say something about our brains, cognition, and consciousness. And by a 'strong Turing test', I don't mean dinky 5 minute tests with a "Ukrainian boy". Imagine you carry on a 20 year relationship with a computer pen-pal, having in-depth discussions about every-day things from movies, to music, to sports to family and relationships. Imagine such a computer program fooling every human it interacts with for decades at a time, I think that would say something about ourselves and I think it would render the question of consciousness meaningless. If it quacks like a duck, looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and you can't tell the difference between it and a duck, it's a duck. Another problem is that philosophers and even regular people tend to relish in ambiguity when it comes to certain ideas and concepts, even trying to elevate them to supernatural levels. Things like free will, love, or consciousness are apparently outside of the natural world, and not subject to natural laws. I think that's wrong. I think the answer is much simpler and much more humbling than we are willing to admit.

usumoio 12y ago
I agree. The only proof you have that I am a conscience being is that you believe that to be so because I conduct myself as one. You can't really prove that I am or am not conscience. You can only observe that I act like a conscience being.
ambler0 12y ago
I think we agree. And I think Turing's point in choosing a conversation as the test was to pick something that would indicate the vast range of human experience. If a computer could pass a strong version of the test as you describe, then I would agree that we would have say, as you do, "if it looks like a duck, .... then it is a duck." But I don't agree that it renders the concept of conciousness meaningless (or at least any more meangingless, depending on what you think about the concept now). On the contrary, I think we might have to say, "this computer is probably concious", and afford it all of the rights that we do for humans. BTW I don't think either Turing or Chomsky would say that >Things like free will, love, or consciousness are apparently outside of the natural world I obviously don't speak for either of them, but I'm pretty sure they both subscribe to the theory of causal determinism and computational theory of mind.
- TheCraiggers 12y ago
  I'm not so sure that just because you can fool me that an object is a duck, that it is a duck. At least when applied to general AI. Nor do I necessarily agree that just because I can have a conversation with an algorithm, that we should give that algorithm all the rights given to humans. For example, if I say mean things to that algorithm, even one that can fool me into thinking it's another human for decades, is that morally wrong? Even if it's just setting some variable in memory to sad=true? If so, is it morally wrong for me to create a program consisting only of a singular red button, that when pushed, sets the sad flag? There was another "game" created a couple years ago that featured a fictional human (a little girl, if memory serves) on life support. They programmed it so that unless somebody in the world clicked a button in their browser, the girl would die within 10 seconds and the game would basically delete itself, ending forever. (The response was so strong that people flooded the server, and I believe their hosting provider blocked access to their site, thereby killing the program untimely.) If the little girl was removed, and the goal was to just keep the program running as long as possible on life support, would that be morally wrong? I ask these questions because I don't think a even a complex script which is doing nothing more than attempting to fool me should be considered worth assigning rights to, even if it's really good at it. To be honest, I'm not entirely sure how to define consciousness in this regard, but I suspect it would require surprising its creators to the point that they cannot fathom how it behaved the way it did. Or maybe I'm confusing consciousness with free will. Either way, if the only thing separating a program that deserves human-level rights from those that don't is some combination of power (enough to scan all the valid responses and deliver the best one) and a wide array of responses linked to conversations, then I'd argue that all programs deserve the same basic human rights.
  - crusso 12y ago
    is it morally wrong for me to create a program consisting only of a singular red button, that when pushed, sets the sad flag? We could discover tomorrow that there's a "sad ganglia" in the human brain that can be set on or off with an electromagnetic field. Does that mean that humans are ultimately biological machines without rights?
ddt 12y ago
