3 ms·

Even worse, from what I've observed, such networks are often not secure even against a trivial ARP spoof attack, so anyone connecting to the coffee shop Wi-Fi c

Even worse, from what I've observed, such networks are often not secure even against a trivial ARP spoof attack, so anyone connecting to the coffee shop Wi-Fi could mount this attack.

e12e 12y ago
Is there any reasonable way to make them secure against ARP spoofing? As I understand it, it would require individual login from all clients (some form of 802.1x)? And even if you do protect against ARP spoofing via 802.1x -- you would still need some kind of shared secret/certificate scheme to avoid a fake access point? As anyone sitting next to you is likely to be able to provide a stronger signal than the hotspot... Reminds me that I had an idea to wrap up some kind of hot-spot with an easy to use internet cafe style time-limited access software distribution and offer up to local businesses... I suppose these days providing a screen for qr-code sharing of details would be a viable option...
- apendleton 12y ago
  To make them immune to the ARP spoofing in the general case is hard, but as I understand it, to make them immune to the specific case of clients other than the gateway impersonating the gateway (which is what people want to do for most MitM) is pretty straightforward. The access point is probably itself the gateway most of the time, so it knows the gateway's MAC (its own), and it can reliably refuse to forward ARP packets for other MACs claiming to be the gateway.
  - e12e 12y ago
    > it can reliably refuse to forward ARP packets for other MACs claiming to be the gateway. I thought most wireless lans acted as an (shared medium) ethernet, that is, they allow clients to send packets directly client to client? That is, I thought [ed:naughty]-client could just broadcast ARP packets directly to the clients? Or does perhaps (ethernet) broadcast traffic go through the gateway? None of this helps with a rouge AP, of course -- so it might be a bit academic.
    - apendleton 12y ago
      In infrastructure mode, all WiFi traffic goes through the access point. Whether or not, from a configuration perspective, the access point lets you meddle with traffic that passes through it is a separate question, but I don't think there's anything wireless-protocol-wise that precludes it.
      - thegeomaster 12y ago
        Just to add—in open networks masquerading as the AP is possible so long as you can reach the hosts with your Tx. This is mitigated with encryption, however, as I understand the WPA2 standard, I suppose you could send out a broadcast ARP response packet encrypted using the Group Transient Key pretending to be the AP. However, probably all sane clients would discard ARP responses that were broadcast, as normally, ARP responses should always be unicast to the requesting client. Edit: Looks like I was spot-on! This is a real vulnerability, and is called Hole 196: http://www.airtightnetworks.com/wpa2-hole196 http://www.airtightnetworks.com/wpa2-hole196.
      - MichaelGG 12y ago
        How does a client actually authenticate a packet coming from the AP versus something else? The only info is a preshared key so it doesn't seem possible to have any true security there.
        e12e 12y ago
        I believe the AP has separate session keys per client (the shared secret is used for authenticating with the AP and setting up a session -- and yes, I guess that means if you know the shared secret the client expects you to use (eg: a note in a cafe) you can probably impersonate the AP at the point of client association) -- but the group key is special. But as demonstrated up-thread I clearly need to refresh my knowledge of 802.11*...
        thegeomaster 12y ago
        The PSK is used to derive pairwise keys between each station and the AP. However, if the attacker knows the PSK, it's theoretically impossible sufficiently advanced attacks. That's why enterprise networks use RADIUS for enhanced security.
- deleted 12y ago
  [deleted]
- thegeomaster 12y ago
  With Wi-Fi, the AP knows the physical addresses of its connected clients because it needs them in order to maintain 802.11 state. A solution would be to keep a MAC-IP mapping table and then refuse to deliver any ARP packets with erroneous IPs, but keeping these mappings can be tricky because of the limited memory, and I imagine one can do something like a MAC flood. The best protection is if the clients themselves are secure, and I know some Windows antiviruses block ARP spoofing attack. MikroTik RouterOS logs you out (blocking your Internet access) forcefully when you attempt an ARP spoof with forwarding, but oops: even when logged out, you can do it and see others' outbound packets, you just can't forward them via the same interface. Our networks are broken. Hosts trust each other, but they shouldn't--this is not ARPAnet anymore. Everything shoild be encrypted and integrity-protected from bottom-up. I don't like how these stupid LAN attacks are never mentioned but are grossly powerful because of the insecurity by design.

