5 ms·

The new era of encryption will be marked not by making existing encryption solutions more secure, but by concealing the very act of existence of encrypted data.

by gesman 13y ago

The new era of encryption will be marked not by making existing encryption solutions more secure, but by concealing the very act of existence of encrypted data. "Here's my data but you cannot read it" - does not runs so well with courts, high stakes competitors and deep pocketed enemies. Once it is known "what to crack" the "how to" solution will be found. "Rubber hose cryptography" is one of these :) If you're not possessing anything to crack (or so "they" think), you're safe :)

vezzy-fnord 13y ago
That would be steganography then, which is distinct.
deeringc 13y ago
The flip side of this is that it becomes impossible for someone to prove that they haven't got an encrypted volume stored somewhere. It will be interesting to see in which way the courts go with this.
- maxerickson 13y ago
  That's always been impossible.
  - alexkus 13y ago
    Not always (as long as you're talking about something they are in possession of, you're right if you mean you can't prove that you don't have some flash drive hidden somewhere but, then again, it need not be encrypted if they don't have access to it). To start simply, it's certainly possible to prove that a disk installed with a base install of an OS (and then never touched) contains no encrypted volumes if all of the remaining blocks are empty. Every file can be compared to a known good copy and if there's no other data anywhere on the disk then there can't be anything hidden on it. From there it's a case of proving that each bit of extra data on this disk relates to a file available under the OS or a fragment of such a file (now deleted). This gets progressively harder the more the disk has been used. It impossible to deny this when you have a GB+ sized area of unpartitioned data (or unmounted partition) containing seemingly random noise. Or a similar GB+ sized file that you cannot demonstrate to be something benign by unpacking/decrypting/etc. "It's a file of random noise I generated" is going to set off the alarm bells.
    - boobsbr 13y ago
      If I remember correctly, when you buy a blank hard drive, and then format it, the formatting tool does not zero out the entire partition. The empty space left after a base install of an OS is note literally all zeroes or ones, it's random noise. Am I wrong or outdated on this?
    - maxerickson 13y ago
      I think that knowability is one place where it pays to be careful and pedantic. So in that framework "stored somewhere" is a long ways from "You can characterize the contents of a known drive".
randywaterhouse 13y ago
Implementations of crypto, such as Truecrypt, rely on algorithms/ciphers such as AES which (in some modes) basically appears random... But the appearance of randomness is not enough if someone is convinced there is meaningful data there. Of course, a break such as "we can tell if there's a hidden truecrypt volume" is bad, and if I recall correctly there are ways of doing this now. You'd need to basically never transmit the data, transmission automatically implies there is something there. If you didn't transmit, just used the data locally... And it appeared random, you'd have a pretty solid case for "they can't know". But if you slip up just once it's all over. They know.
- 6d0debc071 13y ago
  Or, transmit random data on a schedule indistinguishable from the actual data, I suppose.
  - jballanc 13y ago
    Hence numbers stations: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Numbers_stations http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Numbers_stations
    - kaoD 13y ago
      Number stations are always so creepy. Now I'm scared to get out of my room.
goggles99 13y ago
I am not following you. Concealing? do you mean physically hiding the media on which it is stored? Like a flash chip in a tie clasp? If you mean concealing as in hidden partitions, data streams, or digital Stenography - these are all easily detectable upon close inspection. If there is extra bits where none are expected, this becomes a giveaway. Perhaps enough misdirection and a custom strategy of hiding could further obfuscate the location and content of the data, but as for hiding it's existence - this is not easily accomplished (if even possible).
- kenj0418 13y ago
  TrueCrypt offers a volume-within-a-volume option. The free space of a volume normally contains random data, and the hidden volume is presumably headerless. The idea is then to put something that you might want to hide in the outer volume (freaky porn, for example), then put your actual secrets (evidence of your criminal enterprise, for example) in the hidden volume. If forced to disclose the password, then only the outer volume is apparent and you can disclose that under duress.
  - tlrobinson 13y ago
    I think on most operating systems the free space usually contains remnants of deleted files, not random data, unless you use some sort of secure deletion mechanism (srm, etc). If the free space of your volume contains truly random looking data then there would be reason to suspect a hidden volume. Presumably that's not the case with TrueCrypt volume-within-a--volumes, but if you're using TrueCrypt there's already reason to suspect you might have hidden volumes. It's impossible to prove the existence or nonexistence of hidden volumes, but that could be a good or bad thing depending on your adversary's willingness to jail/torture/kill you on suspicion alone. I'm not aware of hidden volume software that integrates with "unsuspicious" file systems. Does something like that exist?
  - jessaustin 13y ago
    This isn't a panacea. Check out what the dm-crypt folks have to say about it (question 5.2): https://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/wiki/FrequentlyAskedQuestions#5._Security_Aspects https://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/wiki/FrequentlyAskedQue... tl;dr: even if your adversary can't "prove" you have another encrypted volume, when they can see all the random data on your disk or inside the "outer" volume, you can't prove you don't have an "inner" one. In a situation shitty enough that you're compelled to divulge incriminating secrets, you're boned whether you have another secret volume or not. Elsewhere in the FAQ they propose zeroing out unused space on your disk whenever travelling to totalitarian states that could demand decryption keys.
ot 13y ago
Interestingly, this is something Julian Assange worked on several year before starting Wikileaks: Starting around 1997, he co-invented the Rubberhose deniable encryption system, a cryptographic concept made into a software package for the Linux operating system designed to provide plausible deniability against rubber-hose cryptanalysis;[68] he originally intended the system to be used "as a tool for human rights workers who needed to protect sensitive data in the field." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Julian_Assange#Computer_programming_and_other_employment http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Julian_Assange#Computer_program...
- pessimizer 13y ago
  https://web.archive.org/web/20110709154812/http://iq.org/~proff/rubberhose.org/ https://web.archive.org/web/20110709154812/http://iq.org/~pr...
scrrr 13y ago
By the way, this is exactly why the NSA will not catch many terrorists. You can always hide data and you can always hide communication (which is just data written and read by two different endpoints).
- takeda 13y ago
  Spying on terrorists is just a red herring to keep public calm about it. I don't think NSA really cares about it, there are far more valuable benefits of spying.

