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Fifth Amendment Prohibits Compelled Decryption, New EFF Brief Argues
- hsmyers 13y agoWhy is that when the government says "But, but computer!" judges abandon common sense and case law. Even when the tables are turned there is still an amazing amount of techno-ignorance in the process. Consider the long ago (tech time anyway) prosecution of Microsoft. The idiots in charge completely ignored their success with IBM and attacked via the browser vector. Andrew Schulman at the time of pre-trial investigation had three books entitled Undocumented this that and the other thing. Each should have been a successful blueprint in terms of anti competitive behavior. Had this and the browser been part of their war chest I think the result would have been considerably stronger (i.e. the bust them apart goal would have been reached) with a appropriately more useful public result. <end_of_slightly_off_topic_rant/>
- betterunix 13y ago"Why is that when the government says "But, but computer!" judges abandon common sense and case law" I can think of a few reasons: (1) My understanding of the legal theory is that computers are considered to increase the capabilities of the population; hence, the government's power to enforce the law must also be increased. Consider a car analogy: you must display visible license plates to identify your vehicle whenever it is on the road, yet that was never required for horses, carriages, bicycles, or any previous mode of transportation. Likewise with computers: where previously you might have been able to whisper a secret to someone a foot away from you, now you can secretly communicate with someone across thousands of miles. (2) It is assumed that the spirit of the law must be upheld. If the police are legally allowed to wiretap a suspect as part of an investigation, then encryption must not be allowed to get in the way of that. In other words, technology must not defeat the law, even in spirit. (3) Conservative views of technology: quite a few judges are still of the opinion that personal computers are just fancy cable boxes, and so doing anything that violates the will of service providers or governments is "abuse." Entering a URL manually is considered to be vastly different from writing a script to generate and fetch URLs automatically, even if there is no technical difference. If you discover that your phone lets you make a free long distance call when you whistle into it, you are a criminal; if you discover that a web server will give you anyone's account number when you enter the right URL, well, you're an even worse criminal. (4) Ignorance of what is actually possible with computers. See e.g. how Kevin Mitnick was treated when prosecutors claimed he could whistle into a phone line and thus launch a nuclear strike.
- ds9 13y agoRe (2), the idea that LE is entitled to have comms decrypted has never been "the spirit of the law" until very recent legislation. In the days of "alligator clip on the wire", the law allowed the police only to intercept whatever the content was, in the form it was in - it did not compel the people speaking to explain their "code words", or to speak in a language the officers could understand. It is precisely this fact which makes the current "going dark" argument an example of overreaching and mendacious, bad-faith deceptive rhetoric: encryption does not take away any powers the police formerly had; to the contrary, the demand for decryption goes far beyond traditional wiretapping principles.
- betterunix 13y agoI am not saying that I agree with the idea, but one could make an argument that modern cryptography is different from speaking with code words, and that the spirit of wiretapping laws extends to forced decryption. Using code words only barely qualifies as "encryption" at all -- it is certainly not going to meet basic semantic security definitions. Further, codewords are not something is built into any communications equipment, not automated, and computed in one's head -- quite different from TLS or OTR. One could argue (as the DoJ does) that the spirit of wiretapping law is that the police can, with the approval of a court, temporarily violate a specific suspect's privacy in an electronic communication system. Hence if the system automatically encrypt's the suspect's messages, the police should be able to obtain plaintexts. Phone companies are not exempted from wiretapping requirements when they multiplex phone calls, despite the fact that that is a technical measure that (as a side effect) impedes wiretapping. Again, this is not an argument I agree with. For one, wiretapping laws do not, as you pointed out, require a suspect to participate in any way in the wiretapping. For another, there is a component of modern encryption that does (or should) occur in a suspect's mind, much like the computation of code words. It is also true that in general, wiretapping laws have expanded far more rapidly than communications technologies have hampered police investigations; the ability of the citizens to have a private conversation is still "catching up."
- ds9 13y ago
- saraid216 13y ago> Even when the tables are turned there is still an amazing amount of techno-ignorance in the process. Honestly, the EFF is the only entity that it is even bothering to do something about this. Keep this in mind when computer interface design is built towards making sure the user doesn't need to understand what's happening. It's part of it.
