12 ms·
The Heartbleed Challenge
- conformal 13y agowhat i am expecting ppl to see is that you can't actually get to the tls private key itself. we have done some testing with our backup service, cyphertite, and have yet to attack and actually compromise any keying material. EDIT: forgot to cite neel mehta https://twitter.com/neelmehta/statuses/453625474879471616 https://twitter.com/neelmehta/statuses/453625474879471616
- jnbiche 13y agoYou all are involved in so many great open source projects -- just wanted to give a shout-out to Conformal. People do notice and appreciate your contributions. How many full-time people are working there?
- conformal 13y agowe appreciate your supportive comments :) there are about 10 of us at conformal.
- dfc 13y agoI like spectrwm but it really needs a NEWS/CHANGELOG. Users can not quickly get an idea of what has changed in between release X and Y. I went to update the debian "please package latest spectrwm" bug and there is no easy way to post the changes between 1.0.0 (yes the debian package is that old) and 2.5.0.
- wglb 13y agoThis post first agreed, then upon further review retracted that finding: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7561399 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7561399
- eastdakota 13y agoYou can read more about the CloudFlare Challenge and our own tests on obtaining SSL Private Key material here: http://blog.cloudflare.com/answering-the-critical-question-can-you-get-private-ssl-keys-using-heartbleed http://blog.cloudflare.com/answering-the-critical-question-c... Matthew Prince Co-founder & CEO, CloudFlare
- conformal 13y agonice write up. we saw similar results in that the keying material never made it into the memory leaked. i've never felt so thankful for a memory allocation pattern.
- deleted 13y ago[deleted]
- ditoax 13y agoThe don't sign comments rule is designed to stop pointless posting of company URLs when there is no need to. In this case it is clearly appropriate for Matthew to disclose who he is as it is important to the context of the post.
- ominous_prime 13y agoThanks. This makes a lot of sense, and matches what I saw myself. I never got anything out of nginx, but I found apache quite easy. I never built more than a POC, and left it at that. I didn't think about it at the time, but it was only on a newly started apache instance. Coupled with the fact the apache as a frontend tls server is pretty rare on big sites nowadays, I'm feeling pretty good about what did happen, vs what could have happened.
- apaprocki 13y agoIt seems like a "feature" that you'd want your process to store the private key material as low as possible in the address space so that arbitrary read overruns don't run the risk of hitting it. It seems to just accidentally be this way in nginx, but I wonder if it should just be another (tiny) layer in the overall security design.
- NKCSS 13y agoToo bad the link they give on that page doesn't exist (yet): http://blog.cloudflare.com/the-heartbleed-challenge/ http://blog.cloudflare.com/the-heartbleed-challenge/
- jgrahamc 13y agoSorry about that. It's meant to redirect to: http://blog.cloudflare.com/answering-the-critical-question-can-you-get-private-ssl-keys-using-heartbleed http://blog.cloudflare.com/answering-the-critical-question-c...
- batmansbelt 13y agoDon't be surprised when the winner has an @nsa.gov email address.
- dfc 13y agoI would be shocked if Neel was wrong about private key exposure AND it is a nation state that highlights his misunderstanding.
- fulafel 13y agoCloudfare isn't making the same claim - they're just saying it doesn't seem to happen on their (modified) Nginx setup.
- dfc 13y agoI do not understand what you are trying to convey in your message. I never mentioned Cloudflare and neither did the comment I was responding to. What part of my comment led you to believe I was presenting/responding-to a claim made by cloudflare?
- fulafel 13y agoThe article is about Cloudfare saying their keys are safe. We were discussing implications of someone winning the Cloudfare challenge. You suggested the fall of the challenge would confirm Neel being wrong? I was alluding to Neel's position that that any key leaking is "unlikely" - a much more tenuous position than Cloudfare's. But maybe you meant that he's alrady been proven wrong, and the nsa would be another? Then I did misinterpret that bit.
- dfc 13y agoToo often you seem lame jokes like the original comment that require the belief that NSA is leaps and bounds ahead of the world in infosec AND yet NSA is composed of bumbling morons. NSA would be grossly incompetent if they knew how to retrieve the private key AND then informed the world of their offensive capability. This is a basic tenet of intelligence operations, you do not publicize your capabilities to your adversaries. The renowned clandestine operative B.Smalls, eloquently stated rule #2: Never let 'em know your next move Don't you know bad boys move in silence and violence?
