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One iffy part I would like to add is government itself. It was generally thought that government would not keep security vulnerabilities hidden, prioritizing to
by belorn 13y ago
One iffy part I would like to add is government itself. It was generally thought that government would not keep security vulnerabilities hidden, prioritizing to protect citizens rather than having a minor advantage in hacking.
Together with the earlier leaks regarding sabotaged security standard, US government is the most damaging entity to computer security today. Anything they do need to be viewed under the understanding that NSA primary priority is to be able to hack other peoples computers. Be that a encryption algorithm, or a kernel module, NSA priority is 100% clear.
That used to be a tin-foil hat idea just a few months ago, and we know better now. If NSA comes carrying gifts, it warrant being very careful in accepting them from a party with such hostile priorities.
- akjj 13y ago> It was generally thought that government would not keep security vulnerabilities hidden Was that what people thought? Were there vulnerability reports in open-source software that were coming from the NSA or thought to be coming from the NSA? Surely everyone knew that the NSA was capable of finding exploits in software, and I would think that it would be hard to keep secret whether or not they're being reported. > That used to be a tin-foil hat idea just a few months ago, and we know better now. It's well-known that the NSA pushed to have DES limited to 56-bit keys. There were suspicions about Dual_EC_DRBG long before there were any leaks from Snowden. In the 90s, they pushed the Clipper chip, in which they'd engineered a back door. I think that everyone understood that the NSA had somewhat of an interest in weaker cryptography. That's why the cryptographic standardization processes happened in the open and when constants were needed, they were taken from the digits of pi or some such sequence.
- XorNot 13y agoDES was about speed. DES was in an age when computers were slow, DES was slow, and the NSA was already helping defeat a cryptanalysis attack on it. Limiting the keys to a sensible number means it can be used in a practical sense.
- HoochTHX 13y ago> It was generally thought that government would not keep security vulnerabilities hidden It depends on which they find it on, according to this talk, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E4Zx5rQFk4U https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E4Zx5rQFk4U , If vulnerabilities are found on secure systems they are immediately classified, For them to be able to report they have to refind and document the vulnerability on a non secured system.
- nialo 13y agoThere's a video from the RSA conference in 2011 with Dickie George, who was the director for Information Assurance at NSA when DES was being reviewed. He claims that the agreement between NIST and NSA was that: 1, NSA would only change things if they could find a specific problem with the cipher, and 2, NSA promised that DES would have security equal to its key size. The implication is then that they decided that 56 bits was how secure it was, and then picked that as the key size. You can believe him or not, but I don't see any particular reason not to. link to the video, the relevant bit is ~8min in: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0NlZpyk3PKI http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0NlZpyk3PKI
- akjj 13y agoThanks for the video. I ended up watching the whole thing. My interpretation is a little different than yours: I think George is saying that there's no point in having a key longer that 56 bits given that the goal is 56 bits of security, but he's vague about where the requirement for 56 bits of security came from. In any case, the video certainly supports my larger point that the idea that NSA would sabotage a crypto standard was mainstream within crypto circles, even in the '70s.
- mpyne 13y ago> That used to be a tin-foil hat idea just a few months ago, and we know better now. If NSA comes carrying gifts, it warrant being very careful in accepting them from a party with such hostile priorities. Well, not really. The "tinfoil" idea is that NSA is breaking into crypto so that they can blackmail politicians, black-bag innocent citizens, etc. But it was never widely assumed that NSA wasn't trying to break every bit of encryption they could. Besides the fact that such activities are literally their job, it's one of the few things they'd just as likely tell you directly if you asked them. "Q: Are you trying to break cipher/cryptosystem FOO?" "A: Yes, we're trying to break all of them, to protect our SIGINT capability". NSA has spent literally decades analyzing and breaking the military-grade ciphers of other nations. So I don't know where people got the idea that just because civilians obtained access to military-grade encryption, that NSA would suddenly stop with cryptanalysis efforts. But it has nothing to do with civilians per se; the military and national security opponents are using our civilian crypto too! Is that inconvenient for civilian cryptography? Sure. But let's not act like people are having something chipped and taken away from them, that they've always had. Before RSA and DH there was essentially no widely-known safe cryptosystems that we could use. You used DES, or you could make up your own Vigenère implementation perhaps (have fun with key exchange!). And that's just discussing computer communications. Your phones were all tappable, international telegrams easily read if it suited NSA, and good luck if you used one of those new-fangled cell phones. The claimed threat is that computers make NSA more capable of surveilling the people at large, but the evidence shows that systems like Tor are putting up an exceptional fight, and even cryptosystems like TLS with many known weaknesses mostly work against global passive surveillance. You would have to get on NSA's specific shitlist to have to really worry, but being on that shitlist 20 years ago meant anything you said would be picked up... and now, even that is not so certain.
- dobbsbob 13y agoUnfortunately it's politcians in 6 countries who try to dismantle the now totalitarian levels of surveillance who end up on this shit list too. Then soon it will be you and me.
- moutarde 13y agoThe NSA shouldn't just be an attacker it should also provide defence. If one of their many contractors can leak details to the press for idealogical ends it's pretty safe to assume that much worse secrets have already been leaked to other nation states (China, Russia etc....) for financial gain. I think it's entirely reasonable to assume that a lot of exploits the NSA has discovered and not revealed (because it thinks they are "secret") have actually been sold to other governments by it's own contractors. By not revealing these exploits to citizens they are actually leaving them open to attack by foreign governments. Large companies trying to defend against industrial espionage are probably most at risk.
- api 13y agoI never thought that. I always assumed all cyber-war capable governments had hidden caches of 0-day vulnerabilities.
- B-Con 13y agoAt a DefCon (15, I think?) I got to ask a panel of FBI/CIA/NSA bigwigs a question at an open Q/A panel. I asked how they made the decision of which exploits they'd keep for themselves and which they'd help the project patch. The response was 100% boilerplate. "We have a system for evaluating it," was the basic answer, in more words than that. I didn't really expect anything more, but it was worth a shot. I've never believed that their "system" was in any way primarily for the public interest. I can't point to any specific evidence, it just never felt like the type of thing they would do. Good exploits just seemed far too useful to be worth giving up.