- IceyEC 13y agoEven in this specific case that is not true; the brief was filed by the EFF in addition to the ACLU.
- tedunangst 13y agoOne may as well ask why every time a judge issues a ruling, geeks everywhere shout "I know more about the law than you do, dumb judge!"
- rayiner 13y ago> Why is that when the government says "But, but computer!" judges abandon common sense and case law. It's exactly the opposite. It's technologists that say "but, but computer!" and demand special treatment for computers are involved.[1] Judges generally treat computers in terms of real-world analogies to concrete things, and these analogies often clash with idealistic notions held by technologists. This case is actually an excellent example of that phenomenon. I've heard people say that their laptop/phone/etc is an "extension of their mind" or something to that effect. Because the 5th amendment only applies to testimonial incrimination (because of the use of the word "witness" in the text of the 5th), you need that nexus to the mind in order to justify concluding that forcing someone to give up an encryption key is equivalent to forcing them to testify against themselves. The more obvious (to me, anyway) analogy is that a laptop/phone is like a backpack or briefcase. I keep documents, photos, notes, etc, in my laptop just as I would keep them in a briefcase. Well, under the case law it is not prohibited under the 5th amendment to force someone to unlock a briefcase! That act has no nexus with a person's internal thoughts and is thus not testimonial. [1] Other examples include various CFAA-related things. Nobody would defend just walking into peoples' houses and saying "hey, your locks suck!" but defend analogous behavior with regard to computer security all the time. You also see it in the e-mail context. E.g. most people who complain about the government possibly subpoenaing e-mails they store on Google's servers would not see the problem with the government subpoenaing Enron's records they stored at their accounts' premises. Technologists generally want to ignore the obvious physical analogies in favor of ones based on how they perceive the electronic world (i.e. it's "my personal documents" even though it's stored on a cloud and dozens of engineers and sysadmins have access to them).
- kinghajj 13y agoAn unencrypted hard drive may be akin to a briefcase, but what about an encrypted one? Wouldn't that be more like a safe with a combination lock? IIRC, courts still cannot compel one to disclose the combination to unlock a safe, only to provide a key to a lock, exactly because safe combinations exist solely within the defendant's mind--just like most encryption keys. Disclosing the key implies that one has access to the data, which may be incriminating in and of itself with certain data. Even if the key is not provided, and the defendant is allowed to enter their password privately so that prosecutors may inspect the unencrypted data, the act of entering the password in and of itself provides evidence that one is aware of the contents, and thus may be used as evidence against oneself.
- thex86 13y agoDoes the Fifth Amendment only apply to US citizens? The reason I ask is this: if I am traveling to the US and the TSA asks me to decrypt my laptop or unlock my phone, am I protected under the Fifth Amendment? Well, are US citizens protected under it at the airport?
- eof 13y agoYes in theory everyone.. not just nationals/citizens are protected by the constitution/bill of rights. But the reality is that no, there are too many exceptions to what was supposed to be a source of truth in our laws to do much more than 'pretend' we are protected by the constitution; citizens or otherwise.
- saraid216 13y ago> Yes in theory everyone.. Um. Which theory is this? Last I checked, as an American citizen, I'm not subject to Russian law. Why are Russians subject to American law?
- john_b 13y agoThe original comment was asked in the context of traveling to the US. If you travel to Russia, you are most definitely subject to Russian laws.
- deleted 13y ago[deleted]
- dllthomas 13y agoRussians being protected by the 5th Amendment is not an example of Russians being subject to American laws, but an example of the American government being subject to American laws.
- deleted 13y ago[deleted]
- npsimons 13y ago
- eof 13y agoThis is astoundingly obvious. > nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, I could see compelled decryption being congruent with the constitution if the decrypter is guaranteed immunity--ie, you can be compelled to be a witness against someone else.
