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To play devil's advocate, this could potentially be less harmful than the existing situation: where e.g. various corporate nets will require you to install root
by MaulingMonkey 13y ago
To play devil's advocate, this could potentially be less harmful than the existing situation: where e.g. various corporate nets will require you to install root certs to accomplish the same MITM attack, in a less visible fashion (after installation), with some if not all of the same caveats - especially if given the ability to opt out.
(Bugs, insufficiently scary UI, and "discovery" are all massive concerns of course...)
- atmosx 13y agoHm, no. Various corporate networks doesn't classify as an ISP, the number of potentially abused users is not the same. A company can do whatever it wants to, an ISP offers a service and should respect the privacy of it's costumers, at least theoretically.
- wmf 13y agoThis proposal isn't intended for ISPs and should never be used on the public Internet.
- atmosx 13y agoOh, my bad then. I miss-understood the proposal and it's implications. But since the protocol supports that, how can we be sure that ISPs won't use it?
- MaulingMonkey 13y agoCynically, "we can't". Or "they already have better options". Alternatively, outcry and blacklisting ISP proxies - just as we do with root cert abuse.
- quotemstr 13y ago> various corporate nets will require you to install root certs to accomplish the same MITM attack They don't even bother making you install CA certificates. They just abuse subordinate CAs: see https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2013/02/15/announcing-version-2-1-of-mozilla-ca-certificate-policy/ https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2013/02/15/announcing-vers... I'm also a huge fan of Google's http://www.certificate-transparency.org/ http://www.certificate-transparency.org/, which makes it very difficult to fool very many people for very long.