Even worse, from what I've observed, such networks are often not secure even against a trivial ARP spoof attack, so anyone connecting to the coffee shop Wi-Fi could mount this attack.

e12e 12y ago

Is there any reasonable way to make them secure against ARP spoofing? As I understand it, it would require individual login from all clients (some form of 802.1x)? And even if you do protect against ARP spoofing via 802.1x -- you would still need some kind of shared secret/certificate scheme to avoid a fake access point? As anyone sitting next to you is likely to be able to provide a stronger signal than the hotspot... Reminds me that I had an idea to wrap up some kind of hot-spot with an easy to use internet cafe style time-limited access software distribution and offer up to local businesses... I suppose these days providing a screen for qr-code sharing of details would be a viable option...

apendleton 12y ago
To make them immune to the ARP spoofing in the general case is hard, but as I understand it, to make them immune to the specific case of clients other than the gateway impersonating the gateway (which is what people want to do for most MitM) is pretty straightforward. The access point is probably itself the gateway most of the time, so it knows the gateway's MAC (its own), and it can reliably refuse to forward ARP packets for other MACs claiming to be the gateway.
- e12e 12y ago
  > it can reliably refuse to forward ARP packets for other MACs claiming to be the gateway. I thought most wireless lans acted as an (shared medium) ethernet, that is, they allow clients to send packets directly client to client? That is, I thought [ed:naughty]-client could just broadcast ARP packets directly to the clients? Or does perhaps (ethernet) broadcast traffic go through the gateway? None of this helps with a rouge AP, of course -- so it might be a bit academic.
  - apendleton 12y ago
    In infrastructure mode, all WiFi traffic goes through the access point. Whether or not, from a configuration perspective, the access point lets you meddle with traffic that passes through it is a separate question, but I don't think there's anything wireless-protocol-wise that precludes it.
    - thegeomaster 12y ago
      Just to add—in open networks masquerading as the AP is possible so long as you can reach the hosts with your Tx. This is mitigated with encryption, however, as I understand the WPA2 standard, I suppose you could send out a broadcast ARP response packet encrypted using the Group Transient Key pretending to be the AP. However, probably all sane clients would discard ARP responses that were broadcast, as normally, ARP responses should always be unicast to the requesting client. Edit: Looks like I was spot-on! This is a real vulnerability, and is called Hole 196: http://www.airtightnetworks.com/wpa2-hole196 http://www.airtightnetworks.com/wpa2-hole196.
    - MichaelGG 12y ago
      How does a client actually authenticate a packet coming from the AP versus something else? The only info is a preshared key so it doesn't seem possible to have any true security there.
      - e12e 12y ago
        I believe the AP has separate session keys per client (the shared secret is used for authenticating with the AP and setting up a session -- and yes, I guess that means if you know the shared secret the client expects you to use (eg: a note in a cafe) you can probably impersonate the AP at the point of client association) -- but the group key is special. But as demonstrated up-thread I clearly need to refresh my knowledge of 802.11*...
      - thegeomaster 12y ago
        The PSK is used to derive pairwise keys between each station and the AP. However, if the attacker knows the PSK, it's theoretically impossible sufficiently advanced attacks. That's why enterprise networks use RADIUS for enhanced security.
deleted 12y ago
[deleted]
thegeomaster 12y ago
With Wi-Fi, the AP knows the physical addresses of its connected clients because it needs them in order to maintain 802.11 state. A solution would be to keep a MAC-IP mapping table and then refuse to deliver any ARP packets with erroneous IPs, but keeping these mappings can be tricky because of the limited memory, and I imagine one can do something like a MAC flood. The best protection is if the clients themselves are secure, and I know some Windows antiviruses block ARP spoofing attack. MikroTik RouterOS logs you out (blocking your Internet access) forcefully when you attempt an ARP spoof with forwarding, but oops: even when logged out, you can do it and see others' outbound packets, you just can't forward them via the same interface. Our networks are broken. Hosts trust each other, but they shouldn't--this is not ARPAnet anymore. Everything shoild be encrypted and integrity-protected from bottom-up. I don't like how these stupid LAN attacks are never mentioned but are grossly powerful because of the insecurity by design.