8 ms·

We should celebrate Ladar for making the decision to put himself at risk in order to protect his users, but I think we should be careful not to forget that Lada

by moxie 13y ago

We should celebrate Ladar for making the decision to put himself at risk in order to protect his users, but I think we should be careful not to forget that Ladar was forced to make that decision because the security of Lavabit was all a total handwave. This wasn't untested water, either. The exact same thing happened to Hushmail for the exact same reason, and should have been evidence enough that the model isn't viable. So I think we should definitely support Ladar as a person, but we also need to be careful not to confuse that with supporting Lavabit, which was a very real danger that should never be repeated again (again).

Dylan16807 13y ago
How was it a handwave if it actually worked? And this is the first time I've heard that Hushmail was forced to betray their users, rather than doing it in response to a simple request. Do you have more information on that?
- socillion 13y ago
  Being legally bound to give up the information is equivalent to being forced. If it wasn't forcible, why did Lavabit have to choose between compliance and shutting down? Could you clarify what you mean by "How was it a handwave if it actually worked?" Lavabit, like Hushmail, has had no problem giving up information to law enforcement in the past.
  - deleted 13y ago
    [deleted]
  - Dylan16807 13y ago
    I think I missed some important things lavabit had done in the past, I concede.
- betterunix 13y ago
  "How was it a handwave if it actually worked?" Ladar claimed that he had no way to access user emails. The hidden subtext of that, which was sort of hand-waved away, was that he had no such access with the code he had written, and that all that stood between your mail and his eyes was his own willingness to write that code. The entire security of Lavabit depends on Ladar and his principles.
  - bsimpson 13y ago
    Isn't that always going to be true? These systems are entirely built on code, and code is malleable. If you have control over the code that gets executed at every point in the stack (which the operator of a web app certainly does), there's always room for the operator to change the code and therefore change the behavior to do anything, including log things that were previously considered secure. > The entire security of Lavabit depends on Ladar and his principles. That has always been true. If he was a less scrupulous individual, he could have run an off-the-shelf e-mail solution with 0 fancy security, but claimed that it was all secure on the backend in his marketing. You wouldn't know the difference, because you can't audit the source code. Unless you have the access, time, and expertise to perform your own source audit, any claims of security are always implicitly built upon a foundation of trust that the operator is doing what it claims.
    - betterunix 13y ago
      "These systems are entirely built on code, and code is malleable. If you have control over the code that gets executed at every point in the stack (which the operator of a web app certainly does), there's always room for the operator to change the code and therefore change the behavior to do anything, including log things that were previously considered secure." Which is exactly why nobody should have believed Ladar's claims in the first place. He trumpeted the fact that he had not yet developed any wiretapping capability and tried to distract everyone from the hard reality of "encrypted webmail." This is why real security and privacy require end-to-end encryption.
      - jamiesonbecker 13y ago
