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What's particularly interesting is that some of the recent disclosures don't seem to be visible inside the bubble. Take this assertion, for instance: "The NSA
by rst 13y ago
What's particularly interesting is that some of the recent disclosures don't seem to be visible inside the bubble. Take this assertion, for instance:
"The NSA copy of my emails won't be viewed by police or FBI investigating me about marijuana use, for instance. Law enforcement might get a search warrant and retrieve a copy from Google, but not from the NSA."
In fact, it's been known for months that the DEA receives intercepts from the NSA in such volume that they have an office devoted to handling them (the DEA's "Special Operations Division"). And as for search warrants, the manuals for that office describe a practice of "parallel construction" which involves, not to put to fine a point on it, lying about the ultimate source of the information they're using, with the clear intent of evading judicial scrutiny.
Details here: http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/07/us-dea-irs-idUSBRE9761AZ20130807 http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/07/us-dea-irs-idUSBRE...
- sitkack 13y agoIt really depends on how widely it is reported. Government employees even those with clearance are prohibited from looking at the wikileaks cables. If it makes it into the NYT and they see it, then it is ok. But they can't actively dig for it. Direct from the mouths of government employees.
- windexh8er 13y agoAgain, an assumption that a magical unicorn guards the morality of being told what someone can or cannot do should be understood as a non-trustworthy system. Especially one that is referred to as the NSA in very general terms - as they have no control over employees or data dissemination / exfiltration. And, yes, the last statement is fact based on all of the supporting evidence in the public domain. If one thinks otherwise I politely redirect you back to aforementioned magical unicorns.
- secthrowaway 13y agoOutside of magical unicorns, what kind of unicorn should guard things? I'm afraid automated systems don't offer either the coverage or the flexibility to provide what you think should be provided.
- X4 13y agoYes, but why can Loren Sands-Ramshaw use a blog, where he critics his employer and also use Kickstarter without getting fired? Not that I want him to get fired, but I worry that he risks his job in telling us this critical information! Aren't those things, a spy shouldn't have? Is the working strategy, filling the web with disinformation about NSA employees, or is it to never use the web with a real identity for the period of contractual employment? I mean, from a technological standpoint, every single HN member would love to work for the NSA. Because they have an extremely sophisticated set of technology that people would like to get their hands on. (Well, that's at least what we think they have). Keep in mind though, that in reality only a very small percentage of HN would actually like to work for the NSA! This is not because of the recent revelations, but because the government in general has not a positive image for most hackers.
- rst 13y agoHe's no longer employed by the NSA. He left to play with a startup and some personal coding projects; the last paragraph of his post links to them. Any discussion of his employment there still gets reviewed by the NSA, but that's routine for anyone who does classified work. (And he does say up front that he sought that review, and that they had no problem with him posting what the rest of us read.)
- X4 13y agoThank you :)
- sans-serif 13y agoThen it's even more important that we read this blog post in the knowledge that it's the one that made it past NSA screening. We'll never know how many didn't.
- wcfields 13y agoWhat's the legal term? I think it's "double construction"? Where the prosecution knows it's you from illegal means (wiretap/NSA spying) but by that knowledge can go back and construct the legal case in reverse. It's been rumored that Dread Pirate Of SilkRoad case was figured out that way.
- SideburnsOfDoom 13y agoIt is parallel construction http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6911150 http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6911150
- mattlutze 13y agoThe story around DPR getting caught started in him making posts that had personally identifiable information from his anonymous accounts in the very beginning, not from illegal searches. That's just a really long scraping / pattern-matching exercise of publicly available data, and the reminder that even particularly clever people won't be on point 100% of the time.
- koide 13y agoOr they did find him illegally and found later on the public pattern-matching exercise to justify their findings. Which is exactly the point of parallel construction. We cannot know.
- dragonwriter 13y ago> What's the legal term? I think it's "double construction"? Where the prosecution knows it's you from illegal means (wiretap/NSA spying) but by that knowledge can go back and construct the legal case in reverse. I think the technical term is either "perjury" or "fraud on the court". The euphemism, though, is "parallel construction".
- blocking_io 13y agoIt is not necessarily illegal means, but simply means that the government do not want to expose in open court. Perhaps this is because they are illegal, or perhaps revealing the source of intelligence could compromise an active intelligence operation. The NSA does not want its methods exposed in open court. You will probably say that this is because they are illegal. But an equally plausible explanation is that revealing details of their capabilities is of benefit to their adversaries.
- czr80 13y agoThis is an interesting article, thanks for sharing. Your summary does not quite reflect the article though. You say "In fact, it's been known for months that the DEA receives intercepts from the NSA in such volume that they have an office devoted to handling them (the DEA's "Special Operations Division")", which to me created the impression that the NSA was funneling large amounts of information about US citizens to the DEA. However, the article actually says: "...two dozen arms of the government working with the Special Operations Division, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Security Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency.", and later that "the Special Operations Division of the DEA funnels information from overseas NSA intercepts, domestic wiretaps, informants and a large DEA database of telephone records to authorities nationwide to help them launch criminal investigations of Americans. The DEA phone database is distinct from a NSA database disclosed by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden." [emphasis mine] It's quite possible that the NSA passed only occasional information about non-US citizens - it's impossible to tell from that article - if that's the case, then to many people they're acting within their mandate. I'm not trying to defend the NSA, and I'm deeply troubled by the implications of mass surveillance. But it's important I think to be clear about the claims we're making since otherwise it's easy for people to dismiss us.
- rst 13y agoThanks for the close reading. I guess it depends what you think "no domestic intercepts" excludes, and how much you believe that everyone in the NSA follows the rules. Even if most of them do, a few have the tools to become a very big problem --- and the rest of the organization wouldn't necessarily know, since in an organization like the NSA, people aren't supposed to know what's happening in the office down the hall. To start with the scope of what's available: it almost certainly includes data on US persons "incidentally" acquired in taps on an authorized target. I'm not aware of anything on DEA procedures there specifically, but as for the general rules, see here: http://www.emptywheel.net/2013/11/08/the-intelligence-communitys-wide-open-unprotected-back-door-to-all-your-content/ http://www.emptywheel.net/2013/11/08/the-intelligence-commun... Of course, even if NSA analysts know that they have DEA "customers" (as they apparently call the recipients of their intelligence), it might be a breach of the rules to select overseas targets which would be likely to have domestic contacts of interest to the DEA. But given that knowingly breaking the rules in pursuit of an authorized goal seems to count in NSA audits as mere "lack of due diligence", and not classed as "abuse", I'm not sure how much comfort to take from that. Analysis of NSA audit data from Marcy Wheeler here: http://www.emptywheel.net/2013/08/16/lack-of-due-diligence-the-nsas-the-analyst-didnt-give-a-fuck-violation/ http://www.emptywheel.net/2013/08/16/lack-of-due-diligence-t... ... with further notes on the audit process, and narrow definitions of "abuse" here: http://www.emptywheel.net/2013/08/20/if-nsa-commits-database-query-violations-but-nobody-audits-them-do-they-really-happen/ http://www.emptywheel.net/2013/08/20/if-nsa-commits-database...
- coldpie 13y agoYes, this stood out at me too. As soon as I read that statement, I knew the author was either lying or underinformed. Thanks for providing the article.