My big takeaway from the Chomsky quote is that it's useless to ask if computers can think because one of the fundamental properties we associate with thinking is some biological/spiritual aspect. For a computer to "think", we'd need to redefine what we mean by think. And if we have to redefine what it means to think, why bother hailing it as an accomplishment to make a computer "think". The properties are incredibly important to our understanding of the world. The fact that we have different words for "think", "compute", and "calculate" gives some insight into the value we assign to the distinction as a culture. If those differentiations didn't exist, the problem of simulating cognition wouldn't change. What would change is our perception of the problem. If thinking, calculation, and computation all share the same word, it becomes a question of degrees of "thinking" rather than substantially different processes. I don't think Chomsky is trying to elevate certain things outside of the laws of nature. He's describing how what we choose to differentiate changes our fundamental perceptions of those things. Submarines could "swim". They could also "read", but those words have a very specific set of properties associated with them.
- sampo 12y ago
  > we associate with thinking is some biological/spiritual aspect Well I don't. > The fact that we have different words for "think", "compute", and "calculate" Also my native language (Finnish) doesn't have separate words for "compute" and calculate". Both are covered by "laskea". (Also "suorittaa" is used, but that is "execute".)
  - SoftwareMaven 12y ago
    But you do have a different word for "think", right? Google Translate shows multiple, but these three seem most applicable: ajatella: propose, consider, think about, weigh, cogitate, think miettiä: think about, think, consider, reflect, contemplate, ponder luulla: think, believe, suppose, imagine, expect, suspect The difference between "think" and "compute" is the important distinction being made, and I tend to agree that moving the goal posts does nothing to help decide whether a computer is really capable of thought.
    - 12y ago
pizza234 12y ago
There are a few problems with this line of reasoning. First, that there is an implicit assumption about how cognition and consciousness are defined, but there is no real definition. Following the example, it's not defined what a duck is, and "philosophers" actually don't try to elevate the question - they try to find answers to it. While a "strong" test for example would look appealing, the problem is that there is no real model of weakness/strenght, and while a human would pass all the possible models of humanity, a computer would surely pass only the ones it's programmed for. Another thing is that in order for a computer to truly mimic a human, that is, to fool people for 20 years about movies/music/sports/family/relationships, but also other abstract experiences, the computer would need to experience them, and especially, elaborate them in a human way. Which is again, very "open", and it's the core problem. Even excluding the openness problem, the Turing test in the way it's posed, looks to me as the photorealism problem. You can achieve it in a static picture, but once you freely move in a 3D world, you see the flaws that show that what you're experiencing in reality is a limited set of limited algorithms, which are used to workaround hard problems (workaround is the key). I think exactly the same arguments stand, that is, in order to mimic a human in such a high level of faithfulness, very hard problems would need to be solved, not just worked around.
- wlievens 12y ago
  The very hard problems you are referring to are called Strong AI. If your argument is that passing a proper Turing Test requires Strong AI, then, well, duh?
- macspoofing 12y ago
  >First, that there is an implicit assumption about how cognition and consciousness are defined, but there is no real definition. And yet volumes are written on the topic, and you have no trouble dismissing this particular approach as not really answering "consciousness". Well what do you mean exactly then? >and while a human would pass all the possible models of humanity, a computer would surely pass only the ones it's programmed for. I don't agree with either the first nor the second assumption a priori. Would a schizophrenic, or autistic or infant brain pass "all the possible models of humanity". And second, why would a computer pass only the models it was programmed for?! We know that isn't true with today's software and today's AI. IBM's Watson wasn't programmed with every single fact it used to win Jeopardy, nor is any rudimentary video game AI programmed with a specific set of behaviors that it executes regardless of player actions. If you want to go deeper, I can also claim the human brain itself was shaped by natural selection for a finite and very specific set of tasks, and the neural machinery is as deterministic as software since both are subject to the fundamental laws. So tell me why can't software simulate human behaviour again? >Another thing is that in order for a computer to truly mimic a human, that is, to fool people for 20 years about movies/music/sports/family/relationships, but also other abstract experiences, the