6 ms·

Well - this comes as a pretty big surprise. Is this real? Is there a known vulnerability that catalyzed this? Money from Microsoft? Threats? I'm not buying in

Well - this comes as a pretty big surprise. Is this real? Is there a known vulnerability that catalyzed this? Money from Microsoft? Threats? I'm not buying into conspiracy theories, but it does seem pretty out of place.

pearjuice 12y ago
The binaries are properly GPG-signed with the same key as the previous binaries, check for yourself. [They] either compromised their private key too or the actual developer(s) did this. Be it voluntarily or by force of secret three-character agencies / a massive pay check.
- this_user 12y ago
  Maybe something like the Lavabit scenario where they rather close the shop than sell their users out. On the other hand, proposing Bitlocker as an alternative would be rather suspect in that case.
  - unsignedint 12y ago
    Well, the thing is though, it's not that they were hosting users' data. It's not like they would be forced to provide the contents of users' communication. I suppose they could be approached by someone to plant backdoor into the software, but I wonder if that can be done without someone noticing it...
    - y4mi 12y ago
      considering heartbleed... yes
    - iondream 12y ago
      Yeah it could be a gag order from a secret court. maybe they folded because they were forced to compromise the code...
    - marcosdumay 12y ago
      If they put a backdor on the binaries, but not source, lots of people will be compromissed, and for a really long time nobody may notice. EDIT: I normaly don't care. But this time I'd be glad if who downmoded this post explained why.
  - mikelat 12y ago
    IF THIS IS THE CASE and that's an IF then it seriously brings into suspect backdoors in larger proprietary software. Because really if they're going after trucrypt then they have to already have gone after the big players. I'm not going to jump the gun just yet but after snowden it's not out of the question.
    - grrowl 12y ago
      Not "backdoors" but it seems Microsoft stores the BitLocker decryption key, based on this leaked slide (just found on twitter): https://twitter.com/TheBlogPirate/status/471759810644283392/photo/1 https://twitter.com/TheBlogPirate/status/471759810644283392/... edit: Confirmed Microsoft stores your recovery key on their servers if you're not connected to a domain: http://windows.microsoft.com/en-AU/windows-8/bitlocker-recovery-keys-faq http://windows.microsoft.com/en-AU/windows-8/bitlocker-recov...
      - cradle 12y ago
        Microsoft storing your key is opt-in and optional. Whether or not they superstitiously store it anyway is a different question.
- bitJericho 12y ago
  If their site/dns/whatever was compromised than there's no way you can trust the GPG signature at this point. I'll await a proper press release.
- harshreality 12y ago
  If this is a hack, then the truecrypt.org site (or dns) and sourceforge site are both compromised, suggesting a dev got hacked who would have had access to both, and perhaps the TC signing key as well (not everyone practices good signing key hygiene, like keeping it offline, even for important software projects). Even if it's a legit announcement, I wouldn't run that 7.2 binary. Anyone running truecrypt already has truecrypt, right? I don't know why they'd release a new version at the same time as such a dire and panic-inducing announcement.
  - prg318 12y ago
    SourceForge recently forced their users to change their passwords [1] because of an attack on their infrastructure [2]. Pure speculation but I'm not sure if that had anything to do with this? [1] http://sourceforge.net/blog/sourceforge-net-global-password-reset/ http://sourceforge.net/blog/sourceforge-net-global-password-... [2] http://sourceforge.net/blog/sourceforge-net-attack/ http://sourceforge.net/blog/sourceforge-net-attack/
    - A_Non_eMouse 12y ago
      Those two SourceForge blog posts are from January 2011, a year before the release of TrueCrypt 7.1a. The recent forced change was due to infrastructure changes. https://sourceforge.net/blog/forced-password-change/ https://sourceforge.net/blog/forced-password-change/