        You might be missing the point a little bit. You're correct, but end-to-end encryption is irrelevant if the operator changes the (e.g., Javascript) code in a webmail app and maybe even just for a single user. The trust model has to include the device/OS/browser/etc that you're accessing the device on as well as all code and keys (including WOT servers, GPG keys, and the webmail code itself, or, if locally installed, all binary packages, updates, etc). Which I think is the point is really that in the face of a government who can compel, e.g., * an OS vendor to install a backdoor in their software, * a microprocessor vendor to critically weaken the Random Number Generator, * the author and BDFL of a key operating system kernel to use said RNG, * a distribution to include compromised or even unsigned packages, * a mobile carrier who will allow random hardware on their network that can sniff, MITM, and inject evil data, * a mobile phone manufacturer who will install CarrierIQ, * (heavens!) a user/customer who visits an app store and installs an application with either a trojan attached or one that is directly a trojan,.. In other words, no amount of end-to-end crypto will save us if we're attacked at each end and in the middle by people who will stop at literally NOTHING (jail) just to get at the data. This is why Schneier wrote "The Government has betrayed the Internet." http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/05/government-betrayed-internet-nsa-spying http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/05/governm... Encryption is no panacea when you're dealing with someone who controls both ends and the middle. :( To put this on Lavabit is poor form, IMO. This is one end who stood up and fought and paid a huge price.
- tomphoolery 13y ago
  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hushmail#Compromises_to_email_privacy http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hushmail#Compromises_to_email_p... I remember this happening. Since whoever runs Hushmail didn't go to the press and his blog and make a big scene after being approached by the feds (both for the US and Canada, mind you, since Hushmail's a canadian company). There's a reason why Hushmail was targeted, it was at the time the best way to figure out who's shipping large quantities of drugs everywhere. In the same year, Hushmail and eGold became compromised and Bush passed a law stating police can open your mail in USPS if they think you're a terrorist (previously they needed a warrant which by the time they obtained one you'd already have your package). Coincidentally, this was I believe around the time Silk Road started up. :) So, Hushmail was involved in the pre-Silk Road days of internet drug trafficking, and I'm pretty sure that is not the position they wanted to be in. We'll never know if Hushmail was "forced" to give up users' information, but I would say that even if they didn't want to, they pretty much would have no other choice other than shutting their doors.
anologwintermut 13y ago
Unless he actually used properly implemented forward secure SSL for every connection, which I doubt all of either his customers browsers or the SMTP servers he talked to supported, didn't his choices actually put his customers in more danger? He could have complied with one of the several valid court orders that requested he give the FBI data on a specific account but stopped short if installing FBI code or devices on his system or handing over the keys. Had he done so, it would have stop there. Instead, it escalated to the point where he actually was forced to expose all his users. Anyone who has transcripts of those connections (e.g the NSA), can now read them, get the passwords, and decrypt any mail they got form the server. It seems like a boneheaded move unless his only goal was to protect Snowden at all costs.
- aaaaaababdd 13y ago
  Read the article.
  - anologwintermut 13y ago
    I did. I even quoted it here https://news.ycombinator.com/edit?id=6517845 https://news.ycombinator.com/edit?id=6517845
- angersock 13y ago
  According to the article, the FBI jumped straight to "give us all the SSL keys for everything", and would not let him to that selective warrant. He rightly observed that those leaked keys would then get into the hands of God-only-knows-who.
  - anologwintermut 13y ago