- ig1 13y agoIs this running on an off-the-shelf nginx or your custom version ?
- deleted 13y ago[deleted]
- jgrahamc 13y agoThe challenge web site is running stock NGINX.
- dredge 13y agoFor the command to match the description, shouldn't that be "echo -n"? Otherwise the signed string would include a trailing newline. I do not expect this will make a material difference to the challenge - presumably you used the quoted commands to generate the answer.
- pornel 13y agoThere is no portable way to echo without a newline. Use printf instead.
- jgrahamc 13y agoMeanwhile over in a Makefile... # Automatically figure out what echo options to use so that echo # '\r\n' actually just outputs the characters CR and LF and nothing # else. This is very shell dependent. ECHO_OPTIONS := -e -n -en ECHO := $(foreach o,$(ECHO_OPTIONS),$(if $(call seq,$(shell echo $o '\r\n' | wc - c),2),$(eval ECHO := echo $o))) ifeq ($(ECHO),) $(error Failed to set ECHO, unable to determine correct echo command, tried options $(ECHO_OPTIONS)) endif
- jkrems 13y agoMaybe they changed the description in the meantime, it now includes the newline, saying: "Proof I have your key\n"
- livid 13y agossl_certificate /home/nick/ssl-bundle.crt ssl_certificate_key /home/nick/server.key
- fla 13y agoGot that one too. Also got this [1] but it looks like public keys maybe ? I'dont have time to check right now. [1] http://pastebin.com/KiVNV0c6 http://pastebin.com/KiVNV0c6
- M4v3R 13y agoI got this, but I have too little time to verify whether it actually contains key information or not: http://pastebin.com/0CRw6hSy http://pastebin.com/0CRw6hSy Edit: It seems that these are only trusted CA certs, there is no server cert in there.
- danielweber 13y agoIt's cool seeing other people's attempts to extract the key in my return buffer. It's like multiplayer microcorruption.com
- tptacek 13y agoWhich, FWIW, is in the works.
- kaivi 13y agoThis is fun, indeed. Has anyone already made a patch for this bug, where the lib returns random data instead of actual heap chunks?
- alexkus 13y agoIrony would be such a patch leaking information about the state of any random number generator leading to more easily guessable session keys or the like. (Of course, creating suitable fake data with a separate PNRG to avoid this would be pretty easy.)
- simias 13y agoIt's a good idea but even if nobody successfully exploits this particular website with the heartbleed bug doesn't mean much for the rest of the vulnerable sites. Since the bug exposes a few kilobytes of uninitialized malloc() memory the kind of data the attacker will retrieve is heavily dependent on the software the server is running.
- ygra 13y agoI read elsewhere that the bug exposes first and foremost memory that OpenSSL itself used before (because OpenSSL has its own allocator running on top of malloc).
- Robadob 13y agoWhere it might not be possible to get SSL private keys directly via heartbleed. Is there not also the possibility of exposing reused credentials or something that exposes a further exploit that could provide root access or similar to a server, allowing the retrieval of these keys? It may not be possible in this clean minimal install, but in a real production environment, it should still be treated as a threat?
- remon 13y agoI must be the only one that's pretty much done with having to read about heartbleed.
- SchizoDuckie 13y agoMy guess is that if this gets exploited this is going to be used in combination with another (yet unknown) bug. Now all we can do is set back and hope the white hats prevail
- 51Cards 13y agoIs this really an accurate challenge? I have wondered if the true exposure risk from Heartbleed may be over-stated* due to memory separation between processes, etc. This however is probably a clean server with a fairly static install. There isn't a risk of things like session leakage which I think is the true risk of Heartbleed. Nor would there be the memory fragmentation that would occur in a production system. While intriguing I'm not sure how much it proves? (* this is still good though as any risk is unacceptable and shouting Fire makes everyone move... and they need to on this issue)
- jgrahamc 13y agoThere's no memory separation between a web server that incorporates OpenSSL and... itself.
- danielweber 13y agoIt might be more accurate if this server ran some services, though, like a real server would.
- jerf 13y agoIt may be the case that Heartbleed did not practically expose private keys. The risk was not overstated in general, though; a virtually undetectable method that has been proved to do things like leak plaintext username/password credentials is still catastrophic.
- thedufer 13y agoAnything OpenSSL decrypts surely has to hit the OpenSSL process's memory, right? That would include requests, which could easily contain sessions, passwords, etc.
