8 ms·

The Internet Is Burning

38 points by Libertatea 12y ago

Zigurd 12y ago
That's a very good article. highly secure practices need to become pervasive, or surveillance will forever remain pervasive. One big problem, though, is that governments are buying zero-days. Why tolerate that, and the people making zero-days? They should be treated like bioterrorists making enhanced ebola virus.
- coderzach 12y ago
  > Why tolerate that, and the people making zero-days? They should be treated like bioterrorists making enhanced ebola virus. That is the silliest thing I've heard on hackernews in a while. Criminalizing disclosure of security flaws would make everything MUCH less secure. Security flaws would still be found by unscrupulous individuals, it's just that the users and creators of the flawed software wouldn't know about them.
  - Malachai2227 12y ago
    It seems to me that Zigurd is referring to people who keep exploits secret and sell them for financial gain to criminals and government agencies.
  - ihsw 12y ago
    Full, anonymous, and public disclosure is fine, however selling exploits is not. The problem is when you sell exploits to software maintainers whom have no interest in fixing the bug, but instead are interested in purchasing the silence of the exploit developer.
  - Zigurd 12y ago
    > Criminalizing disclosure of security flaws I made no such suggestion, much less proposal. The problem is commercial, militarized development of zero-day exploits and selling to the highest bidder. UNLIKE responsible disclosure by legitimate security researchers, weaponized exploits are very analogous to the freelance development of bioweapons and then auctioning them off to the highest bidder. It is a cancer on computing, and deserves to be stamped out, as such a bioweapons development would get wiped out quickly and conclusively.
skue 12y ago
> I’m pleased that I was a Heartbleed hipster, dissing OpenSSL before it was cool (i.e. ten days before Heartbleed emerged into the light) but I don’t pretend to be a security expert. When did it become appropriate to diss open source software without the expertise to create something better, and why does he think this is brag-worthy?
- vezzy-fnord 12y ago
  You don't need to be an expert in order to criticize a piece of software, but yes, it's nothing worth bragging about.
- adventured 12y ago
  Open source is now the majority concept, if not in distribution then certainly in ideology. It won. It's to be expected that technology hipsters would turn against it. We'll probably see a new wave of people arguing in favor of proprietary software instead (using whatever bs reasoning is necessary, including "it's safer!").
  - hkmurakami 12y ago
    And round we go again... It's almost like fashion.
  - deleted 12y ago
    [deleted]
- ScottBurson 12y ago
  I think he's making a joke at his own expense ("ten days before Heartbleed").
- wyager 12y ago
  > When did it become appropriate to diss open source software without the expertise to create something better I know cancer is bad, even though I lack the expertise to treat it. I know house fires are bad, even though I lack the expertise to put them out. You don't need to be an expert on some piece of software to see that it's bad. You only need to be an expert if you're actually trying to implement it.
cheald 12y ago
It all sounds very nice and grand, but the author had this epiphany during the presentation of a security vulnerability in Cisco's products. Cisco's superior software engineering practices may in fact make their products more secure than the majority of software, but it didn't keep them from being broken. The fact of the matter is that security is hard. Balancing security with usability with speed of development with ROI is a tricky proposition. Cisco has a fundamental need to write high-security code because what they are selling is highly-secure infrastructure. That same need doesn't exist for other entities, and it shouldn't exist, because that security comes at financial and usability costs, at the least. That isn't to say that software developers shouldn't employ best practices and strive for secure code, but security is not a boolean, and it seems somewhat naive to equate "many people write imperfectly secure code" with "nobody cares about security". There's a middle ground between security being a "debacle" and it always being a persistent threat. Bugs exist - and will always exist. You can spend lots and lots of money making sure that fewer bugs exist in your code, and you can spend lots and lots of money writing in-house code or auditing external code, but unless there is economic incentive to do so ("a security breach in our difficult-to-update firmware will leave our company devastated"), spending those resources makes very little sense. Additionally, all it takes is one bug to bring your massively expensive hyper-engineered software to its knees, as we saw in the Cisco case. Security is always not about writing perfectly-engineered, hyper-secure code. It's about tradeoffs between financial resources and usability, and it's about mitigation of potential damage. If you write code predicated on "this is so well written that it can never be broken", you're in for a bad time.
- deleted 12y ago
  [deleted]
- crest 12y ago
  Just watch this before use Cisco crap: https://media.ccc.de/browse/conferences/sigint13/vortrag_mp6_og_-_2013-07-05_12:00_-_cisco_in_the_sky_with_diamonds_-_fx_-_greg_-_5115.html https://media.ccc.de/browse/conferences/sigint13/vortrag_mp6...
adventured 12y ago
The security lapses and mistakes are, unto themselves, not getting worse. They're exposing a dramatically greater number of people and a lot more data accordingly. That is all that has fundamentally changed, and that tells you the problem.
- georgemcbay 12y ago
  This is an important point. When I first started using the internet in the late 80s there was nary a non-mil site (and even those were iffy) that I couldn't get into almost instantaneously using remote exploits in widely used software like sendmail; and once in it was almost trivial to get root escalation, often through fairly well known (by the standards of the time) issues with the way suid root programs would badly parse environmental variables that you could maliciously malform to get the suid program to execute other arbitrary programs. Things were much less complex back then but the security was far worse on the whole than it is today. People would just telnet around! In plaintext! On local networks that were largely switch-free with ethernet adapters that would gladly go into promiscuous listening mode. Not to mention things like full-blown IP spoofing before ingress/egress filtering was common and all the TCP stacks had terribly predictable sequencing. The important things that changed are as you said that dramatically greater number of people are impacted by these issues, and to a lesser degree the people hacking into systems back then on average were less likely to have any malicious intent or financial motives (the change with this is somewhat directly related to the first point).
ChuckMcM 12y ago
This quote leaps out "Oh, it’s been awful if you’re an activist, a dissident, a journalist, a victim of identity theft, a specific target of the NSA, etc; but most people aren’t." It isn't all that different than the 'real world' where if someone decides to target you in meatspace there isn't a lot you can do (except perhaps arm yourself and the outcome of that is dubious at best). I'm all in favor of building a more secure network though. We could even use the pipes that are there, definitely going to start small though.