  - derefr 12y ago
    > Anyone running truecrypt already has truecrypt, right? I frequently reformat my boot volumes—but I've had a .tc file laying around on an external HD since forever, with my websites' X.509 private keys and such inside. I'm probably going to do exactly as this announcement says: download the export-only binary, create a loop-mounted LUKS volume, and migrate everything over.
    - slashdotaccount 12y ago
      Recent versions of cryptsetup support decrypting truecrypt volumes, just use cryptsetup for both.
- eli 12y ago
  A much simpler explanation is someone defaced the site around the same time a new release was coming out. Is there anything in the signed release package to corroborate what the site says?
  - Amezarak 12y ago
    Yes. See the sibling poster's image link. I also installed 7.2 in a VM and received the same warning. It also looks like I can't encrypt anything, just decrypt.
- deleted 12y ago
  [deleted]
- sp332 12y ago
  Here's the source code diff https://www.alchemistowl.org/arrigo/truecrypt-7.1a-7.2.diff.gz https://www.alchemistowl.org/arrigo/truecrypt-7.1a-7.2.diff....
  - makmanalp 12y ago
    Time to call in the underhanded C contest (http://underhanded.xcott.com/ http://underhanded.xcott.com/) participants on a special bugfinding challenge :)
    - pearjuice 12y ago
      Not needed. Just quickly scroll through the diff (better version here: https://gist.github.com/anonymous/e5791d5703325b9cf6d1 https://gist.github.com/anonymous/e5791d5703325b9cf6d1) and you will immediately see that all that was done is disable/remove a majority of the functionality. AbortProcess ("INSECURE_APP"); Print ("WARNING: Using TrueCrypt is not secure"); They added exceptions/rose errors/printed warnings everywhere where you could possibly encrypt and all of it reflects their intent at the Sourceforge page.
      - makmanalp 12y ago
        The whole point of the underhanded c contest is that the code looks extremely benign, and you wouldn't know that it's doing something evil by staring at it for a short time. Example: http://underhanded.xcott.com/?page_id=22 http://underhanded.xcott.com/?page_id=22 Anyway, it was a joke. edit: But I'm not touching that binary with a 10 foot pole, thank you. There isn't even any guarantee yet that that source compiles into the given binary.
- CodeMage 12y ago
  Same key as the previous binaries? I doubt it, given that the keys were replaced mere 3 hours before the new binaries were published: http://sourceforge.net/p/truecrypt/activity/?page=0&limit=100#5386267c34309d5eeee49ec1 http://sourceforge.net/p/truecrypt/activity/?page=0&limit=10...
  - verytrivial 12y ago
    Anyone have key fingerprints for pub keys used for the 7.1a vs 7.2 signing? Preferably pub key from a while ago I guess.
    - GoodOlClint 12y ago
      This looks like the previous key: https://github.com/DrWhax/truecrypt-archive/blob/master/TrueCrypt-Foundation-Public-Key.asc https://github.com/DrWhax/truecrypt-archive/blob/master/True... Besides the different file name, the contents of the files match: http://www.diffchecker.com/szpb500v http://www.diffchecker.com/szpb500v
    - LeoPanthera 12y ago
      There's a "TrueCrypt Foundation" key on the keyservers from 2004, the ID is E3BA73CAF0D6B1E0.
      - throwaway8889 12y ago
        The time stamp on key servers can not be trusted. Anyone can spoof keys in anyone elses name, with any timestamp they want. The only way to verify is if you have the previous key stored somewhere, or can find a trustpath to it.
        adrianN 12y ago
        I have the key stored in my local keychain: E3BA73CAF0D6B1E0 C5F4 BAC4 A7B2 2DB8 B8F8 5538 E3BA 73CA F0D6 B1E0 Checks out.
    - 12y ago
kmfrk 12y ago
Matthew Green (@matthew_d_green) was involved in the audit. Follow him for what's what.
- kzrdude 12y ago
  > The audit did not find anything -- or rather, nothing that we haven't already published. https://twitter.com/matthew_d_green/status/471751054673989633 https://twitter.com/matthew_d_green/status/47175105467398963...