- 51Cards 13y agoMuch kudos to the guy who cracked it later in the day. I'm glad this proved a useful test. I gladly stand corrected.
- forgotAgain 13y agoA different CloudFlare post on HN https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7572666 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7572666 claimed that they had a fix for the HeartBleed bug 12 days ago. At CloudFlare, we received early warning of the Heartbleed vulnerability and patched our systems 12 days ago. I commented on that post that the date of discovery was 7 days ago http://www.vocativ.com/tech/hacking/behind-scenes-crazy-72-hours-leading-heartbleed-discovery/ http://www.vocativ.com/tech/hacking/behind-scenes-crazy-72-h... For whatever reason that HN post was deleted and resubmitted so it now has no comments on it. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7572796 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7572796 Was the bug discovered 12 days ago or 7?
- eastdakota 13y agoThe bug was discovered by whitehat researchers approximately 12 days ago. It was publicly announced 5 days ago. We got early word of it from the researchers who initially discovered it, allowing us to patch our systems and ensure all sites behind CloudFlare were not vulnerable. However, we have no way of knowing how long blackhats may have had it. It had been present in the OpenSSL software for the last 2+ years. Therefore we're trying to get an informed sense of the security risks. Hence our work attempting to use the vulnerability to recover SSL private keys and, as announced today, the CloudFlare Challenge.
- voidlogic 13y agoI'm disgusted they chose to share it with you early and not the major Linux distros...
- leejoramo 13y agoI have not seen any comment by the security researchers about why they choose to disclose to some organizations (such as cloud flare) earlier than the general public or the distributions. Perhaps, they felt the need to have some organizations with very large OpenSSL installations test the patch prior to make sure it worked and did not cause any unexpected problems?
- 13y ago
- attheodo 13y agoperfect attempt to steal 0day spl0its :P
- rubiquity 13y agoIf what CloudFlare is saying is true (and I think it is), that the only possibility of Nginx/Apache leaking the private key is on start up due to how low of a memory address the private key is given, is there anything in Nginx/Apache to fire a bunch of dummy requests at itself before accepting public connections? This should effectively bury the memory address that the private key is stored in. Would this be useful if it doesn't exist or would it only be useful in hindsight?
- tptacek 13y agoDidn't Juliano Rizzo already post that he'd been able to extract keys from a server? I'm not clear on the circumstances; for instance, it might have been right after boot, and it might have been Apache, and it might have been FreeBSD.
- conformal 13y agoi suspect the memory accessible by this bug depends a lot on the software, OS and possibly hardware, e.g. on openbsd and bitrig amd64, the amount of memory leaked per exploit is less than 64 KB, closer to 32 KB. if you go much past the 32 KB mark on these OSes, it segfaults. running an exploit script against one of our own services showed only 1-2 KB of information, most if it being the (public) cert, and the rest zeroed out.
- wglb 13y agoErrata security modified their original post to say that yes they are extractable. And a moderator properly fixed the title after the article was changed to reflect the retraction: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7561399 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7561399
- kaivi 13y agoFound this among the returned data: http://cl.ly/image/2o391V1T2R46 http://cl.ly/image/2o391V1T2R46 Who would request that much lorem ipsum nonsense and for what purpose?
- spydum 13y agoperhaps to push the memory allocation for url out a bit wider, to get a segment of memory in a different place?
- apaprocki 13y agoI seriously don't expect anyone will find anything (reasons mentioned in the blog post), but that doesn't mean I haven't pointed my exploit that searches for private key material in the return buffer at it on a one second interval. If anything I suppose CloudFlare will be able to produce some pretty pictures of the amount of incoming heartbeats they received!
- tomvangoethem 13y agoNote that by visiting, your IP and referer become accessible by anyone running an heartbleed exploit: 93.142.x.x - - [11/Apr/2014:10:44:36 -0400] "GET /heartbleed HTTP/1.1" 200 1148 "https://news.ycombinator.com/" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64)AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/34.0.1847.116 Safari/537.36"
- webXL 13y agoWhoops, too late. Were you able to get that info from actually running the exploit?