    The story, as far as I have read from this article and others, was they asked for data(probably with an NSL), he said no. They got a court order. He said no. At some-point he was willing to cooperate, but by that point, they didn't care because they thought he was jerking them around.They then requested the SSL keys. This article is more clear about the exact sequence of events[0], but the the posted one says so as well. The initial request was not for the SSL keys. From the newyorker article : "On June 10th, the government secured an order from the Eastern District of Virginia. The order, issued under the Stored Communications Act, required Lavabit to turn over to the F.B.I. retrospective information about one account, widely presumed to be that of Snowden. (The name of the target remains redacted, and Levison could not divulge it.) The order directed Lavabit to surrender names and addresses, Internet Protocol and Media Access Control addresses, the volume of each and every data transfer, the duration of every “session,” and the “source and destination” of all communications associated with the account. It also forbade Levison and Lavabit from discussing the matter with anyone. " Sometime after his initial refusal and then offer to comply with some caveats that the fed's interpreted as stalling: "Prior to the hearing on July 16th, the U.S. Attorney filed a motion for civil contempt, requesting that Levison be fined a thousand dollars for every day that he refused to comply with the pen-register order. EARLIER IN THE DAY, Hilton issued a search-and-seizure warrant, authorizing law enforcement to seize from Lavabit “all information necessary to decrypt communications sent to or from [the account], including encryption keys and SSL keys,” and “all information necessary to decrypt data stored in or otherwise associated with [the account].” (emphasis mine) [O]http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/10/lavabit_unsealed/ http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/10/lavabit_unsealed/
smsm42 13y ago
It wasn't a handwave. It was the best current technology could offer, but this technology was not meant to deal with the oppressive government that can compel any company to reveal any information. As soon as Ladar realized that, and the fact that he is in the jurisdiction of the oppressive government, Lavabit was done.
- betterunix 13y ago
  "It was the best current technology could offer" Sure, if we ignore the existence of things like PGP, S/MIME, smart cards, and the dozens of other ways we can have secure email without relying on some trusted third party like this. "this technology was not meant to deal with the oppressive government that can compel any company to reveal any information" Then it was not meant to deal with the evil hacker who takes control of the server and grabs valuable information. "As soon as Ladar..." There's the handwave. The security of the system depends not on technology, math, or physical laws, but on the whims of just one man. What if Ladar was less principled?
  - vividmind 13y ago
    Have you heard about "thermorectal decryption"?
  - michaelt 13y ago
    Sure, if we ignore the existence of things like PGP, S/MIME, smart cards, and the dozens of other ways we can have secure email without relying on some trusted third party like this. As I understand it Snowden was using Lavabit to communicate with journalists who didn't themselves have/use/understand PGP. Lavabit is technology you can use even if no-one else uses it. How do PGP and S/MIME solve the bootstrapping problem, where no-one uses them because no-one uses them?
    - betterunix 13y ago
      There is no bootstrapping problem. Snowden was also able to get journalists to use OTR, without relying on some web interface with questionable security claims. The problem with PGP and S/MIME is that the existing software is too hard to set up. It is hard to tell journalists to go use Thunderbird, get Enigmail set up, and publish a key. The situation is even worse with S/MIME, despite the built-in support in many email clients. Basically, the problem is that PGP and S/MIME as they exist today are (and I shudder to say it) too security conscious. The reality is that most users are not going to take the time to maintain their public keys, to verify others' public keys, etc., nor are most users going to spend the time to get their keys verified by a CA. We need a "lite" PGP client that is less obnoxious about using untrusted keys, and basically a "newbie" PGP that is more vulnerable to active MITM attacks (which are actually much harder to pull off than one might expect). It would also be nice if public keys could be easily published via QR codes, so that someone can literally hand their public key to another person. The worst thing we can do is lie to people about the security they receive e.g. telling them things like "Lavabit is set up so that nobody but you can read your email!"

