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Telegram secret chat geolocation leak
- ch0wn 13y agoI really hope that of all those issues that were raised over the last weeks some make it out of our tech bubble into the consumer world. All of us know pretty well by now that this software is probably never going to be trustworthy and shouldn’t be used for any purposes that require confidentiality or authenticity, but I’m afraid that this is overshadowed by their “military-grade” marketing efforts for people outside of this scene.
- judk 13y agoHas anyone outside of the tech bubble heard of Telegram?
- eps 13y agoLet's try and not turn every flaw of every Telegram app into the OMG-look-at-these-morons fiesta. This is an issue with a specific version of one out of many apps, not a protocol issue and it hardly warrants the near-hysterical "NEVER" in the title.
- ge0rg 13y agoYou would be right if the telegram developers haven't started with ridiculous security claims ("military-grade", "unbreakable"). Their marketing implies you can use telegram for sensitive communication, which in practice you can not. If you are a political dissident and use the app, you might get jailed or killed due to the fake sense of security. Secure IM is not for hiding your diary from your sister any more.
- rlwolfcastle 13y agoWhat they need is military grade math Ph.Ds
- hwh 13y agoThey might unintendedly have those already.
- tonetheman 13y agoExactly++
- ge0rg 13y agotl;dr: if a geolocation is sent via telegram "secret chat" (end-to-end encrypted), the telegram android app will use clear-text google maps api to display the map, thus revealing the location to passive adversaries. according to a comment, this issue is already fixed in the source and an update for Google Play is in the works.
- coherentpony 13y agoThank you.
- sillysaurus2 13y agoIf Telegram had hired any decent security company to go over their design, then this bug would have been caught, because this is a rookie mistake. One of the most basic security requirements for any app is that all network traffic is protected via SSL, so that would've been one of the first things that a decent appsec company would've checked. Telegram could hire an appsec company to analyze their design, but they're choosing not to.
- aioprisan 13y agoAgreed, the fact that no credible security firm was hired to analyze their entire architecture and implementation screams of something wrong happening here. Either that or gross negligence, neither of which are reassuring.
- AsymetricCom 13y agoMessages through the iPhone's default messenger also have geolocation data embedded.
- scotty79 13y agoI think all the hate towards Telegram might be good for them. Provided that they have thick enough skin to suffer through it. They will emerge as the bulltet proof communication tool they wish to be. As for me anything that kills skype is worth rooting for.
- ch0wn 13y agoAs tptacek explained very well yesterday, this is not the way crypto systems are built: > Be honest with yourself. Crypto doesn't get beta-tested into resiliency. Strong systems start out strong. If you're building something because its your dream to thwart the NSA, don't kid yourself into thinking that you'll get there by first protecting people's Warcraft clans. (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6961260 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6961260)
- unicornporn 13y agoYes, and don't forget that if the NSA gets direct access (by threat, payment or persuasion) to their infrastructure these bold statements mean null. Secure communication will NOT be centralized.
- eps 13y agotptacek said it! Hallelujah! One man's beta-testing is another man's peer review. They are fundamentally the same process, so - sure, you can iterate your crypto design into a better shape by releasing a production app and attracting the reviewers by making over-the-board marketing claims. It's certainly more conventional to request feedback during the design phase, but it doesn't mean that doing it ass-backwards is not an option. In the end it's the underlying motivation that matters.
- nav1 13y agoThey are not the same process at all. Releasing a secure messaging application that leaks data is really not okay.
- 13y ago
- raverbashing 13y agoYes, it's possible to query Google Maps using the API over HTTPS But even better would be to not have geolocation. Or just send the GPS coordinates without any API help (might be impossible on an Android phone)
- venomsnake 13y agoIt is quite possible - triangulating the cells can locate you up to 100 meters in city conditions with no problems.
- TelegramApp 13y agoOne of the Telegram apps for Android did use Google Maps in http-mode. The issue was fixed within an hour, and the update is on its way to Play Market, containing several other security-related improvements. At this moment we are working together with security experts on code review for our client applications. We awarded the person who discovered the bug and are designing a bug bounty program, which will be rolled out soon.
- enraged_camel 13y ago>>We awarded the person who discovered the bug How much did you award them?
- louwrentius 13y agoHow the F* is it possible that your app's reason of existence depends on proper security and you miss usage of HTTP where only HTTPS should be used? A vulnerability like that could be found with a proper grep on the source code. But even that seems to be too much effort.
- jere 13y agoIt may be worth pointing that the Telegram FAQ claims there are two Android apps and they were both developed through a contest (I assume by third party developers). I'm curious if it was the N or S edition? http://telegram.org/faq#q-why-do-you-have-two-android-apps http://telegram.org/faq#q-why-do-you-have-two-android-apps
- litemn 13y agoLeak was in the N edition.
- nationcrafting 13y agoGood on you for being so quick to implement these bug fixes. Others on HN have commented that the iteration process is probably not the best way to approach crypto, due to the high risk for the end user. It seems obvious to me that nothing in this world is ever bug-free, and there is no such thing as foolproof where time is involved. You might as well accept this, and actually embrace it. It seems to me Telegram are embracing it very well. Telegram is not robust at any point in time, but it is antifragile, since it benefits from shocks to become stronger over time. Like Hydra's heads, you can cut them off, but they will grow back twice as numerous. This is actually much better than robustness, it just doesn't look like it, because heads being cut off is more memorable and mediatic than heads growing back. Of course, there is the argument that such high claims should not have been made on buggy software. But it is because such high claims were made, and because crypto people got annoyed about them, that everyone has been trying to break it, thus rendering it more foolproof. It's annoying, but it's clearly working: at this rate of improvement, I'd be surprised if the product weren't pretty damn good in just a few months' time. If anyone has doubts over the current version, well, just don't use it in life-threatening situations until you're reasonably confident about it being fit for your purposes, which is an assessment that will also depend on the person or institution you're trying to avoid, and the quality of resources they have at their disposal.
- kyberias 13y agoSo what are the implications for application DESIGN? None. It was just a mistake in not using SSL. Next.
- mannykannot 13y agoI am curious as to what you think design is. And what 'just' means, for that matter.
- cmiles74 13y agoPerhaps this means that is was "just" poorly "designed".
- venomsnake 13y agoAlso any company that had credit card and password info stolen were just made a mistake of not using proper KDF. Those types of errors are scary not just because what they are but because it is interesting what else is wrong.
- DanBC 13y ago> It was just a mistake in not using SSL. In a secure, crypto, application? You can see how that's a bit concerning? I'm not quite sure why programmers release crypto apps as "SECURE", instead of "We'd like this to be secure, so we're releasing this beta edition with a bug bounty. Don't use it for safety critical applications yet."
- kyberias 13y agoLook, I'm not saying it's not concerning. I'm saying this does not imply anything on the design of the application. If the only lesson I can get from this is "to use SSL", then the design lesson wasn't very illuminating. Get it?
- al2o3cr 13y ago"None" is a bit strong - after all, we're talking about people who have assured us that their boffins are smart enough to roll a new cryptosystem who then turn around and fail Security 101.
- deleted 13y ago[deleted]
- tszming 13y agoEven you are using HTTPS to call Google Maps API, it is useless if NSA can access the contents in plain text inside the Google datacenter. Why not just remove it? [1] http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-in...
- venomsnake 13y agoWhy is such feature even enabled in a "secure" application is even better question. After all you may be dealing with compromised endpoints or evil maids - so showing your location is stupid.
- deleted 13y ago[deleted]