- tomvangoethem 13y agoYes, I was. I extracted access-log entries from 23 unique IPs in a few hours, though most came from a single IP
- benmmurphy 13y agoso i assume any intermediate values from the RSA computations will end up in the heap and may be accessible by an attacker. is it possible to reconstruct the key from these values? i could be missing something but it looks like signing does m mod p and m mod q and part of these operations involves doing a left shift on the divisor (p, q) and this is allocated to a temporary buffer. if these buffers are allocated near the heartbeat buffers then they could be leaked. i'm looking at crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c and it is possible that this code is not the code that is being used to do the signing in ssl. /* signing */ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { .. .. if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || ((rsa->p != NULL) && (rsa->q != NULL) && (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) ) { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) goto err; static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) { .. .. /* compute I mod q */ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { c = &local_c; BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err; } else { if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err; } .. .. /* compute I mod p */ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { c = &local_c; BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err; } else { if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err; } #define BN_mod(rem,m,d,ctx) BN_div(NULL,(rem),(m),(d),(ctx)) int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rm, const BIGNUM *num, const BIGNUM *divisor, BN_CTX *ctx) .. sdiv=BN_CTX_get(ctx); .. if (!(BN_lshift(sdiv,divisor,norm_shift))) goto err; BN_lshift() shifts a left by n bits and places the result in r (r=a*2^n). EDIT: obviously if you leak p and q you can trivially reconstruct the private key :) but it is possible other intermediate values might be leaked as well that allow for key reconstruction. though, considering left shifted p and q look a lot like normal p and q i'm surprised no-one has found this by just searching through the leaked data. so maybe this is not leaked or it requires a read at the correct time because these buffers might be trashed by another computation.
- 13y ago
- Diastro 13y agoAnyone know what the comodoca cert are all about?
- daedalus2027 13y agoI have got this header: OpenSSL/0.9.8o zlib/1.2.3.4 libidn/1.15 libssh2/1.2.6 Host: www.cloudflarechallenge.com Accept: / PrivateKey: EiS3mdBFanVEaeRkk4otJRRHFTGi6tVZUJKl5v7rGpjJnY0gTn4PWSlOJqA2l32o Content-Length: 1721 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Expect: 100-continue http://pastebin.com/FLcsYDfE http://pastebin.com/FLcsYDfE
- loopdoend 13y agoThat is somebody trolling you by modifying their request headers.
- kurokikaze 13y agoSomeone POSTs the "BEGIN SECRET KEY" strings and such to server. Funny thing is, key is probably stored as binary and without file header/footer.
- deleted 13y ago[deleted]
- AshleysBrain 13y agoWould a multi-process server engine help protect against this? Think what Chrome does with tabs. If the network request is received by a dedicated IO process which then uses IPC to communicate with other parts of the server, then perhaps sensitive information like keys would not be in the same address space so could not be leaked? I guess if the bug was in a sensitive process then it would still happen. Disclaimer: I have no idea how modern servers are architected, perhaps they already do this :) Would be interested to hear from anyone more knowledgeable.
- X-Istence 13y agoThe keys would be in the same process as the one doing the SSL in the first place, and that is the part that is vulnerable. Even communicating over IPC you would still be vulnerable.
- quasque 13y agoI wonder if Cloudflare is logging all data sent to and from the challenge server, and then searching it for private key fragments. If not, they should be! As it's not guaranteed that a lucky attacker will be aware of receiving key material, if it is exposed.
- d0ne 13y agoWe will add a $10,000 bounty for the first published and confirmed successful completion of this challenge. Conditions: 1) CloudFlare confirms success. 2) The winner publishes their solution, including source, publicly. 3) Promptly send the link to the publication to [adam | ionicsecurity | com] (for tracking the order of submissions) Good luck!