pearjuice 12y ago

The binaries are properly GPG-signed with the same key as the previous binaries, check for yourself. [They] either compromised their private key too or the actual developer(s) did this. Be it voluntarily or by force of secret three-character agencies / a massive pay check.

this_user 12y ago
Maybe something like the Lavabit scenario where they rather close the shop than sell their users out. On the other hand, proposing Bitlocker as an alternative would be rather suspect in that case.
- unsignedint 12y ago
  Well, the thing is though, it's not that they were hosting users' data. It's not like they would be forced to provide the contents of users' communication. I suppose they could be approached by someone to plant backdoor into the software, but I wonder if that can be done without someone noticing it...
  - y4mi 12y ago
    considering heartbleed... yes
  - iondream 12y ago
    Yeah it could be a gag order from a secret court. maybe they folded because they were forced to compromise the code...
  - marcosdumay 12y ago
    If they put a backdor on the binaries, but not source, lots of people will be compromissed, and for a really long time nobody may notice. EDIT: I normaly don't care. But this time I'd be glad if who downmoded this post explained why.
- mikelat 12y ago
  IF THIS IS THE CASE and that's an IF then it seriously brings into suspect backdoors in larger proprietary software. Because really if they're going after trucrypt then they have to already have gone after the big players. I'm not going to jump the gun just yet but after snowden it's not out of the question.
  - grrowl 12y ago
    Not "backdoors" but it seems Microsoft stores the BitLocker decryption key, based on this leaked slide (just found on twitter): https://twitter.com/TheBlogPirate/status/471759810644283392/photo/1 https://twitter.com/TheBlogPirate/status/471759810644283392/... edit: Confirmed Microsoft stores your recovery key on their servers if you're not connected to a domain: http://windows.microsoft.com/en-AU/windows-8/bitlocker-recovery-keys-faq http://windows.microsoft.com/en-AU/windows-8/bitlocker-recov...
    - cradle 12y ago
      Microsoft storing your key is opt-in and optional. Whether or not they superstitiously store it anyway is a different question.
bitJericho 12y ago
If their site/dns/whatever was compromised than there's no way you can trust the GPG signature at this point. I'll await a proper press release.
harshreality 12y ago
If this is a hack, then the truecrypt.org site (or dns) and sourceforge site are both compromised, suggesting a dev got hacked who would have had access to both, and perhaps the TC signing key as well (not everyone practices good signing key hygiene, like keeping it offline, even for important software projects). Even if it's a legit announcement, I wouldn't run that 7.2 binary. Anyone running truecrypt already has truecrypt, right? I don't know why they'd release a new version at the same time as such a dire and panic-inducing announcement.
- prg318 12y ago
  SourceForge recently forced their users to change their passwords [1] because of an attack on their infrastructure [2]. Pure speculation but I'm not sure if that had anything to do with this? [1] http://sourceforge.net/blog/sourceforge-net-global-password-reset/ http://sourceforge.net/blog/sourceforge-net-global-password-... [2] http://sourceforge.net/blog/sourceforge-net-attack/ http://sourceforge.net/blog/sourceforge-net-attack/
  - A_Non_eMouse 12y ago
    Those two SourceForge blog posts are from January 2011, a year before the release of TrueCrypt 7.1a. The recent forced change was due to infrastructure changes. https://sourceforge.net/blog/forced-password-change/ https://sourceforge.net/blog/forced-password-change/
- derefr 12y ago
  > Anyone running truecrypt already has truecrypt, right? I frequently reformat my boot volumes—but I've had a .tc file laying around on an external HD since forever, with my websites' X.509 private keys and such inside. I'm probably going to do exactly as this announcement says: download the export-only binary, create a loop-mounted LUKS volume, and migrate everything over.
  - slashdotaccount 12y ago
    Recent versions of cryptsetup support decrypting truecrypt volumes, just use cryptsetup for both.
eli 12y ago
A much simpler explanation is someone defaced the site around the same time a new release was coming out. Is there anything in the signed release package to corroborate what the site says?
- Amezarak 12y ago
  Yes. See the sibling poster's image link. I also installed 7.2 in a VM and received the same warning. It also looks like I can't encrypt anything, just decrypt.
deleted 12y ago
[deleted]
sp332 12y ago
Here's the source code diff https://www.alchemistowl.org/arrigo/truecrypt-7.1a-7.2.diff.gz https://www.alchemistowl.org/arrigo/truecrypt-7.1a-7.2.diff....
- makmanalp 12y ago
  Time to call in the underhanded C contest (http://underhanded.xcott.com/ http://underhanded.xcott.com/) participants on a special bugfinding challenge :)
  - pearjuice 12y ago
    Not needed. Just quickly scroll through the diff (better version here: https://gist.github.com/anonymous/e5791d5703325b9cf6d1 https://gist.github.com/anonymous/e5791d5703325b9cf6d1) and you will immediately see that all that was done is disable/remove a majority of the functionality. AbortProcess ("INSECURE_APP"); Print ("WARNING: Using TrueCrypt is not secure"); They added exceptions/rose errors/printed warnings everywhere where you could possibly encrypt and all of it reflects their intent at the Sourceforge page.
    - makmanalp 12y ago
      The whole point of the underhanded c contest is that the code looks extremely benign, and you wouldn't know that it's doing something evil by staring at it for a short time. Example: http://underhanded.xcott.com/?page_id=22 http://underhanded.xcott.com/?page_id=22 Anyway, it was a joke. edit: But I'm not touching that binary with a 10 foot pole, thank you. There isn't even any guarantee yet that that source compiles into the given binary.
CodeMage 12y ago
Same key as the previous binaries? I doubt it, given that the keys were replaced mere 3 hours before the new binaries were published: http://sourceforge.net/p/truecrypt/activity/?page=0&limit=100#5386267c34309d5eeee49ec1 http://sourceforge.net/p/truecrypt/activity/?page=0&limit=10...
- verytrivial 12y ago
  Anyone have key fingerprints for pub keys used for the 7.1a vs 7.2 signing? Preferably pub key from a while ago I guess.
  - GoodOlClint 12y ago
    This looks like the previous key: https://github.com/DrWhax/truecrypt-archive/blob/master/TrueCrypt-Foundation-Public-Key.asc https://github.com/DrWhax/truecrypt-archive/blob/master/True... Besides the different file name, the contents of the files match: http://www.diffchecker.com/szpb500v http://www.diffchecker.com/szpb500v
  - LeoPanthera 12y ago
    There's a "TrueCrypt Foundation" key on the keyservers from 2004, the ID is E3BA73CAF0D6B1E0.
    - throwaway8889 12y ago
      The time stamp on key servers can not be trusted. Anyone can spoof keys in anyone elses name, with any timestamp they want. The only way to verify is if you have the previous key stored somewhere, or can find a trustpath to it.
      - adrianN 12y ago
        I have the key stored in my local keychain: E3BA73CAF0D6B1E0 C5F4 BAC4 A7B2 2DB8 B8F8 5538 E3BA 73CA F0D6 B1E0 Checks out.
  - 12y ago

kmfrk 12y ago

Matthew Green (@matthew_d_green) was involved in the audit. Follow him for what's what.

kzrdude 12y ago
> The audit did not find anything -- or rather, nothing that we haven't already published. https://twitter.com/matthew_d_green/status/471751054673989633 https://twitter.com/matthew_d_green/status/47175105467398963...