4 ms·
1) Lets just call a do-over, EVERYONE generate new private keys and request new certs. Any cert created before April 10 2014 will be considered suspect. 2) C
by sitkack 13y ago
1)
Lets just call a do-over, EVERYONE generate new private keys and request new certs. Any cert created before April 10 2014 will be considered suspect.
2)
Create a bloom filter for revoked certs. Have a remote cert revocation server/cache so I don't need to have a 50MB file of revocations.
- the_ancient 13y agowhile the problem is wide spread, it is no where near enough to say "all certs after 4/10 are suspect" There are an ever larger number of certs not impacted by this event.
- jerf 13y agoFalse positives are a problem for a Bloom filter. You could conceivably create one for a given registrar, though, which could in theory create a Bloom filter, iterate through all the certs it has issued, and then list out the certs that the Bloom filter issues false positives for, but are still valid. However, it's too late to put that into play. Nobody ever expected to have to revoke this quantity of certs. (In hindsight, that was obviously wrong. Something like this was going to happen someday. But this is exactly the sort of thing that's very easy to argue away, because nobody wants to be convinced that this amount of work will be necessary.)