- suyash 13y agoThat is awesome Adam, please have it posted on the Challenge page so that more people can see it. Hopefully someone solves it soon :)
- indutny 13y ago-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hello Adam! My email is public: fedor@indutny.com , and here is my proof of identity: https://keybase.io/indutny https://keybase.io/indutny . If you wish - you could contact me via it. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJTSJ7IAAoJEPsOEJWxeXmZYnkP/1r9qVARb89x2bAteh9RPcRI VGUmRZVz/1wLqy/LmvB+XwgkEGRyjQBCa2vHPi8PpwenLEl8IXMMYyzQSqx94tkV y54ZTwABtXXcPIaFOu4O8sG8RM6rDVsF9FpJICVxuYzrkyQPVDMEFa3faBNEgTHo zpgOf5keNq3nCnhTwhkMryBzYVVMLUdQy6JUzhzOXTarmgNH5CtRW0CzFN+9sxM9 6/EH1W4VcJt0lpcvCQK75Kv9syrbavB6qXP85b0gSvKcMHvkX0z5dPphUJcyL/9Q QyXE2vloNj6qwjLQRPoCymSjePeQsodhec47iQxVgil72U5X4YFYJpDHurE5KVOb VIGjmiXhAcL7M8MgywNNtP9iIsi45WiOBmNQVYrBr3/37TSL6FFMfpFVuOxxVrNV fRKRx7VFihTyYxqacwBLAkNPQ6V4QiEdEt74DQFZsokgk1dcchP4GrSypNbrM4SX SJW0RwqF1t44mvuAHmt0U6otgzKy4XyjmDGvki6FNE8ww+OIEQX6tgRPSTD0bURn PyNtZ1EKYZguQt3b4pveVK8JMgWxuCcO9LgKFbPTZJ8YBYOTCU6WtTm4OfCdnTG7 1EtOv6c2k5nlOiK11K8M9ZPEkjq//6C0MZFn1CB7/43+tkWDTr/vSayW/6Yi8pF5 /C1vMZXz3MmpY/gj9z+W =mH1/ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
- mikeash 13y agoI wonder if one could use this server (or, of course, any other vulnerable server, but the hostname on this one is nice) for phishing people. For example, e-mail them the link, then try to snarf the referer header out of the server's memory in the hopes that their webmail URL contains something juicy, or give them a fake form that POSTs interesting data to it. Probably far-fetched, but it's amusing to consider.
- koliber 13y agoSo out of curiosity, I ran the python heartbleed tester against their server. Surprisingly, the first (and every response thereafter) returned a memory dump which contained at least part of what looked like a private key. I immediately became skeptical when each of these apparent private keys ended in LOLJK. 0690: 79 37 70 71 31 76 63 2F 74 70 49 67 68 4C 4F 4C y7pq1vc/tpIghLOL 06a0: 4A 4B 3D 3D 2D 2D 2D 2D 2D 45 4E 44 5F 52 53 41 JK==-----END_RSA 06b0: 5F 50 52 49 56 41 54 45 5F 4B 45 59 2D 2D 2D 2D _PRIVATE_KEY---- Seems like a clever setup to return hand-crafted responses.
- zenojevski 13y agoGot that too: 1ef0: 4E 63 46 39 33 51 75 34 64 2F 48 6E 47 6D 4B 50 NcF93Qu4d/HnGmKP 1f00: 51 42 72 4A 43 50 53 69 54 67 70 2F 63 79 37 70 QBrJCPSiTgp/cy7p 1f10: 71 31 76 63 2F 74 70 49 67 68 4C 4F 4C 4A 4B 3D q1vc/tpIghLOLJK= 1f20: 3D 2D 2D 2D 2D 2D 45 4E 44 25 32 30 52 53 41 25 =-----END%20RSA% 1f30: 32 30 50 52 49 56 41 54 45 25 32 30 4B 45 59 2D 20PRIVATE%20KEY- 1f40: 2D 2D 2D 2D 20 48 54 54 50 2F 31 2E 31 0D 0A 48 ---- HTTP/1.1..H Curiously enough, one of the first responses, after which they became somewhat predictable (with the occasional "herring"). Seems like some experimenting (based on differing offset, and `%20` vs `_`).
- haldean 13y agoI got a private key without the LOLJK, but I'm 99% certain this is someone trolling me. Still going to double-check though.
- umrashrf 13y agoLook what I found... 0390: 00 00 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C ..OLOLOLOLOLOLOL 03a0: 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C OLOLOLOLOLOLOLOL 03b0: 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C OLOLOLOLOLOLOLOL 03c0: 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C OLOLOLOLOLOLOLOL 03d0: 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C OLOLOLOLOLOLOLOL 03e0: 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C OLOLOLOLOLOLOLOL 03f0: 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C OLOLOLOLOLOLOLOL 0400: 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C OLOLOLOLOLOLOLOL 0410: 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C OLOLOLOLOLOLOLOL 0420: 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C 4F 4C OLOLOLOLOLOLOLOL
- dimsumdumdum 13y agoI find this to be disingenous on CloudFlares part. First of all their configuration is almost irrelevant. The heartbleed.com guys did in fact recover key material without much effort. I really dont care what cloudflare thinks they know about heap allocation in THEIR one trick pony configuration. its irrelevant to the problem at hand. Sadly another example of CF grandstanding to appear smarter than everyone else with little to back it up.
