3 ms·

The problem with e-mail is that gathering the meta-data is almost as valuable as looking inside at the message contents. Secure messaging layers aren't going to

The problem with e-mail is that gathering the meta-data is almost as valuable as looking inside at the message contents. Secure messaging layers aren't going to help you there - unless everyone starts using something like Tor.

betterunix 13y ago
Why Tor? We have had mix-nets for many years, and they do an excellent job of protecting metadata. Even old-fashioned cypherpunks remailers do a fine job at that.
- e12e 13y ago
  Appologies for the spelling errors in this note below - it's an OCR of an old printout (I've been unable to find a current archive of cypherpunks going back this far): Cypherpunks archive-96.02.29-96.03.06: List of reliable remailers List of reliable remailers Anonymous Remail Service (nobody@vegas.gateway.com) Sun, 3 Mar 199609:18:03-0500 ( Messages sorted by: [date][ threa4][ subject][ author] ( Next message: Adam Shostack: "Re: NYT on Crypto Bills" ( Previous message: Raph Levien: "List of reliable remailers" ( Next in thread: Black Unicorn: "Re: your mail" Thought that this was worth reposting: >1 attended last weeks "Information, National Policies; and International >Infrastructure" Symposium at Harvard Law School, organized by the Global >Information Infrastructure Commission, the Kennedy School and the >Institute for Information Technology Law & Policy of Harvard Law School. >During the presentation by Paul Strassmann, National Defense University >and William Marlow, Science Applications International Corporation, >entitled 'Anonymous Remailers as Risk-Free International Infoterrorists" >the questions was raised from audience (Professor Chaarles Nesson, >Harvard LAw School) - in a rather extended debate - whether the CIA and >similar government agencies are involved in running anonymous remailers >as this would be a perfect target to scan possibly illegal messages. >Both presenters explicitly acknowledged that a number of anonymous >remailers in the US are run by government agencies scanning traffic. >Marlow said that the government runs at least a dozen remailers and that >the most popular remailers in France and Germany are run by the >respective government agencies in these countries In addition they >mentioned that the NSA has successfully developed Systems to break >encrypted messages below 1000 bit of key length and strongly suggested >to use at least 1024 bit keys. They said that they themselves use 1024 >bit keys. >J ask Marlos afterwards if these comments were off or on record, he >paused then said that he can be quoted. >So I thought I pass that on. ft seems interesting enough, don 't you > think? >Best > Viktor Mayer-Schoenberger >Information Law Project >Austrian Institute for Legal Policy Groundfog@alpha.c2.org ( Next message: Adam Shostack: "Re: NYT on Crypto Bills" ( Previous message: Raph Levien: "List of reliable remailers" ( Next in thread: Black Unicorn: "Re: your mail" I of 1 05.09.96 01:58

betterunix 13y ago

Why Tor? We have had mix-nets for many years, and they do an excellent job of protecting metadata. Even old-fashioned cypherpunks remailers do a fine job at that.

e12e 13y ago
Appologies for the spelling errors in this note below - it's an OCR of an old printout (I've been unable to find a current archive of cypherpunks going back this far): Cypherpunks archive-96.02.29-96.03.06: List of reliable remailers List of reliable remailers Anonymous Remail Service (nobody@vegas.gateway.com) Sun, 3 Mar 199609:18:03-0500 ( Messages sorted by: [date][ threa4][ subject][ author] ( Next message: Adam Shostack: "Re: NYT on Crypto Bills" ( Previous message: Raph Levien: "List of reliable remailers" ( Next in thread: Black Unicorn: "Re: your mail" Thought that this was worth reposting: >1 attended last weeks "Information, National Policies; and International >Infrastructure" Symposium at Harvard Law School, organized by the Global >Information Infrastructure Commission, the Kennedy School and the >Institute for Information Technology Law & Policy of Harvard Law School. >During the presentation by Paul Strassmann, National Defense University >and William Marlow, Science Applications International Corporation, >entitled 'Anonymous Remailers as Risk-Free International Infoterrorists" >the questions was raised from audience (Professor Chaarles Nesson, >Harvard LAw School) - in a rather extended debate - whether the CIA and >similar government agencies are involved in running anonymous remailers >as this would be a perfect target to scan possibly illegal messages. >Both presenters explicitly acknowledged that a number of anonymous >remailers in the US are run by government agencies scanning traffic. >Marlow said that the government runs at least a dozen remailers and that >the most popular remailers in France and Germany are run by the >respective government agencies in these countries In addition they >mentioned that the NSA has successfully developed Systems to break >encrypted messages below 1000 bit of key length and strongly suggested >to use at least 1024 bit keys. They said that they themselves use 1024 >bit keys. >J ask Marlos afterwards if these comments were off or on record, he >paused then said that he can be quoted. >So I thought I pass that on. ft seems interesting enough, don 't you > think? >Best > Viktor Mayer-Schoenberger >Information Law Project >Austrian Institute for Legal Policy Groundfog@alpha.c2.org ( Next message: Adam Shostack: "Re: NYT on Crypto Bills" ( Previous message: Raph Levien: "List of reliable remailers" ( Next in thread: Black Unicorn: "Re: your mail" I of 1 05.09.96 01:58