7 ms·
Er, actually reading the specification, it's about proxying http resources, not https ones. This proposal is strictly better than the transparent proxying that'
by quotemstr 13y ago
Er, actually reading the specification, it's about proxying http resources, not https ones. This proposal is strictly better than the transparent proxying that's common on the internet today.
To distinguish between an HTTP2 connection meant to transport "https"
URIs resources and an HTTP2 connection meant to transport "http" URIs
resource, the draft proposes to
register a new value in the Application Layer Protocol negotiation
(ALPN) Protocol IDs registry specific to signal the usage of HTTP2
to transport "http" URIs resources: h2clr.
...
4.3. Secure Forward Proxy and https URIs
The Proxy intercepts the TLS ClientHello analyses the application
layer protocol negotiation extension field and if it contains "h2"
value it does not do anything and let the TLS handshake continue and
the TLS session be established between the User-Agent and the Server
(see Figure 8).
- vezzy-fnord 13y agoRead the rest. You'll see that these proxies also serve as handlers for all TLS sessions.
- quotemstr 13y agoWhere does it say that?
- vezzy-fnord 13y ago3.1.1 TLS Handshake with Proxy certificate When the user has given consent to the use of a proxy, the User-Agent SHOULD store this consent so that the user does not have to give consent for each new TLS connection involving the proxy. The consent SHOULD be limited to the specific access and MAY be limited to a single connection to that access or limited in time. How the consent information is stored is implementation specific, but as a network may have several proxies (for network resilience) it is RECOMMENDED that the consent is only tied to the Subject field of the proxy certificate so that the consent applies to all proxy certificates with the same name. If the user has previously given consent to use the specific proxy and the user-agent has stored that, the user-agent may conclude that the user has given consent without asking the user again. If the user provides consent, the User-Agent continues the TLS handshake with the proxy. ----------- Right in the next section, it's again implied: The proxy will then notice that the TLS connection is to be used for a https resource or for a http resource for which the user wants to opt out from the proxy. The proxy will then forward the ClientHello message to the Server and the TLS connection will be end-to-end between the user-agent and the Server. ----------- Then in 3.2, again implied: When the User-Agent arrives to the portal page it becomes aware of the existence of a Proxy in the access network and receives a consent request for the proxy to stay in the path for HTTP URI resources. The user-agent then SHOULD secure user consent. When the user has given consent to the use of a proxy, both the User-Agent and the Proxy SHOULD store this consent so that the user does not have to give consent for each new TLS connection involving the proxy.
- quotemstr 13y agoThe way I'm reading the sections you've quoted, the spec merely allows proxying of https ciphertext. Every router in the internet does that already. Bear in mind that in HTTP 2.0, all connections are TLS connections. The spec sections you've quoted just say that users should only have to consent once to their "http"-resource connections being proxied; they're not talking about "https" resources.
- bbatsell 13y agoHTTP/2 changes the meaning of the http:// http:// scheme. All connections will now be TLS-encrypted. (Edit: Maybe not. See hobohacker below.) http:// http:// means that the endpoint has not been verified using the CA system and is using a self-signed certificate (and is thus trivially vulnerable to a MITM should certificate keys not be checked out-of-band). The purpose is to provide confidentiality to the vast majority of traffic, even if the authentication part of the CIA triangle isn't achieved. This proposal's purpose is to undo that and expose all traffic using the http:// http:// scheme to your ISP, exactly as it is today. (I would also note that this draft is proposed by AT&T, which is now rolling out new plans in Austin that charge an extra $30/month if you do NOT agree to them inspecting and data-mining all of your internet activity and selling it to advertisers.)
- quotemstr 13y ago> http:// http:// means that the endpoint has not been verified using the CA system and is using a self-signed certificate (and is thus trivially vulnerable to a MITM should certificate keys not be independently checked). Right. I understand that. The lack of certificate verification for the http scheme means that ISPs can MITM HTTP traffic with or without this proposal, just like they can with HTTP/1.1. So how does this proposal make things worse? > new plans in Austin that charge an extra $30/month if you do NOT agree to them inspecting and data-mining all of your web browsing and selling it to advertisers Really? That's a special kind of evil and should be illegal.
- pktgen 13y ago> Really? That's a special kind of evil and should be illegal. Nah, no need to make it illegal. He's referring to AT&T's "GigaPower" gigabit service in Austin... the same service that's available from 2 other providers for the same, or cheaper, as what AT&T's charging for their data-mined bullshit. AT&T will have a fun time getting customers when Google and Grande point that out in their attack ads. :D
- nandhp 13y agoOne other provider. Neither Google (1 Gbps, "by mid 2014") nor Time Warner (300 Mbps, "by the fall of 2014") is yet offering comparable service. Only AT&T and Grande have any actual ultra-high-speed customers at this time.
- mst 13y agoI think the crucial thing to understanding this is this diagram - UserAgent Proxy Server TLS Session #1 TLS Session #2 <------------> <-------------> HTTP <-----------------------------------> which makes it clear that the point is to be able to say "I trust this proxy sufficiently that I'm ok with it acting as an intermediary, but I still don't want my stuff in the clear between me and the proxy or between the proxy and the far end server." So it's about enabling the user to trust -only- the proxy, whereas currently in order to get utility out of a proxy you need to send the traffic as plain HTTP which then trusts both the proxy and the networks over which the data will travel. That seems to me to absolutely meet the requirements for "strictly better".
- mirkules 13y agoIf your definition of "better" is simply "faster", then yes, it is better. If you care about security of your data, end-to-end, this is worse (as others have pointed out because of your ISP being a MitM). In addition, now we are introducing another vector of attack for bad guys to exploit - how enticing does it sound that every ISP becomes a root certificate authority, essentially?
- patrickmcmanus 13y agoindeed - but I think its even worse than that, because even "faster" is rather contextual. proxies can inject dog leg routes, single points of failure, computational and i/o bottlenecks and they make lovely centralized dos and data theft targets. They also often downgrade you out of performance enhancements that the client and server would have negotiated if they had been speaking directly (e.g. some actually block compression negotiation so they can observe the content of more flows with less cpu). Sometimes they do make things faster though - its just not clear to me why we want to continue to centralize that approach rather than distributing it across the network given all the baggage proxying carries.
- mst 13y agoYour ISP could be MitM-ing your plaintext HTTP already, and it's the use cases that we currently use plaintext HTTP for that this is addressing. If you care about security of your data, end-to-end, then you should probably only use this feature, if at all, with the proxy running on a machine you control - but presumably in that case you currently aren't using plaintext HTTP for anything anyway, so I don't see how it relates.