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It's a difference in who you care about it being secure from, and what it is you're trying to protect. SSL is enough (I think?) to prevent a random attacker fr
by gknoy 13y ago
It's a difference in who you care about it being secure from, and what it is you're trying to protect.
SSL is enough (I think?) to prevent a random attacker from snooping your traffic to get your _credentials_. However, now imagine a judge gives them a subpoena saying, "We need Dylan's password. You receive it in plaintext over a secure tunnel, and you must give it to us." There's no wiggle room for that kind of request, and then a court-backed attacker would be able to do things like use your password as evidence, and probably even use it to try to gain access to other things of yours.
A way to prevent a court-ordered harvesting of your credentials would be for the service to have your public key, and require you to cryptographically sign something as part of the login process: Your secret stays secret on your end.
Back to what you are trying to protect. There are many things that can be secure, and from different types of attackers. We would ideally like to be able to keep our credentials (keys, passwords) secure from attackers both black-hat and police-hat, and we would like to also be able to keep the contents of our communications secret from those same entities. Most services safeguard your credentials against everyone except the court, and try to only protect your data similarly.
- Dylan16807 13y agoWell I would deal with that problem in an entirely different way. Courts should not have the power to compel either party in a private communication to keep records of what was said/transmitted.