3 ms·
Seems like a reasonable[1] approach would be to have a custom handshake using pre-generated pre-shared secrets (using eg AES-GCM ?). You'd probably want separat
by e12e 13y ago
Seems like a reasonable[1] approach would be to have a custom handshake using pre-generated pre-shared secrets (using eg AES-GCM ?). You'd probably want separate keys pr vm though -- which I suppose defeats the point (If you can do that, just give each vm its ssh/ssl-key(s) from "outside"...).
Perhaps it is possible to do something along these lines with TLS-PSK? If we assume a goal of no random session keys for the setup, I guess it would still be possible to a) sniff the "seed", record it for all N vms sharing a PSK b) (later) break into one out of any N vms, thus c) derive the state of all N vms entropy pool at the state of keygeneration.
The more I think about this, it seems the easiest fix is to a) make sure the host has a reasonable entropy pool b) have the host supply entropy seed to the vm when it boots. Maybe some new standard virtual entropy-seed device (might be specified as a blocking source of entropy as opposed to an unlimited tap into the hosts /dev/urandom).
At least there are things in place (like Kerberos/LDAP or AD) for managing shared secrets for the host(s) (which might not be used for managing the VMs) -- so having a service like this on all the hosts (only) should be easier than demanding all VMs have it.
Then just do a cat /dev/special_random_init_random > /dev/urandom on (vm) boot.
[1] As reasonable as it is to have a big list of per-machine shared secrets...