by gesman 13y ago

vezzy-fnord 13y ago

That would be steganography then, which is distinct.

deeringc 13y ago

The flip side of this is that it becomes impossible for someone to prove that they haven't got an encrypted volume stored somewhere. It will be interesting to see in which way the courts go with this.

maxerickson 13y ago
That's always been impossible.
- alexkus 13y ago
  Not always (as long as you're talking about something they are in possession of, you're right if you mean you can't prove that you don't have some flash drive hidden somewhere but, then again, it need not be encrypted if they don't have access to it). To start simply, it's certainly possible to prove that a disk installed with a base install of an OS (and then never touched) contains no encrypted volumes if all of the remaining blocks are empty. Every file can be compared to a known good copy and if there's no other data anywhere on the disk then there can't be anything hidden on it. From there it's a case of proving that each bit of extra data on this disk relates to a file available under the OS or a fragment of such a file (now deleted). This gets progressively harder the more the disk has been used. It impossible to deny this when you have a GB+ sized area of unpartitioned data (or unmounted partition) containing seemingly random noise. Or a similar GB+ sized file that you cannot demonstrate to be something benign by unpacking/decrypting/etc. "It's a file of random noise I generated" is going to set off the alarm bells.
  - boobsbr 13y ago
    If I remember correctly, when you buy a blank hard drive, and then format it, the formatting tool does not zero out the entire partition. The empty space left after a base install of an OS is note literally all zeroes or ones, it's random noise. Am I wrong or outdated on this?
  - maxerickson 13y ago
    I think that knowability is one place where it pays to be careful and pedantic. So in that framework "stored somewhere" is a long ways from "You can characterize the contents of a known drive".

randywaterhouse 13y ago

Implementations of crypto, such as Truecrypt, rely on algorithms/ciphers such as AES which (in some modes) basically appears random... But the appearance of randomness is not enough if someone is convinced there is meaningful data there. Of course, a break such as "we can tell if there's a hidden truecrypt volume" is bad, and if I recall correctly there are ways of doing this now. You'd need to basically never transmit the data, transmission automatically implies there is something there. If you didn't transmit, just used the data locally... And it appeared random, you'd have a pretty solid case for "they can't know". But if you slip up just once it's all over. They know.