- betterunix 13y agoOh but the courts can find convenient interpretations of the wording. Like, the act of entering a passphrase only proves that you know the passphrase, so unless that knowledge is entered as evidence against you you have not actually witnessed against yourself. Really though, there is a deeper issue here. What if I legitimately forget my passphrase? There is no real way to know whether or not I forgot it; will I be held in contempt of court over my forgetfulness? Will I be accused of perjury? Will I be imprisoned? Might the government accuse me of a crime, point to an encrypted hard drive that I have not used in a year, and then throw me in prison for failing to decrypt it?
- stcredzero 13y agoWhat if I legitimately forget my passphrase? There is no real way to know whether or not I forgot it MRIs might change this.
- consultant23522 13y agoSomething, something, xkcd, $5 wrench.
- jlgreco 13y agoI am not convinced that they could within any foreseeable future. They may be able to prove that the knowledge is in there, or they may be able to prove that you think you are lying, but proving that you are truly able merely unwilling to actually vocalize that data is another matter entirely. Hell, there are disorders that render you unable to vocalize your own name, despite knowing full well what it is and wanting to vocalize it. Who is to say that "It is on the tip of my tongue/fingers, but I can't seem to say/type what it is." does not, under an MRI, appear to be "He knows what it is, but won't say/type it."? I'm sure you could find expert witnesses willing to be paid to argue either way exactly what the MRI is or could be indicating.
- hamburglar 13y agoI like this argument and agree with it, but it seems like the only real way to truly protect yourself from being compelled to incriminate yourself is to use deniable encryption. There will always be cases where a specific jurisdiction makes an incorrect call that forces someone to give up their key or go to jail. There needs to be a solution for that other than suing to put the toothpaste back in the tube.
- betterunix 13y agoDeniable encryption only works if either (a) everyone is using it or (b) there is no way to tell if you are using it. I doubt you will ever see the former, and that latter is pretty difficult -- even if such a scheme exists, you have to also hide the deniable encryption software you are using i.e. it is the classic warden problem. To put it another way, let's say you are using Truecrypt, and the prosecution can prove that you have incriminating documents on your laptop. You enter your "innocent" passphrase and behold! No incriminating documents. I think the next obvious move will be for the court to demand that you enter your other passphrase, leaving you trying to prove that you really were not using the distinguishing feature of Truecrypt. A better solution, where applicable, is to destroy keys as quickly as you can. Keep your keys on a smartcard, and self-destruct the card if you think you will be arrested. You will deny yourself access to your files, but you will also deny your adversary such access. The police might try to prove that you destroyed evidence, but that is much harder to prove if your own procedure is to periodically destroy your keys (and such a procedure can be done individually without raising suspicion). Basically it all comes down to opsec -- something the military has known for centuries.
- hamburglar 13y agoI'm talking about a deniable encryption scheme such as rubberhose, where the fact that you're using it is known, but it's impossible to tell whether you've revealed all the hidden aspects or not. "Here's my key." "Well, you're using deniable encryption; we need your other key." "Ok, here are my other two keys." But your hypothetical is also strange: "let's say ... the prosecution can prove that you have incriminating documents on your laptop." If the prosecution can prove that you have incriminating documents before you ever provide the keys, you're already screwed.
- dllthomas 13y agoIf you can be compelled to provide a physical key, I don't see why a digital key should be different. It's not "being a witness". That said, I'm nonetheless happy the EFF is pushing at this - it's that kind of pressure that makes sure reasonable calls are made in the corner cases.
- revelation 13y agoBecause you can't stick a digital key into random data and expect the result to make any sense? They believe the random looking data is actually encrypted data, data they believe is relevant, and they believe it can be decrypted by what they believe is a keyphrase they believe you still remember or had in the first place. That is quite a big wager to throw someone in jail over, for a potentially unlimited time. (Now of course TrueCrypt containers and the like still have somewhat of a recognizable header format - but theres no guarantee they contain anything)
- MichaelGG 13y agoThat's why a court becomes involved and a judge makes a decision based on reasonable belief. For instance, if you have a laptop that has a password on boot, and there's evidence that you've been using the laptop, you'd need a pretty great excuse to suddenly not know the boot password.
- dllthomas 13y agoFor the record, I absolutely don't think that indefinite detention is an appropriate response.
