4 ms·
> The general purpose ciphersuite at the time of this writing is: ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-E
by e12e 13y ago
> The general purpose ciphersuite at the time of this writing is:
ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:kEDH+AESGCM:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA:AES128-GCM-SHA256:AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-RC4-SHA:RC4-SHA:HIGH:!aNULL:!eNULL:!EXPORT:!DES:!3DES:!MD5:!PSK
Whoa! I'd like to see some reasoning behind allowing that many. How many user agents allow 128-bit aes and not 256? Why would you need to allow both? If 128 is enough, you don't need 256. If you need 256 you should block 128.
It's not a very big deal, but given the choice between complexity and simplicity in encryption -- I'd always prefer simplicity...
Not just "fewer cipher suites", but also what follows from that: "We allow X bit symmetric keys only", we guarantee forward secrecy (or not) etc.
But still, a lot better than leaving things at their default, I guess :-)
- hsivonen 13y agoThe rationale for preferring 128-bit AES over 256-bit AES is given later in the doc.
- e12e 13y agoI was kind of arguing against including both, on the basis that it is unlikely(?) that a client that enable 256bit aes suites disables 128bit -- and so if indeed 128bit might be more secure (see the note on timing attacks) -- why leave 256 bits enabled? Has anyone seen clients in the wild that disable 128bit and enable 256? Especially end-user clients, and/or "permanent" deployments/appliances, where the new cipher-suite isn't a result of power-user tinkering, but a decision that's taken out of the end-users hands?
- jvehent 13y agoWe don't control what the client enables. Any client could decide tomorrow to disable AES-128, and we need to support that. The ciphersuite focuses on ordering ciphers by strength and performance, and we don't just disable cipher for the sake of keeping it small. After all, it's the same number of clicks to copy a large ciphersuite than a small one ;)