6 ms·
TPM chip protecting SSH keys from being copied or stolen
- wmf 13y agoDoes this allow the host key to be stored in the TPM?
- makomk 13y agoI'd be worried about that leading to a denial-of-service attack on ssh; TPM crypto operations are really slow.
- majke 13y agoRecently I wanted to find if Apple hardware ships with a TPM chip. This article from 2006 suggests it doesn't: http://www.osxbook.com/book/bonus/chapter7/tpmdrmmyth/ http://www.osxbook.com/book/bonus/chapter7/tpmdrmmyth/ BTW This site is fascinating, for example here's on Apple encryption of binaries: http://osxbook.com/book/bonus/chapter7/binaryprotection/ http://osxbook.com/book/bonus/chapter7/binaryprotection/
- pudquick 13y agoInitial models did ship with a TPM, but current ones do not. Install Windows Vista or later via Bootcamp and it'll gladly tell you about the lack of any such chip.
- csmuk 13y agoAre you sure? Just because the ACPI/BIOS doesn't present it to the kernel, doesn't mean it's not there.
- nathan_f77 13y agoNo Apple computers have had a TPM chip since 2006. [1] [1] http://www.pcworld.com/article/157966/laptop_security.html http://www.pcworld.com/article/157966/laptop_security.html
- nivla 13y agoWhat is the general consensus on TPM? Is it trustable? Bitlocker is the only encryption I know that makes use of it. Weirdly, Truecrypt is stern about never ever using it. Assuming no foul play, I think a combination of TPM (Hardware based Keys), Secure boot and Open source encryption should be enough to keep your data safe from any prying eyes.
- J_Darnley 13y ago> What is the general consensus on TPM? I want to know this too. Last I ever heard about TPM was that Treacherous Computing campaign which said that TPM was supposed to be the ultimate DRM scheme which was supposed to lock you out of your media, files, and the computer if it didn't like what you were doing.
- dlitz 13y agoTPM chips are designed to enforce the rules of whoever controls the TPM chip over the will of whoever is sitting at the computer. This can be good or bad, depending on who those respective parties are.
- MichaelGG 13y agoAre there any TPM implementations where the user doesn't control the TPM? And by user, I mean the owner of the physical device (so a company over its laptops, a person over their laptops). I've not heard of any TPM that has some other owner, like the claims against TPMs have said. TPMs aren't needed to provide a DRM scenario - UEFI Secure Boot can do that by itself, right?
- nocoment 13y ago> Are there any TPM implementations where the user doesn't control the TPM? The design of the TPM prevents the user from ever fully controlling it, so complete revocation of access is unnecessary. Anything in the system/bootup can update a PCR, revoking some or all access to essential keys. Take the chromebook I am using right now. The user can disable secureboot (which isn't actually implemented with the TPM) and use an unsigned image, but can not create an image signed by themselves. With either boot, I nominally have control of the TPM, so far so good. But the PCR values written by the boot process will be different so I can not use keys from one boot in the other. For example, my encrypted filesystems from the google boot are inaccessible. This is great for the security of my data if my chromebook is stolen. But it also means a web service like my companies' VPN or MPAA's movie server could demand that I use attestment to show I am using a google configured chromebook, if I did a custom boot the attestment will not have the right PCR values, so I am incapable of using the service. > TPMs aren't needed to provide a DRM scenario - UEFI Secure Boot can do that by itself, right? AFAIK, UEFI secure boot limits the device based on a list of public keys, but has no access to any form of secret key. So booting an insecure clone to contact a DRM protected service (or otherwise emulate the secured device) works perfectly fine.
- deleted 13y ago[deleted]
- whatcd 13y agoInformation on how Chrome OS uses TPM chips: http://www.chromium.org/developers/design-documents/tpm-usage http://www.chromium.org/developers/design-documents/tpm-usag...
- kyboren 13y agoNeat, if you disregard the (justified? unjustified?) widespread suspicion of TPMs. However, this only prevents an attacker copying the key to another machine. If the attacker has access to that key, then they have access to your machine. Not much stops them from installing malware and using your machine as a proxy for the session they want to establish to the endpoint (with the additional benefit of appearing to connect to that endpoint from your machine in any connection logs). It should be noted that ssh, gpg-agent, and OpenPGP smart cards already provide the capability to store an SSH key on a removable smart card. Storing your key on a smart card provides the additional barriers that such a proxying setup would only work 1) while you have the card inserted, and 2) if you authorize that access by entering the PIN (optionally through an un-observable channel if you have a Class II or III reader). Of course such hypothetical malware would still be able to inject commands into a session once you log on to the endpoint, but it would be much harder to avoid your detection. Of course, most modern machines come with a TPM (right? correct me if I'm wrong), while very few people have an OpenPGP smart card.
- MichaelGG 13y agoSuspicion of TPMs has, so far, been just wrong. Most machines don't have TPMs; they're usually a feature on "business" laptops. Lenovo's ThinkPads have them, IdeaPads don't. But now Windows 8.1 apparently makes OEMs ship a TPM to provide transparent device encryption for tablets - so it should become more commonplace. (It might only be for ARM devices though.) I'd assume those TPMs provide the full APIs and capabilities others do.
- salient 13y agoIntel has a habit of trickling down features of "business chips" to the consumer chips. If I'm not mistaken, they may even be the same chips, Intel just disables those features for lower-end chips. So it's just a matter of time. I think it's right to be very suspicious of these chips, especially since Intel has been awfully quiet despite all the accusations, and we do know that NSA has been trying to get "encryption hardware vendors" to subvert the encryption for them.
- blahbl4hblahtoo 13y ago
- Spooky23 13y agoIf you want a solution for secure ssh key storage that is based in hardware, I would look at using a GPG Card or other smart card solution. Smart cards are more portable, more standardized, and you're not dependent on physical possession of a particular hardware component. The big caveat being that if you need FIPS 140-2 validation, you'd need a commercial smart card solution.
- matthiasb 13y agoA single FIPS-certified smart card is under $30. Not much considered the value they provided IMHO;-)
- pdkl95 13y agoNote that the Trusted Computing Group has seen the controversy over Snowden's leaks as useful tool for spreading propaganda about the TPM and their goal of establishing a root of trust. They acknowledge that almost nobody actually wants a TPM ("There has been no market driver to incorporate TPMs"), and observe that post-Snowden there are more people looking to improve their internet security. Therefor, the plan is to repudiate the NSA, ("The manufacturers of TPMs must demonstrate that there are no back doors in their products." - at least not an NSA back-door...) and push their usual word-games about the TPM such as "secure end-to-end communication [...] made possible [...] with TPMS. So it may be prudent to question the motives behind any of these new attempts at justify the TPM. http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardstiennon/2013/11/16/trusted-computing-must-repudiate-the-nsa/ http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardstiennon/2013/11/16/trust... Edit: It seems the author of this post appears to work at Google, a contributor to the Trusted Computing Group.
- DannyBee 13y ago"It seems the author of this post appears to work at Google, a contributor to the Trusted Computing Group." Yes, however, note this is a hobby project, written on his own time, with no official affiliation to Google at all.
- jlgaddis 13y agoThe author could have saved himself some trouble if he would've investigated GnuTLS (which can do everything on his requirements list).
- thomashabets 13y agoGnuTLS can't be a PKCS#11 provider, so no.
- matthiasb 13y agoI store my SSH keys in a smart card. The benefit over TPM is that it is portable.