3 ms·
Personally I think the risk that CAs are or will be compromised is much higher than the risk of a practical SHA-1 preimage attack. The entire CA model is very s
by api 13y ago
Personally I think the risk that CAs are or will be compromised is much higher than the risk of a practical SHA-1 preimage attack. The entire CA model is very shaky.
MS has a history of helping out its buddies in the certificate troll mafia. This seems like it kind of fits in that category.
- moyix 13y agoYou don't need a preimage attack for SHA-1 to cause problems with CAs, just collisions. For example, MD5 does not have any preimage attacks I'm aware of, but it is possible to create rogue CA certificates that use MD5 [1]. Bruce Schneier estimates that we will see SHA-1 collisions relatively soon [2], so it's not like Microsoft is just making this stuff up. I agree that CA compromise is a serious problem, but it's not one Microsoft can do something about. They can ban SHA-1 in certificates, and I think it's a good idea. [1] http://www.phreedom.org/research/rogue-ca/ http://www.phreedom.org/research/rogue-ca/ [2] https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2012/10/when_will_we_se.html https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2012/10/when_will_we_...