38 points by Libertatea 12y ago

That's a very good article. highly secure practices need to become pervasive, or surveillance will forever remain pervasive. One big problem, though, is that governments are buying zero-days. Why tolerate that, and the people making zero-days? They should be treated like bioterrorists making enhanced ebola virus.

coderzach 12y ago
> Why tolerate that, and the people making zero-days? They should be treated like bioterrorists making enhanced ebola virus. That is the silliest thing I've heard on hackernews in a while. Criminalizing disclosure of security flaws would make everything MUCH less secure. Security flaws would still be found by unscrupulous individuals, it's just that the users and creators of the flawed software wouldn't know about them.
- Malachai2227 12y ago
  It seems to me that Zigurd is referring to people who keep exploits secret and sell them for financial gain to criminals and government agencies.
- ihsw 12y ago
  Full, anonymous, and public disclosure is fine, however selling exploits is not. The problem is when you sell exploits to software maintainers whom have no interest in fixing the bug, but instead are interested in purchasing the silence of the exploit developer.
- Zigurd 12y ago
  > Criminalizing disclosure of security flaws I made no such suggestion, much less proposal. The problem is commercial, militarized development of zero-day exploits and selling to the highest bidder. UNLIKE responsible disclosure by legitimate security researchers, weaponized exploits are very analogous to the freelance development of bioweapons and then auctioning them off to the highest bidder. It is a cancer on computing, and deserves to be stamped out, as such a bioweapons development would get wiped out quickly and conclusively.

skue 12y ago

> I’m pleased that I was a Heartbleed hipster, dissing OpenSSL before it was cool (i.e. ten days before Heartbleed emerged into the light) but I don’t pretend to be a security expert. When did it become appropriate to diss open source software without the expertise to create something better, and why does he think this is brag-worthy?

