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FTA: The key itself is not evidence, contraband, fruits, or instrumentalities of crime, Lavabit argues, but is merely a way to get to evidence, contraband, fru
by bradleyjg 13y ago
FTA:
The key itself is not evidence, contraband, fruits, or instrumentalities of crime, Lavabit argues, but is merely a way to get to evidence, contraband, fruits, or instrumentalities of crime. This is a clever argument pressing an undeveloped aspect of Fourth Amendment law, but I don’t think it ultimately works. It’s pretty standard for computer warrants to authorize the seizure of passwords, encryption codes, operating manuals, “and other information necessary to access the computer equipment, storage devices or data.” I haven’t seen a Fourth Amendment challenge to such provisions, but I would think they are okay because they involve instrumentalities of crime. That is, the password or encryption key is part of the tool used to commit the crime, so it is part of the instrumentality of crime and can properly be obtained in a search warrant.
- lambda 13y agoI'm not sure you could reasonably claim that Lavabit's private key is an instrumentality of crime, since Lavabit's private key is in the control of and used by Lavabit, the service provider, not the alleged criminal. This would be like claiming you could seize the entire phone network because someone somewhere used it to commit a crime. Now, you may be able to demand that Lavibit hand over the user's password or encryption keys, if it is able to do so. Those could likely be considered instrumentalities of crime. But handing over Lavabit's own private keys goes beyond that, to something that Lavabit merely uses to keep it's communications private with all of its customers, the people under investigation and everyone else. Asking for Lavabit's private key is like asking for the master key to let you into any room the building, when only one tenant is actually under investigation. It goes beyond what is necessary to investigate the actual case in question.
- bradleyjg 13y agoIf the landlord uses identical locks on all the apartment doors, he can't turn around and complain that turning over the key to the apartment being investigated would open all the doors. As for the instrumentality of the crime, even though it's Lavabit's SSL key the government's contention is that Snowden made use of it in his alleged crimes (by for example encrypting leaked data with the public half of the key for transmission to lavabit's web to email gateway, where it would ultimately be decrypted by lavabit using the private key, and then emailed to the a recipient.) Suppose a criminal rented a car and used it as a getaway vehicle and then returned it. The police could get access to the car for forensic evidence from the rental company, notwithstanding the fact that the car belonged to the rental company who was not accused of any crime.
- lambda 13y agoBut it's not a matter of using identical locks. He has offered to turn over particular pieces of evidence about particular suspects; but he refused to hand over his private key which would allow the feds to snoop on everything. It's like asking for the master key, when only the key to one particular room (or one particular car) would be sufficient for the investigation.
- bradleyjg 13y agoAnalogies extended too far can be unhelpful, but I'll risk it one more time. His offer, made rather late in the game, was the equivilent of the super telling the police they couldn't enter the apartment, but that he (the super) would search it for them and pick up whatever they were asking for, if they were willing to pay him some money for his time. That might be a reasonable offer, but I don't think there's anything in fourth amendment law, or the statutes, that require the police to take him up on it, rather than just insisting that they do the search themselves. In my own reading of the case, the area of the government's actions that seemed the weakest was the applicability of the rationale for the probable-cause-less pen-trap and stored communication act requests (i.e. the third party doctrine from Smith v. Maryland) to email headers and usage logs from a service that held itself as not being able to access these things. In that circumstance it looks to me like the user does have a reasonable expectation of privacy in those (meta)data, and so a warrant issued upon probable cause should be necessary. However, this case also involved a grand jury subpoena. That's a whole other (troublesome) kettle of fish, one that frankly I'm not too familiar with.
- raganwald 13y agoIf the landlord uses identical locks on all the apartment doors, he can't turn around and complain that turning over the key to the apartment being investigated would open all the doors. Why? When setting up a business, are you required to organize it in such a way that in the future, the government can come along and perform a certain kind of search/and/or seizure? It that your obligation, failing which all of your customers must suffer? It's one thing to have a law that states the government can ask for things. But I haven't heard anybody argue that the law requires you to organize your affairs in such a way that you can comply with requests like this "cleanly."