- dllthomas 13y agoAlso, I don't think "block of random looking bits" should be considered prima-facie evidence that it is encrypted data (by any particular key or even at all). But if there is strong evidence that key A was used to encrypt some bits, and if there is strong evidence that person B has access to key A, then compelling production of that key is not absurd if done correctly.
- philfreo 13y agoThe EFF is doing some incredibly important work. Please setup a monthly donation: https://supporters.eff.org/donate https://supporters.eff.org/donate
- spoiledtechie 13y agoCan someone describe to me the important work they are doing maybe in 5 bullet points? Im cool with donating, but I would love to see why... I don't want my cash going towards something that is just another political scheme to raise cash.
- jlgaddis 13y agohttps://www.eff.org/work https://www.eff.org/work
- chill1 13y agoWell they do a lot of things [1], but they do outline the areas in which they are active. [1] https://www.eff.org/work https://www.eff.org/work
- belorn 13y ago#1 investigates breaches of Internet civil liberties. #2 Provide legal support to people who's civil liberties has been violated. Mostly related to free speech. #3 Protects security researchers from government harassment, particularly those who produce encryption software. #4 Develops software security tools, like https everywhere. #5 Uses legal tools to get government to admit and publicly release documents related to surveillance, incorrect search and seizures, anti-file sharing laws, patents and free speech. see more at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_litigation_involving_the_Electronic_Frontier_Foundation https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_litigation_involving_t...
- tptacek 13y agoIf you want to fund security tool development, consider contributing directly to that. For instance, the effort to audit Truecrypt is still raising funds: http://istruecryptauditedyet.com/ http://istruecryptauditedyet.com/ The security of Truecrypt is incredibly important to privacy efforts. If you're looking to provide legal support to people, consider donating to ACLU. By the numbers, ACLU appears to be a much more effective way of converting donations to legal support for civil liberties cases. I have some reservations about EFF but unreservedly support ACLU. As a security researcher working in encryption, I'm not sure what #3 is about. I'm more likely to have the government offer me money (I won't work for the government, haven't in the past, or even accept DARPA grants) than harass me.
- jstalin 13y agoAs screwed up as our government is, I'm still so thankful that we have a bill of rights.
- swalsh 13y agoIf I built an encryption system, where entering a specific key initiated a function that systematically destroyed all data on the drive.... could I be accused of tampering with evidence?
- jvreeland 13y agoI'd assume so. It may not be tampering with evidence but i'm sure you'd be charged with something, obstruction at the very least.
- betterunix 13y agoThat is not how things will work. Your drive will be copied before you are even asked for a passphrase. Whatever cryptosystem you have will be modified to be non-destructive. Now, smartcards are another story. Smartcards can be designed to self-destruct after too many bad passphrases are entered. I suspect, though, that a forensic lab could back up the secret before you are allowed to enter anything.
- Jtsummers 13y agoiOS devices (and Android?) can already be configured to wipe their data after so many incorrect PINs are entered. I suspect the creation of a "self-destruct" PIN would be no worse a crime than an "I'm under attack" detection scheme.
- jrockway 13y agoYes. What you really want is a cryptosystem that provides a "clean" image when given one passphrase, and the "real" image when given another passphrase. Then when you're compelled to give up the passphrase, you do. Since it's mathematically impossible to tell the encrypted data from random data you wrote to the disk before using it for real, it would be very difficult to prove (through analysis of the disk image alone) that you knew 1 or more additional passphrases that would reveal other encrypted data. Of course, this all depends on very careful implementation: the "clean" image must not overwrite "real" data, but also must not leak the existence of a possible area of more data. You'd also better have realistic timestamps in the "clean" area, etc.
- deleted 13y ago[deleted]
- schoen 13y agoAs an EFF staffer who worked on this, I want to mention that ACLU and ACLU of Massachusetts deserve substantial credit for this brief.
- vaadu 13y agoWhen did the 5th amendment become a privilege? Last I saw it was part of the Bill of 'Rights'.
- walshemj 13y agoHmm a case of the EFF wanting something to be true I feel To use an analogy if you can be compelled to give up the keys to a physical safe how can electronic keys be considered differently? To quote Spock "a difference that makes no difference is no difference " This is what the "man on the clapham omnibus" would think