6d0debc071 13y ago
Or, transmit random data on a schedule indistinguishable from the actual data, I suppose.
- jballanc 13y ago
  Hence numbers stations: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Numbers_stations http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Numbers_stations
  - kaoD 13y ago
    Number stations are always so creepy. Now I'm scared to get out of my room.

goggles99 13y ago

I am not following you. Concealing? do you mean physically hiding the media on which it is stored? Like a flash chip in a tie clasp? If you mean concealing as in hidden partitions, data streams, or digital Stenography - these are all easily detectable upon close inspection. If there is extra bits where none are expected, this becomes a giveaway. Perhaps enough misdirection and a custom strategy of hiding could further obfuscate the location and content of the data, but as for hiding it's existence - this is not easily accomplished (if even possible).

kenj0418 13y ago
TrueCrypt offers a volume-within-a-volume option. The free space of a volume normally contains random data, and the hidden volume is presumably headerless. The idea is then to put something that you might want to hide in the outer volume (freaky porn, for example), then put your actual secrets (evidence of your criminal enterprise, for example) in the hidden volume. If forced to disclose the password, then only the outer volume is apparent and you can disclose that under duress.
- tlrobinson 13y ago
  I think on most operating systems the free space usually contains remnants of deleted files, not random data, unless you use some sort of secure deletion mechanism (srm, etc). If the free space of your volume contains truly random looking data then there would be reason to suspect a hidden volume. Presumably that's not the case with TrueCrypt volume-within-a--volumes, but if you're using TrueCrypt there's already reason to suspect you might have hidden volumes. It's impossible to prove the existence or nonexistence of hidden volumes, but that could be a good or bad thing depending on your adversary's willingness to jail/torture/kill you on suspicion alone. I'm not aware of hidden volume software that integrates with "unsuspicious" file systems. Does something like that exist?
- jessaustin 13y ago
  This isn't a panacea. Check out what the dm-crypt folks have to say about it (question 5.2): https://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/wiki/FrequentlyAskedQuestions#5._Security_Aspects https://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/wiki/FrequentlyAskedQue... tl;dr: even if your adversary can't "prove" you have another encrypted volume, when they can see all the random data on your disk or inside the "outer" volume, you can't prove you don't have an "inner" one. In a situation shitty enough that you're compelled to divulge incriminating secrets, you're boned whether you have another secret volume or not. Elsewhere in the FAQ they propose zeroing out unused space on your disk whenever travelling to totalitarian states that could demand decryption keys.

ot 13y ago

Interestingly, this is something Julian Assange worked on several year before starting Wikileaks: Starting around 1997, he co-invented the Rubberhose deniable encryption system, a cryptographic concept made into a software package for the Linux operating system designed to provide plausible deniability against rubber-hose cryptanalysis;[68] he originally intended the system to be used "as a tool for human rights workers who needed to protect sensitive data in the field." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Julian_Assange#Computer_programming_and_other_employment http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Julian_Assange#Computer_program...

pessimizer 13y ago
https://web.archive.org/web/20110709154812/http://iq.org/~proff/rubberhose.org/ https://web.archive.org/web/20110709154812/http://iq.org/~pr...

scrrr 13y ago

By the way, this is exactly why the NSA will not catch many terrorists. You can always hide data and you can always hide communication (which is just data written and read by two different endpoints).

takeda 13y ago
Spying on terrorists is just a red herring to keep public calm about it. I don't think NSA really cares about it, there are far more valuable benefits of spying.