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> It's just that the western nations decided to go stupid about fission I have many highly intelligent friends who subscribe to your view. Unfortunately they f

> It's just that the western nations decided to go stupid about fission I have many highly intelligent friends who subscribe to your view. Unfortunately they forget that fission is only as safe as the weakest link, and the consequences of failure are severe, especially when near a water source. I'm not talking about crumbling old soviet-era reactors or even older Japanese ones. Witness Australia's only nuclear facility: http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2010/06/01/2914548.htm?site=sydney http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2010/06/01/2914548.htm?si... My fave quote from the article: "None of our instruments could measure it - it was way off scale. We cleaned up everything and we still couldn't get the dose down." You called out the need for more reliable, safer, and smaller plants. I would argue that there needs to be a significant improvement before fission is publicly acceptable.

hyperbovine 13y ago
If the Japanese can't do it safely, it can't be done safely.
- NamTaf 13y ago
  Why? What makes you think their corporations cut fewer corners than Western ones? What makes you think their employees/scientists/etc. are inherently more infallible than Western ones?
- rlucas 13y ago
  It wasn't "the Japanese" that didn't do it safely at Fukushima. It was GE, which is about as American as you get, along with Toshiba and Hitachi. Also it was the 1960s, which is the age of the technology deployed in these relative archaisms. See http://blog.rlucas.net/tech_and_market_reflections/fukushima-type-reactors-in-the-usa/ http://blog.rlucas.net/tech_and_market_reflections/fukushima...
  - pdonis 13y ago
    It wasn't "the Japanese" that didn't do it safely at Fukushima. It was GE Was GE responsible for the siting of the backup diesel generators and switchgear behind a seawall that was overcome by the tsunami? That was the root cause of all the problems; it wasn't anything to do with the reactor design itself, other than the fact that it needed active cooling after shutdown (which PWR designs from the same time period also did). (That said, I agree the BWR design is outdated and modern designs with passive safety features are much, much better.)
    - andygates 13y ago
      But the backup generators could be moved (and were in similar US installations). Raising the backup generators to protect them against inundation was recommended, but the delay there is pure sclerotic TEPCO.
      - rdl 13y ago
        I still don't understand why Chinooks weren't in the air toward Fukushima within 30 minutes of the tsunami with some generators sling-loaded under them (and refueling, etc.). Either from the JSDF or US Military.
        pdonis 13y ago
        As I understand it, the issue was that not just the generators but the switchgear connecting them to the plant's power grid was behind the seawall that was overcome by the tsunami. So bringing in other generators wouldn't have helped, because there was no way to plug them into the grid.
        rdl 13y ago
        You can usually get portable switchgear, and it was mainly pumps, which should be fairly tolerant even with an emergency cabling job. I'd really consider this a contingency plants should be ready for; if I operated at tepco scale I would probably have actual helicopters under contract (or priority with the military) and strategic equipment in hardened shelters at my plants, just to be able to move it to other plants. From what I've read there was a leadership vacuum for the initial crisis at tepco. I'm actually going to try to visit as close as I can get to the plant tomorrow or Saturday (in Sendai right now)
- lmm 13y ago
  The Japanese are many things, but models of incorruptibility they are not. I'd bet German reactors are safer.
bcoates 13y ago
That appears to be an accident handling the output of an isotope manufacturing reactor, not anything involving a power reactor. > I would argue that there needs to be a significant improvement before fission is publicly acceptable. I would argue that fission is already held to a standard well above that of almost any human endeavor, even those with roughly similar risk profiles (compare almost any form of mining, or the shipping of hazardous cargo by rail)
- nikatwork 13y ago
  > That appears to be an accident handling the output of an isotope manufacturing reactor, not anything involving a power reactor. That is irrelevant to my point, which is that the biggest risk to reactor safety with current fission tech is human error and negligence. > compare almost any form of mining The only form of mining comparable in terms of potential environmental damage is ocean oil drilling[1], which I also oppose. The point is - human nature (re: greedy and negligent idiots) makes current reactor tech unsafe. The potential fallout (pun intended) is not worth the significant risk. [1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deepwater_Horizon_oil_spill http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deepwater_Horizon_oil_spill
  - dekhn 13y ago
    If your technology has reached the point where human error and negligence is the primary source of risk, you've succeeded. That is the goal of producing all reliable technologies. Of course, at that point, your system design primarily exists to prevent human errors from causing harm (for example, yesterday there was a news report that a Fukushima cleanup worker managed to engage a pump that would dump a bunch of radioactive water in the wrong place. He was saved by a backup system.")
    - nikatwork 13y ago
      > If your technology has reached the point where human error and negligence is the primary source of risk, you've succeeded. If all it takes is one earthquake or distracted technician to potentially vaporize a suburb, then your tech has not yet succeeded. Safety regimes to minimize human error are great, but time and time again they are bypassed due to greed, negligence and idiocy. The Fukushima backup system you mention is exactly the kind of thing I'm talking about - but they need to be comprehensive, redundant, and responsibly audited (the part that scares me the most).

hyperbovine 13y ago

If the Japanese can't do it safely, it can't be done safely.