computer would need to experience them No necessarily. It can lie. Or it can live them by ingesting huge amounts of information from digital content, or maybe it was trained in a lab or adopted by a family and raised like a human. Whatever. > and especially, elaborate them in a human way. Define "human way", because that's the entire point. I don't see intrinsically why such a computer program could not be built. What's so special about the "human way". >You can achieve it in a static picture, but once you freely move in a 3D world, you see the flaws that show that what you're experiencing in reality is a limited set of limited algorithms, which are used to workaround hard problems And you base this on what? I mean you're just asserting it can't be done, why? Because human brains are powered by magic!? >I think exactly the same arguments stand, that is, in order to mimic a human in such a high level of faithfulness, very hard problems would need to be solved, not just worked around. I'm not sure what the difference is between solving problems and merely working around them, in your context. But yes, we're not there yet, obviously. I think the Turing test is actually deeper than most people give it credit to be. And you illustrate this perfectly. All your objections are hand-wavy appeals to some vague notions of the "human way".
Paradigma11 12y ago
I would guess that most contemporary philosophers do not fall into this traps but naturally they get no attention. Why? Journalists/ Interested parties ask philosopher about the mind/body problem, the matter of truth, god.... and if 9 out 10 answer that there is no real problem just misconceptions then the journalist will go to the 10th one who will get air time.
md224 12y ago
> Imagine such a computer program fooling every human it interacts with for decades at a time, I think that would say something about ourselves and I think it would render the question of consciousness meaningless. Maybe we're operating with different notions of "the question of consciousness", but I have to disagree that a perfect simulation of a human mind would dissolve the problem. And by "the problem" I mean the Hard Problem of Consciousness, the issue of how the hell the subjective experience of being arises in a lump of bloody meat (or in anything, really). I suppose my question to you is this: do you believe there is something it is like to BE that simulation, to have a first-person subjective experience from the perspective of the computer? I agree with you that elevating certain aspects of reality to "supernatural" status is unhelpful; it's the equivalent of saying "sorry scientists, but this stuff is out of bounds." (I'm also not convinced that dividing reality into natural and supernatural is even a coherent distinction, but that's another discussion.) However, I have to take issue with your suggestion that the answer to consciousness is "much simpler... than we are willing to admit." It may turn out that a future science will come up with a very satisfying answer to the Hard Problem of Consciousness, but I suspect that this will require a paradigm shift so radical that it will make current neuroscience look like phlogiston theory.
- seiji 12y ago
  to have a first-person subjective experience You actually can't prove _anybody else in the world_ besides you has a first person subjective experience. Trying to prove a magic talking box has experience when you can't prove another moist robot has experience is moving the goalpost too far out. require a paradigm shift so radical Not really, we just need more high speed training data. It'll all be available to way too many people, governments, and companies within the next few years.
  - md224 12y ago
    > Trying to prove a magic talking box has experience when you can't prove another moist robot has experience is moving the goalpost too far out. Maybe I'm just confused about what goals we're talking about. If your goal is to understand cognition, then sure; a highly intelligent machine is a great way to do that. However, the comment I replied to was suggesting that strong AI would "render the question of consciousness meaningless"; that's a far stronger claim, and in my opinion, unrealistic. I think you and I are actually in agreement on this one... if anything, I was arguing against A.I. having the goalpost of understanding subjective experience.
mtdewcmu 12y ago
>>If it quacks like a duck, looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and you can't tell the difference between it and a duck, it's a duck. If, later, you discover evidence contrary to it having been a duck, can you revise your belief? Or was your having been convinced of its duck-ness sufficient to make it a duck?
pbhjpbhj 12y ago
>If it quacks like a duck, looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and you can't tell the difference between it and a duck, it's a duck. // Just because you can't tell that something is false, or perhaps just can't elucidate the reason, doesn't make it true.

