20 ms·

The arguments are the same as today: We don't want more controls and oversight, because our enemies could use our limitations against us to neutralize our capab

by sehugg 13y ago

The arguments are the same as today: We don't want more controls and oversight, because our enemies could use our limitations against us to neutralize our capability, and in any case strict military discipline and comprehensive personnel screening will eliminate abuse. Sound familiar?

jarrett 13y ago
There is one very significant wrinkle, though: The difference between ongoing practices and hypothetical, emergency actions. In the former case--ongoing practices--it is hard to make a credible argument against oversight. Some details may need to be withheld from the public to protect basic operation security. For example, the identities of overseas informants ought not to be disclosed, lest they be immediately imprisoned or executed by their governments. Nor should there be a Twitter feed giving up-to-the-minute location data on US special forces teams. These examples seem farcical, but they illustrate the point that at least some operational details genuinely deserve secrecy. (Unless you reject the underlying premise that the United States should conduct intelligence and military operations overseas at all. But that's a very different discussion.) But even though specific details may need to be kept secret--for a reasonable amount of time, until they're no longer actionable by enemies--the nature of the government's ongoing practices ought to be disclosed. The latter case--wherein lower-level officials are permitted to make judgment calls in time-sensitive emergencies--is rather different. This is the situation contemplated by the White House during the Cold War. As the reasoning went, the American nuclear deterrent must be credible, or else the Soviets would seize the opportunity and launch an unprovoked attack on the US, Germany, or both. If a communication breakdown between the White House and the military could render the nuclear arsenal unusable, that would tend to diminish the credibility of the deterrent. On the other hand, the risk of a lower-level official making the wrong judgment call and starting a world war is appreciable. Given these considerations, reasonable people could disagree on what the optimal policy would be. It is not unreasonable or morally repugnant to conclude that certain trusted military officers should be granted the authority to make a judgment call when a) the situation is an emergency, and b) the chain of command has broken down. Again, the key distinction here is between ongoing practices and emergency measures in a hypothetical, worst-case scenario. That distinction must affect our moral judgment of the respective policies.
- ctdonath 13y ago
  Nor should there be a Twitter feed giving up-to-the-minute location data on US special forces teams. These examples seem farcical Prime real-world example: During the Munich Olympics hostage crisis, police prepared to raid the occupied rooms with overwhelming force (a la "SWAT team"). The raid was called off at the last minute when they realized reporters were broadcasting live video of the preparations & locations, and the terrorists were watching it on TV.
  - jimktrains2 13y ago
    Shouldn't you always assume your opponent is expecting you in a situation like that?
    - Loughla 13y ago
      There is a difference between assuming that they are expecting you, and having your enemy know your every.single.move.as.you.make.it. EX: If I'm going to punch you in the back of the head, I'll sneak up behind you. You might know I'm there, you might not. Now, if I come up behind you at the same speed while yelling, "I'M COMING UP BEHIND YOU AND I'M GOING TO PUNCH YOU IN THE BACK OF THE HEAD," you'll definitely know I'm coming, and I should expect a countermeasure. That's pretty-well the difference there.
      - jimktrains2 13y ago
        If we're boxing, or another adversarial match, though wouldn't you become suspicious if I was seemingly unaware that you were behind me? This isn't a "suprise! we're here to check up on things" this is something the kidnappers should be expecting and planning for (what else do they think will happen).
        pgeorgi 13y ago
        The difference was that they knew exactly where the team would break in. The difference between "there will probably be people trying to enter the room" and "I'll shoot that guy once he breaks the window over there"

by sehugg 13y ago

jarrett 13y ago

There is one very significant wrinkle, though: The difference between ongoing practices and hypothetical, emergency actions. In the former case--ongoing practices--it is hard to make a credible argument against oversight. Some details may need to be withheld from the public to protect basic operation security. For example, the identities of overseas informants ought not to be disclosed, lest they be immediately imprisoned or executed by their governments. Nor should there be a Twitter feed giving up-to-the-minute location data on US special forces teams. These examples seem farcical, but they illustrate the point that at least some operational details genuinely deserve secrecy. (Unless you reject the underlying premise that the United States should conduct intelligence and military operations overseas at all. But that's a very different discussion.) But even though specific details may need to be kept secret--for a reasonable amount of time, until they're no longer actionable by enemies--the nature of the government's ongoing practices ought to be disclosed. The latter case--wherein lower-level officials are permitted to make judgment calls in time-sensitive emergencies--is rather different. This is the situation contemplated by the White House during the Cold War. As the reasoning went, the American nuclear deterrent must be credible, or else the Soviets would seize the opportunity and launch an unprovoked attack on the US, Germany, or both. If a communication breakdown between the White House and the military could render the nuclear arsenal unusable, that would tend to diminish the credibility of the deterrent. On the other hand, the risk of a lower-level official making the wrong judgment call and starting a world war is appreciable. Given these considerations, reasonable people could disagree on what the optimal policy would be. It is not unreasonable or morally repugnant to conclude that certain trusted military officers should be granted the authority to make a judgment call when a) the situation is an emergency, and b) the chain of command has broken down. Again, the key distinction here is between ongoing practices and emergency measures in a hypothetical, worst-case scenario. That distinction must affect our moral judgment of the respective policies.

ctdonath 13y ago
Nor should there be a Twitter feed giving up-to-the-minute location data on US special forces teams. These examples seem farcical Prime real-world example: During the Munich Olympics hostage crisis, police prepared to raid the occupied rooms with overwhelming force (a la "SWAT team"). The raid was called off at the last minute when they realized reporters were broadcasting live video of the preparations & locations, and the terrorists were watching it on TV.
- jimktrains2 13y ago
  Shouldn't you always assume your opponent is expecting you in a situation like that?
  - Loughla 13y ago
    There is a difference between assuming that they are expecting you, and having your enemy know your every.single.move.as.you.make.it. EX: If I'm going to punch you in the back of the head, I'll sneak up behind you. You might know I'm there, you might not. Now, if I come up behind you at the same speed while yelling, "I'M COMING UP BEHIND YOU AND I'M GOING TO PUNCH YOU IN THE BACK OF THE HEAD," you'll definitely know I'm coming, and I should expect a countermeasure. That's pretty-well the difference there.
    - jimktrains2 13y ago
      If we're boxing, or another adversarial match, though wouldn't you become suspicious if I was seemingly unaware that you were behind me? This isn't a "suprise! we're here to check up on things" this is something the kidnappers should be expecting and planning for (what else do they think will happen).
      - pgeorgi 13y ago
        The difference was that they knew exactly where the team would break in. The difference between "there will probably be people trying to enter the room" and "I'll shoot that guy once he breaks the window over there"