- alienvenom 13y agohmm, all I'm getting is a bunch of dicks... 0600: 20 38 3D 3D 3D 3D 3D 3D 3D 3D 3D 3D 3D 44 20 20 8===========D 0610: 20 38 3D 3D 3D 3D 3D 3D 3D 3D 3D 3D 3D 44 20 20 8===========D 0620: 20 38 3D 3D 3D 3D 3D 3D 3D 3D 3D 3D 3D 44 20 20 8===========D 0630: 20 38 3D 3D 3D 3D 3D 3D 3D 3D 3D 3D 3D 44 20 20 8===========D
- aus_ 13y agoSomeone is submitting false keys in their POST data :D -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEowIBAAKCAQEAwYUYN1fR2/z+Net8DdDhNR7poeX608gwFNDVTQZNjldwi503 cLCaFbPpGkkh84sxpsL0PqrMx9OprdNaMPe0ewuTjjZyb1MaqzfXz/XCiOaT7kWZ P9bRae2cI5CETZHD/CvWjsxZ+0exFRSGtph+3esDuvwGQprfYY8d2PIpPOFDgIW7 gCX6/xTpB+3PCt8lQYbrYiOIogrI+1xpqp5WBCHRzL6La/Zhav1Q6rrSHk1woGdk gJBNr3k8NsOjFfNbJgLTgsOz7Yu7Wh6UiV7Y5BMxzuK0eMlJey9ODkyFwhG/pnMg qeMf4j1bfaA9AdI8sffSd+1hY9tbt4vfZhBphQIDAQABAoIBACGh/glwS9rN52h7 mr3T9bADxVsL20H/YsvbV5bhZ407iSXalw4Qw1bOQ877stje8iwnaceSa7C3CqBZ QS2Nf2J7KpPmxpCugs4LEIjmD383g7I/iljb/t1IHIDZ1wScNtGW1N1QirrvRMmD Hb6SVko/VBClSHk+7V/JPci8nYok1vWytXyi/QJ8EaQ5FPglm3n+QHBnFdl3A8qn cWpK3t6BYijkJAK5PNIc1g0YxkSerG5hwCqWleRt29V5QPZqgEc0raSFolN0XOo6 8us1z37IDRGvm0sHbGgKfi3/Mj+b3Npa+0cQgsGVmymLjyMSf/cLiF0c3rDpHamY NqsFj8ECgYEA4JHeIM0M/MVCbUaqCFOtGYmRK9CL8eoAGVJgXa96Z+gP7W/bAjw9 IEe9NeGIwr2KidZljyv23CwK1Fn7nDuloG5ZXvzpP3jNRJ62Z0Y6RkICpWgpN1HL uUG6R4LlB3mXyYE4UGoNAxfgWRcPAn0vsKIuY5/N69FBXiE9h6cjHVkCgYEA3Jq8 v/qx7T73p9iUFAFDUNF/poQShqimGdfubMSbhUBXGkx5hPyKYUrzUwwZTlLwo4SB +nP1cuJUdnEY+ZlzSxvh/EADvxiq20aUm7R+o+GXc68JZBmUKg+tQVSTw+Us8uds w1jhFa+b4UpSR+ZHOhR5Hhiw1mdRPu5TAwdtzA0CgYBJpQxnTVdY/YePNoFEQcye d1K4P6flKYvmwfEASC+oK54ti2UTEpYpI92U8eVbl7T7Bug/T3ehNIBIq0msLpNe TVHZqK8FNaR7QGEo9QrfR35+p+38SkK4+ikQkohxLxrr5giFtoGV5hqYnMs7Ubp1 /nmgCiQJlZIOQHBhMBp/4QKBgEog3OgNz5gPHp0SE8AdJIeVvjUwECGbriTlAEMg VboTArHdnL/pNH649sajPCWrjR0FO7/zEzlFgGhEXMYSoEFO30MqJ5ghK9h/ARTJ M/zRo1jGKnuudLElj2xyhSzAZ7g/t7Z0uT3WQqUTmk56vNhxZLmORm3lTdG9t7s+ 1dBJAoGBAJWKz/T/0PQLOOggof0KzEciehWuLcV0eLid16DaNWwiVkm88zt54MdB FkbsXWJpQxYpKCxt4XaZGBVP5yLIkrWjElWMtrZPh3pYR8WJQTwosv74n7roBt80 9ejTR8GQ7401BS7foMjCnVevrl2UwN5SPvtYsLLEMxYGGgSwfz9D -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----