by moxie 13y ago

Dylan16807 13y ago

How was it a handwave if it actually worked? And this is the first time I've heard that Hushmail was forced to betray their users, rather than doing it in response to a simple request. Do you have more information on that?

socillion 13y ago
Being legally bound to give up the information is equivalent to being forced. If it wasn't forcible, why did Lavabit have to choose between compliance and shutting down? Could you clarify what you mean by "How was it a handwave if it actually worked?" Lavabit, like Hushmail, has had no problem giving up information to law enforcement in the past.
- deleted 13y ago
  [deleted]
- Dylan16807 13y ago
  I think I missed some important things lavabit had done in the past, I concede.
betterunix 13y ago
"How was it a handwave if it actually worked?" Ladar claimed that he had no way to access user emails. The hidden subtext of that, which was sort of hand-waved away, was that he had no such access with the code he had written, and that all that stood between your mail and his eyes was his own willingness to write that code. The entire security of Lavabit depends on Ladar and his principles.
- bsimpson 13y ago
  Isn't that always going to be true? These systems are entirely built on code, and code is malleable. If you have control over the code that gets executed at every point in the stack (which the operator of a web app certainly does), there's always room for the operator to change the code and therefore change the behavior to do anything, including log things that were previously considered secure. > The entire security of Lavabit depends on Ladar and his principles. That has always been true. If he was a less scrupulous individual, he could have run an off-the-shelf e-mail solution with 0 fancy security, but claimed that it was all secure on the backend in his marketing. You wouldn't know the difference, because you can't audit the source code. Unless you have the access, time, and expertise to perform your own source audit, any claims of security are always implicitly built upon a foundation of trust that the operator is doing what it claims.
  - betterunix 13y ago
    "These systems are entirely built on code, and code is malleable. If you have control over the code that gets executed at every point in the stack (which the operator of a web app certainly does), there's always room for the operator to change the code and therefore change the behavior to do anything, including log things that were previously considered secure." Which is exactly why nobody should have believed Ladar's claims in the first place. He trumpeted the fact that he had not yet developed any wiretapping capability and tried to distract everyone from the hard reality of "encrypted webmail." This is why real security and privacy require end-to-end encryption.
    - jamiesonbecker 13y ago
      You might be missing the point a little bit. You're correct, but end-to-end encryption is irrelevant if the operator changes the (e.g., Javascript) code in a webmail app and maybe even just for a single user. The trust model has to include the device/OS/browser/etc that you're accessing the device on as well as all code and keys (including WOT servers, GPG keys, and the webmail code itself, or, if locally installed, all binary packages, updates, etc). Which I think is the point is really that in the face of a government who can compel, e.g., * an OS vendor to install a backdoor in their software, * a microprocessor vendor to critically weaken the Random Number Generator, * the author and BDFL of a key operating system kernel to use said RNG, * a distribution to include compromised or even unsigned packages, * a mobile carrier who will allow random hardware on their network that can sniff, MITM, and inject evil data, * a mobile phone manufacturer who will install CarrierIQ, * (heavens!) a user/customer who visits an app store and installs an application with either a trojan attached or one that is directly a trojan,.. In other words, no amount of end-to-end crypto will save us if we're attacked at each end and in the middle by people who will stop at literally NOTHING (jail) just to get at the data. This is why Schneier wrote "The Government has betrayed the Internet." http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/05/government-betrayed-internet-nsa-spying http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/05/governm... Encryption is no panacea when you're dealing with someone who controls both ends and the middle. :( To put this on Lavabit is poor form, IMO. This is one end who stood up and fought and paid a huge price.
tomphoolery 13y ago
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hushmail#Compromises_to_email_privacy http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hushmail#Compromises_to_email_p... I remember this happening. Since whoever runs Hushmail didn't go to the press and his blog and make a big scene after being approached by the feds (both for the US and Canada, mind you, since Hushmail's a canadian company). There's a reason why Hushmail was targeted, it was at the time the best way to figure out who's shipping large quantities of drugs everywhere. In the same year, Hushmail and eGold became compromised and Bush passed a law stating police can open your mail in USPS if they think you're a terrorist (previously they needed a warrant which by the time they obtained one you'd already have your package). Coincidentally, this was I believe around the time Silk Road started up. :) So, Hushmail was involved in the pre-Silk Road days of internet drug trafficking, and I'm pretty sure that is not the position they wanted to be in. We'll never know if Hushmail was "forced" to give up users' information, but I would say that even if they didn't want to, they pretty much would have no other choice other than shutting their doors.

anologwintermut 13y ago

Unless he actually used properly implemented forward secure SSL for every connection, which I doubt all of either his customers browsers or the SMTP servers he talked to supported, didn't his choices actually put his customers in more danger? He could have complied with one of the several valid court orders that requested he give the FBI data on a specific account but stopped short if installing FBI code or devices on his system or handing over the keys. Had he done so, it would have stop there. Instead, it escalated to the point where he actually was forced to expose all his users. Anyone who has transcripts of those connections (e.g the NSA), can now read them, get the passwords, and decrypt any mail they got form the server. It seems like a boneheaded move unless his only goal was to protect Snowden at all costs.