usumoio 12y ago

I agree. The only proof you have that I am a conscience being is that you believe that to be so because I conduct myself as one. You can't really prove that I am or am not conscience. You can only observe that I act like a conscience being.

ambler0 12y ago

I think we agree. And I think Turing's point in choosing a conversation as the test was to pick something that would indicate the vast range of human experience. If a computer could pass a strong version of the test as you describe, then I would agree that we would have say, as you do, "if it looks like a duck, .... then it is a duck." But I don't agree that it renders the concept of conciousness meaningless (or at least any more meangingless, depending on what you think about the concept now). On the contrary, I think we might have to say, "this computer is probably concious", and afford it all of the rights that we do for humans. BTW I don't think either Turing or Chomsky would say that >Things like free will, love, or consciousness are apparently outside of the natural world I obviously don't speak for either of them, but I'm pretty sure they both subscribe to the theory of causal determinism and computational theory of mind.

TheCraiggers 12y ago
I'm not so sure that just because you can fool me that an object is a duck, that it is a duck. At least when applied to general AI. Nor do I necessarily agree that just because I can have a conversation with an algorithm, that we should give that algorithm all the rights given to humans. For example, if I say mean things to that algorithm, even one that can fool me into thinking it's another human for decades, is that morally wrong? Even if it's just setting some variable in memory to sad=true? If so, is it morally wrong for me to create a program consisting only of a singular red button, that when pushed, sets the sad flag? There was another "game" created a couple years ago that featured a fictional human (a little girl, if memory serves) on life support. They programmed it so that unless somebody in the world clicked a button in their browser, the girl would die within 10 seconds and the game would basically delete itself, ending forever. (The response was so strong that people flooded the server, and I believe their hosting provider blocked access to their site, thereby killing the program untimely.) If the little girl was removed, and the goal was to just keep the program running as long as possible on life support, would that be morally wrong? I ask these questions because I don't think a even a complex script which is doing nothing more than attempting to fool me should be considered worth assigning rights to, even if it's really good at it. To be honest, I'm not entirely sure how to define consciousness in this regard, but I suspect it would require surprising its creators to the point that they cannot fathom how it behaved the way it did. Or maybe I'm confusing consciousness with free will. Either way, if the only thing separating a program that deserves human-level rights from those that don't is some combination of power (enough to scan all the valid responses and deliver the best one) and a wide array of responses linked to conversations, then I'd argue that all programs deserve the same basic human rights.
- crusso 12y ago
  is it morally wrong for me to create a program consisting only of a singular red button, that when pushed, sets the sad flag? We could discover tomorrow that there's a "sad ganglia" in the human brain that can be set on or off with an electromagnetic field. Does that mean that humans are ultimately biological machines without rights?

ddt 12y ago

My big takeaway from the Chomsky quote is that it's useless to ask if computers can think because one of the fundamental properties we associate with thinking is some biological/spiritual aspect. For a computer to "think", we'd need to redefine what we mean by think. And if we have to redefine what it means to think, why bother hailing it as an accomplishment to make a computer "think". The properties are incredibly important to our understanding of the world. The fact that we have different words for "think", "compute", and "calculate" gives some insight into the value we assign to the distinction as a culture. If those differentiations didn't exist, the problem of simulating cognition wouldn't change. What would change is our perception of the problem. If thinking, calculation, and computation all share the same word, it becomes a question of degrees of "thinking" rather than substantially different processes. I don't think Chomsky is trying to elevate certain things outside of the laws of nature. He's describing how what we choose to differentiate changes our fundamental perceptions of those things. Submarines could "swim". They could also "read", but those words have a very specific set of properties associated with them.

sampo 12y ago
> we associate with thinking is some biological/spiritual aspect Well I don't. > The fact that we have different words for "think", "compute", and "calculate" Also my native language (Finnish) doesn't have separate words for "compute" and calculate". Both are covered by "laskea". (Also "suorittaa" is used, but that is "execute".)
- SoftwareMaven 12y ago
  But you do have a different word for "think", right? Google Translate shows multiple, but these three seem most applicable: ajatella: propose, consider, think about, weigh, cogitate, think miettiä: think about, think, consider, reflect, contemplate, ponder luulla: think, believe, suppose, imagine, expect, suspect The difference between "think" and "compute" is the important distinction being made, and I tend to agree that moving the goal posts does nothing to help decide whether a computer is really capable of thought.
  - 12y ago

pizza234 12y ago

There are a few problems with this line of reasoning. First, that there is an implicit assumption about how cognition and consciousness are defined, but there is no real definition. Following the example, it's not defined what a duck is, and "philosophers" actually don't try to elevate the question - they try to find answers to it. While a "strong" test for example would look appealing, the problem is that there is no real model of weakness/strenght, and while a human would pass all the possible models of humanity, a computer would surely pass only the ones it's programmed for. Another thing is that in order for a computer to truly mimic a human, that is, to fool people for 20 years about movies/music/sports/family/relationships, but also other abstract experiences, the computer would need to experience them, and especially, elaborate them in a human way. Which is again, very "open", and it's the core problem. Even excluding the openness problem, the Turing test in the way it's posed, looks to me as the photorealism problem. You can achieve it in a static picture, but once you freely move in a 3D world, you see the flaws that show that what you're experiencing in reality is a limited set of limited algorithms, which are used to workaround hard problems (workaround is the key). I think exactly the same arguments stand, that is, in order to mimic a human in such a high level of faithfulness, very hard problems would need to be solved, not just worked around.