vezzy-fnord 12y ago
You don't need to be an expert in order to criticize a piece of software, but yes, it's nothing worth bragging about.
adventured 12y ago
Open source is now the majority concept, if not in distribution then certainly in ideology. It won. It's to be expected that technology hipsters would turn against it. We'll probably see a new wave of people arguing in favor of proprietary software instead (using whatever bs reasoning is necessary, including "it's safer!").
- hkmurakami 12y ago
  And round we go again... It's almost like fashion.
- deleted 12y ago
  [deleted]
ScottBurson 12y ago
I think he's making a joke at his own expense ("ten days before Heartbleed").
wyager 12y ago
> When did it become appropriate to diss open source software without the expertise to create something better I know cancer is bad, even though I lack the expertise to treat it. I know house fires are bad, even though I lack the expertise to put them out. You don't need to be an expert on some piece of software to see that it's bad. You only need to be an expert if you're actually trying to implement it.

cheald 12y ago

It all sounds very nice and grand, but the author had this epiphany during the presentation of a security vulnerability in Cisco's products. Cisco's superior software engineering practices may in fact make their products more secure than the majority of software, but it didn't keep them from being broken. The fact of the matter is that security is hard. Balancing security with usability with speed of development with ROI is a tricky proposition. Cisco has a fundamental need to write high-security code because what they are selling is highly-secure infrastructure. That same need doesn't exist for other entities, and it shouldn't exist, because that security comes at financial and usability costs, at the least. That isn't to say that software developers shouldn't employ best practices and strive for secure code, but security is not a boolean, and it seems somewhat naive to equate "many people write imperfectly secure code" with "nobody cares about security". There's a middle ground between security being a "debacle" and it always being a persistent threat. Bugs exist - and will always exist. You can spend lots and lots of money making sure that fewer bugs exist in your code, and you can spend lots and lots of money writing in-house code or auditing external code, but unless there is economic incentive to do so ("a security breach in our difficult-to-update firmware will leave our company devastated"), spending those resources makes very little sense. Additionally, all it takes is one bug to bring your massively expensive hyper-engineered software to its knees, as we saw in the Cisco case. Security is always not about writing perfectly-engineered, hyper-secure code. It's about tradeoffs between financial resources and usability, and it's about mitigation of potential damage. If you write code predicated on "this is so well written that it can never be broken", you're in for a bad time.

deleted 12y ago
[deleted]
crest 12y ago
Just watch this before use Cisco crap: https://media.ccc.de/browse/conferences/sigint13/vortrag_mp6_og_-_2013-07-05_12:00_-_cisco_in_the_sky_with_diamonds_-_fx_-_greg_-_5115.html https://media.ccc.de/browse/conferences/sigint13/vortrag_mp6...

adventured 12y ago

The security lapses and mistakes are, unto themselves, not getting worse. They're exposing a dramatically greater number of people and a lot more data accordingly. That is all that has fundamentally changed, and that tells you the problem.

georgemcbay 12y ago
This is an important point. When I first started using the internet in the late 80s there was nary a non-mil site (and even those were iffy) that I couldn't get into almost instantaneously using remote exploits in widely used software like sendmail; and once in it was almost trivial to get root escalation, often through fairly well known (by the standards of the time) issues with the way suid root programs would badly parse environmental variables that you could maliciously malform to get the suid program to execute other arbitrary programs. Things were much less complex back then but the security was far worse on the whole than it is today. People would just telnet around! In plaintext! On local networks that were largely switch-free with ethernet adapters that would gladly go into promiscuous listening mode. Not to mention things like full-blown IP spoofing before ingress/egress filtering was common and all the TCP stacks had terribly predictable sequencing. The important things that changed are as you said that dramatically greater number of people are impacted by these issues, and to a lesser degree the people hacking into systems back then on average were less likely to have any malicious intent or financial motives (the change with this is somewhat directly related to the first point).

ChuckMcM 12y ago

This quote leaps out "Oh, it’s been awful if you’re an activist, a dissident, a journalist, a victim of identity theft, a specific target of the NSA, etc; but most people aren’t." It isn't all that different than the 'real world' where if someone decides to target you in meatspace there isn't a lot you can do (except perhaps arm yourself and the outcome of that is dubious at best). I'm all in favor of building a more secure network though. We could even use the pipes that are there, definitely going to start small though.