aaaaaababdd 13y ago
Read the article.
- anologwintermut 13y ago
  I did. I even quoted it here https://news.ycombinator.com/edit?id=6517845 https://news.ycombinator.com/edit?id=6517845
angersock 13y ago
According to the article, the FBI jumped straight to "give us all the SSL keys for everything", and would not let him to that selective warrant. He rightly observed that those leaked keys would then get into the hands of God-only-knows-who.
- anologwintermut 13y ago
  The story, as far as I have read from this article and others, was they asked for data(probably with an NSL), he said no. They got a court order. He said no. At some-point he was willing to cooperate, but by that point, they didn't care because they thought he was jerking them around.They then requested the SSL keys. This article is more clear about the exact sequence of events[0], but the the posted one says so as well. The initial request was not for the SSL keys. From the newyorker article : "On June 10th, the government secured an order from the Eastern District of Virginia. The order, issued under the Stored Communications Act, required Lavabit to turn over to the F.B.I. retrospective information about one account, widely presumed to be that of Snowden. (The name of the target remains redacted, and Levison could not divulge it.) The order directed Lavabit to surrender names and addresses, Internet Protocol and Media Access Control addresses, the volume of each and every data transfer, the duration of every “session,” and the “source and destination” of all communications associated with the account. It also forbade Levison and Lavabit from discussing the matter with anyone. " Sometime after his initial refusal and then offer to comply with some caveats that the fed's interpreted as stalling: "Prior to the hearing on July 16th, the U.S. Attorney filed a motion for civil contempt, requesting that Levison be fined a thousand dollars for every day that he refused to comply with the pen-register order. EARLIER IN THE DAY, Hilton issued a search-and-seizure warrant, authorizing law enforcement to seize from Lavabit “all information necessary to decrypt communications sent to or from [the account], including encryption keys and SSL keys,” and “all information necessary to decrypt data stored in or otherwise associated with [the account].” (emphasis mine) [O]http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/10/lavabit_unsealed/ http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/10/lavabit_unsealed/

smsm42 13y ago

It wasn't a handwave. It was the best current technology could offer, but this technology was not meant to deal with the oppressive government that can compel any company to reveal any information. As soon as Ladar realized that, and the fact that he is in the jurisdiction of the oppressive government, Lavabit was done.

betterunix 13y ago
"It was the best current technology could offer" Sure, if we ignore the existence of things like PGP, S/MIME, smart cards, and the dozens of other ways we can have secure email without relying on some trusted third party like this. "this technology was not meant to deal with the oppressive government that can compel any company to reveal any information" Then it was not meant to deal with the evil hacker who takes control of the server and grabs valuable information. "As soon as Ladar..." There's the handwave. The security of the system depends not on technology, math, or physical laws, but on the whims of just one man. What if Ladar was less principled?
- vividmind 13y ago
  Have you heard about "thermorectal decryption"?
- michaelt 13y ago
  Sure, if we ignore the existence of things like PGP, S/MIME, smart cards, and the dozens of other ways we can have secure email without relying on some trusted third party like this. As I understand it Snowden was using Lavabit to communicate with journalists who didn't themselves have/use/understand PGP. Lavabit is technology you can use even if no-one else uses it. How do PGP and S/MIME solve the bootstrapping problem, where no-one uses them because no-one uses them?
  - betterunix 13y ago
    There is no bootstrapping problem. Snowden was also able to get journalists to use OTR, without relying on some web interface with questionable security claims. The problem with PGP and S/MIME is that the existing software is too hard to set up. It is hard to tell journalists to go use Thunderbird, get Enigmail set up, and publish a key. The situation is even worse with S/MIME, despite the built-in support in many email clients. Basically, the problem is that PGP and S/MIME as they exist today are (and I shudder to say it) too security conscious. The reality is that most users are not going to take the time to maintain their public keys, to verify others' public keys, etc., nor are most users going to spend the time to get their keys verified by a CA. We need a "lite" PGP client that is less obnoxious about using untrusted keys, and basically a "newbie" PGP that is more vulnerable to active MITM attacks (which are actually much harder to pull off than one might expect). It would also be nice if public keys could be easily published via QR codes, so that someone can literally hand their public key to another person. The worst thing we can do is lie to people about the security they receive e.g. telling them things like "Lavabit is set up so that nobody but you can read your email!"