wlievens 12y ago
The very hard problems you are referring to are called Strong AI. If your argument is that passing a proper Turing Test requires Strong AI, then, well, duh?
macspoofing 12y ago
>First, that there is an implicit assumption about how cognition and consciousness are defined, but there is no real definition. And yet volumes are written on the topic, and you have no trouble dismissing this particular approach as not really answering "consciousness". Well what do you mean exactly then? >and while a human would pass all the possible models of humanity, a computer would surely pass only the ones it's programmed for. I don't agree with either the first nor the second assumption a priori. Would a schizophrenic, or autistic or infant brain pass "all the possible models of humanity". And second, why would a computer pass only the models it was programmed for?! We know that isn't true with today's software and today's AI. IBM's Watson wasn't programmed with every single fact it used to win Jeopardy, nor is any rudimentary video game AI programmed with a specific set of behaviors that it executes regardless of player actions. If you want to go deeper, I can also claim the human brain itself was shaped by natural selection for a finite and very specific set of tasks, and the neural machinery is as deterministic as software since both are subject to the fundamental laws. So tell me why can't software simulate human behaviour again? >Another thing is that in order for a computer to truly mimic a human, that is, to fool people for 20 years about movies/music/sports/family/relationships, but also other abstract experiences, the computer would need to experience them No necessarily. It can lie. Or it can live them by ingesting huge amounts of information from digital content, or maybe it was trained in a lab or adopted by a family and raised like a human. Whatever. > and especially, elaborate them in a human way. Define "human way", because that's the entire point. I don't see intrinsically why such a computer program could not be built. What's so special about the "human way". >You can achieve it in a static picture, but once you freely move in a 3D world, you see the flaws that show that what you're experiencing in reality is a limited set of limited algorithms, which are used to workaround hard problems And you base this on what? I mean you're just asserting it can't be done, why? Because human brains are powered by magic!? >I think exactly the same arguments stand, that is, in order to mimic a human in such a high level of faithfulness, very hard problems would need to be solved, not just worked around. I'm not sure what the difference is between solving problems and merely working around them, in your context. But yes, we're not there yet, obviously. I think the Turing test is actually deeper than most people give it credit to be. And you illustrate this perfectly. All your objections are hand-wavy appeals to some vague notions of the "human way".

Paradigma11 12y ago

I would guess that most contemporary philosophers do not fall into this traps but naturally they get no attention. Why? Journalists/ Interested parties ask philosopher about the mind/body problem, the matter of truth, god.... and if 9 out 10 answer that there is no real problem just misconceptions then the journalist will go to the 10th one who will get air time.

md224 12y ago

> Imagine such a computer program fooling every human it interacts with for decades at a time, I think that would say something about ourselves and I think it would render the question of consciousness meaningless. Maybe we're operating with different notions of "the question of consciousness", but I have to disagree that a perfect simulation of a human mind would dissolve the problem. And by "the problem" I mean the Hard Problem of Consciousness, the issue of how the hell the subjective experience of being arises in a lump of bloody meat (or in anything, really). I suppose my question to you is this: do you believe there is something it is like to BE that simulation, to have a first-person subjective experience from the perspective of the computer? I agree with you that elevating certain aspects of reality to "supernatural" status is unhelpful; it's the equivalent of saying "sorry scientists, but this stuff is out of bounds." (I'm also not convinced that dividing reality into natural and supernatural is even a coherent distinction, but that's another discussion.) However, I have to take issue with your suggestion that the answer to consciousness is "much simpler... than we are willing to admit." It may turn out that a future science will come up with a very satisfying answer to the Hard Problem of Consciousness, but I suspect that this will require a paradigm shift so radical that it will make current neuroscience look like phlogiston theory.

seiji 12y ago
to have a first-person subjective experience You actually can't prove _anybody else in the world_ besides you has a first person subjective experience. Trying to prove a magic talking box has experience when you can't prove another moist robot has experience is moving the goalpost too far out. require a paradigm shift so radical Not really, we just need more high speed training data. It'll all be available to way too many people, governments, and companies within the next few years.
- md224 12y ago
  > Trying to prove a magic talking box has experience when you can't prove another moist robot has experience is moving the goalpost too far out. Maybe I'm just confused about what goals we're talking about. If your goal is to understand cognition, then sure; a highly intelligent machine is a great way to do that. However, the comment I replied to was suggesting that strong AI would "render the question of consciousness meaningless"; that's a far stronger claim, and in my opinion, unrealistic. I think you and I are actually in agreement on this one... if anything, I was arguing against A.I. having the goalpost of understanding subjective experience.

mtdewcmu 12y ago

>>If it quacks like a duck, looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and you can't tell the difference between it and a duck, it's a duck. If, later, you discover evidence contrary to it having been a duck, can you revise your belief? Or was your having been convinced of its duck-ness sufficient to make it a duck?

pbhjpbhj 12y ago

>If it quacks like a duck, looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and you can't tell the difference between it and a duck, it's a duck. // Just because you can't tell that something is false, or perhaps just can't elucidate the reason, doesn't make it true.