NamTaf 13y ago
Why? What makes you think their corporations cut fewer corners than Western ones? What makes you think their employees/scientists/etc. are inherently more infallible than Western ones?
rlucas 13y ago
It wasn't "the Japanese" that didn't do it safely at Fukushima. It was GE, which is about as American as you get, along with Toshiba and Hitachi. Also it was the 1960s, which is the age of the technology deployed in these relative archaisms. See http://blog.rlucas.net/tech_and_market_reflections/fukushima-type-reactors-in-the-usa/ http://blog.rlucas.net/tech_and_market_reflections/fukushima...
- pdonis 13y ago
  It wasn't "the Japanese" that didn't do it safely at Fukushima. It was GE Was GE responsible for the siting of the backup diesel generators and switchgear behind a seawall that was overcome by the tsunami? That was the root cause of all the problems; it wasn't anything to do with the reactor design itself, other than the fact that it needed active cooling after shutdown (which PWR designs from the same time period also did). (That said, I agree the BWR design is outdated and modern designs with passive safety features are much, much better.)
  - andygates 13y ago
    But the backup generators could be moved (and were in similar US installations). Raising the backup generators to protect them against inundation was recommended, but the delay there is pure sclerotic TEPCO.
    - rdl 13y ago
      I still don't understand why Chinooks weren't in the air toward Fukushima within 30 minutes of the tsunami with some generators sling-loaded under them (and refueling, etc.). Either from the JSDF or US Military.
      - pdonis 13y ago
        As I understand it, the issue was that not just the generators but the switchgear connecting them to the plant's power grid was behind the seawall that was overcome by the tsunami. So bringing in other generators wouldn't have helped, because there was no way to plug them into the grid.
        rdl 13y ago
        You can usually get portable switchgear, and it was mainly pumps, which should be fairly tolerant even with an emergency cabling job. I'd really consider this a contingency plants should be ready for; if I operated at tepco scale I would probably have actual helicopters under contract (or priority with the military) and strategic equipment in hardened shelters at my plants, just to be able to move it to other plants. From what I've read there was a leadership vacuum for the initial crisis at tepco. I'm actually going to try to visit as close as I can get to the plant tomorrow or Saturday (in Sendai right now)
lmm 13y ago
The Japanese are many things, but models of incorruptibility they are not. I'd bet German reactors are safer.

bcoates 13y ago

That appears to be an accident handling the output of an isotope manufacturing reactor, not anything involving a power reactor. > I would argue that there needs to be a significant improvement before fission is publicly acceptable. I would argue that fission is already held to a standard well above that of almost any human endeavor, even those with roughly similar risk profiles (compare almost any form of mining, or the shipping of hazardous cargo by rail)

nikatwork 13y ago
> That appears to be an accident handling the output of an isotope manufacturing reactor, not anything involving a power reactor. That is irrelevant to my point, which is that the biggest risk to reactor safety with current fission tech is human error and negligence. > compare almost any form of mining The only form of mining comparable in terms of potential environmental damage is ocean oil drilling[1], which I also oppose. The point is - human nature (re: greedy and negligent idiots) makes current reactor tech unsafe. The potential fallout (pun intended) is not worth the significant risk. [1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deepwater_Horizon_oil_spill http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deepwater_Horizon_oil_spill
- dekhn 13y ago
  If your technology has reached the point where human error and negligence is the primary source of risk, you've succeeded. That is the goal of producing all reliable technologies. Of course, at that point, your system design primarily exists to prevent human errors from causing harm (for example, yesterday there was a news report that a Fukushima cleanup worker managed to engage a pump that would dump a bunch of radioactive water in the wrong place. He was saved by a backup system.")
  - nikatwork 13y ago
    > If your technology has reached the point where human error and negligence is the primary source of risk, you've succeeded. If all it takes is one earthquake or distracted technician to potentially vaporize a suburb, then your tech has not yet succeeded. Safety regimes to minimize human error are great, but time and time again they are bypassed due to greed, negligence and idiocy. The Fukushima backup system you mention is exactly the kind of thing I'm talking about - but they need to be comprehensive, redundant, and responsibly audited (the part that scares me the most).