5 ms·

So let's speculate about what the article almost-but-doesn't-quite propose: The NSA, or related parties, was responsible for the breach. There was an investiga

by nlh 13y ago

So let's speculate about what the article almost-but-doesn't-quite propose: The NSA, or related parties, was responsible for the breach. There was an investigation and postmortem, but because of an NSL or other gag-type order, they couldn't accurately publish what they discovered. So they figured that not releasing a report was better than releasing a report that either intentionally misled or pretended not to have figured out what happened. I know, this is a pretty big leap. But regardless -- what does it mean? What are the ramifications if this is what happened?

rgbrenner 13y ago
What are the ramifications if this is what happened? I strongly suspect they were able to get a copy of the kernel source code... They could be doing anything with it.. Porting it to a new platform.. Compiling it with unsafe GCC flags.. Or worse..
- spangled 13y ago
  This reminds me of a friend's response to the idea that the TouchID in the new iphone could be a way for the NSA to get your fingerprints: "Just imagine the shitstorm if they put a camera in there. Or a microphone."
  - r4pha 13y ago
    Or a GPS.
  - ris 13y ago
    There's no good way yet to uniquely identify a person based on a (dodgy) picture of them or sample of their voice. Whereas fingerprints are used for this daily* and a quickly searchable database of these (or just their "hashes") would be incredibly useful to _somebody_. *I'm not raising the issue of whether they _should_ be or not here, just that they are.
    - contingencies 13y ago
      There's no good way yet to uniquely identify a person based on a (dodgy) picture of them or sample of their voice Surely this is sarcastic. We can easily identify with great certainty from a relevant set... as Facebook does, for instance. You have a relevant set if you are many governments (the local government, and in many cases Israel via AMDOCS and its intelligence allies - primarily the US, but in some cases possibly their intelligence allies) or a motivated attacker (eg. with an insider, or hiring an insider via a private investigation firm), because you have the device call/messaging/physical location records from which to cross-match. Even if it's a land-line. You also have easy access to additional voice data (voicemail recording, 'this call may be recorded' records at large companies such as banks or wings of government, etc.). Public data sets on non-secret government telephone interception frequency even in 'free-ish' countries like Australia suggest extremely broad cultures around acceptable collection. (For .au I read a raw statistics report I can't seem to relocate recently, but http://www.smh.com.au/technology/technology-news/be-careful-she-might-hear-you-20120924-26h6r.html http://www.smh.com.au/technology/technology-news/be-careful-... is a good overview.)
- deleted 13y ago
  [deleted]
- jeresig 13y ago
  There was a discussion about this recently saying that it was highly unlikely. All the source was in Git and every git commit references the previous commit, making it highly challenging to modify an old commit without also modifying the commit id. More details: http://archive.is/Khq7R http://archive.is/Khq7R
  - rgbrenner 13y ago
    Yes, it's unlikely they modified the source in git.. But it's possible they were able to download a copy and modify it locally... Possibly adding comments to document certain blocks of code.. Or adding unofficial patches for zfs support... Or worse..
    - adamnemecek 13y ago
      Isn't that against the Geneva Convention?
    - SimHacker 13y ago
      Like enabling ReiserFS??!
  - jeffreyg 13y ago
    whoosh :)
  - deleted 13y ago
    [deleted]
  - joeyh 13y ago
    Here's how to do it: 1. Contribute a driver to the kernel. A network driver would be ideal, but any driver will do. Include a binary firmware blob, because including binary firmware blobs in drivers is how linux kernel devs roll (or how they used to roll). When creating the binary firmware blob, use a SHA1 preimage attack to actually create two versions with the same SHA. One is benign, and one runs your back door. 2. Root git server. Replace object containing firmware blob with the alternate version. This attack should be detectable by comparing blobs from old git clones with blobs from new ones, using a hash that has better preimage resistance than does SHA1. There are other ways to get your SHA1 colliding binary blob into a git commit in ways that are unlikely to be noticed. I demonstrated one (without actual SHA1 preimage attack) here: http://github.com/joeyh/supercollider http://github.com/joeyh/supercollider But a binary firmware blob is pretty much ideal.
- woah 13y ago
  The people need an answer. Does the NSA have a copy of the linux source code or not??!
dmix 13y ago
> WELCOME TO THE CRAPTOPOCLYPSE: From now on, every security discussion wastes 15 minutes on “but did the NSA DO IT?!?!’ no matter how absurd. https://twitter.com/grahamvsworld/status/375793987992715264 https://twitter.com/grahamvsworld/status/375793987992715264 I'd be more curious to see the actual report before speculating.
- 6cxs2hd6 13y ago
  I think the point was, why hasn't the report been released yet, 2 years later? Could be they're lazy. Could be they're embarrassed. Could be they're legally prohibited from reporting it -- which in turn could be due to a NSL. Lots of "could be". But not entirely crazy to list all the possibilities... while waiting for the report, which we can probably all agree ought to be released by now.
  - marcosdumay 13y ago
    My bet is on "lazy", but I think it's much easier to buy into the NSL explanation than the embarrassement one.
    - beernutz 13y ago
      At this point, I think you basically HAVE to assume it was NSA involvement. Most of the people who were considered paranoid before seem to have been underestimating things based on what we now know.
- kbenson 13y ago
  Let's just agree that from now on the NSA is responsible for all future security and privacy problems. If proven otherwise, we will assume the NSA is willing to share the blame. Then we can move forward with the rest of the discussion.
zokier 13y ago
If that were the case why would gregkh say that "There will be a report later this year".
fnordfnordfnord 13y ago
It's not a big leap. The report hasn't been disclosed because they are under legal obligation not to disclose. The report hasn't been disclosed because they are corrupt. The report hasn't been disclosed because they are embarrassed. The report hasn't been disclosed because they are lazy. The report hasn't been disclosed because they are incompetent. What other possibilities exist? Which one is most likely?
- deleted 13y ago
  [deleted]
- bdonlan 13y ago
  How about: The report hasn't been disclosed because they are busy with normal operations. The report hasn't been disclosed because they were pulled away from it to do some more urgent business, and since then it has been forgotten and/or important evidence has been lost. The report hasn't been released due to turnover in whatever group would be responsible for producing the report, which has caused the loss of important tribal knowledge regarding the event. As an outside observer, it's hard to say which it would be. However, I do find it unlikely that there would be a gag order - there is little surveillance data to be directly obtained from kernel.org, and attempting to backdoor the kernel itself would have a high risk of exposure and an extremely high risk of blowback from other governments who use Linux. Even if the NSA or CIA or some other TLA were behind it, they would have taken steps to ensure their identity would not be exposed in any investigation in the aftermath of a successful backdooring; there's no sense then effectively telling people who they are with a gag order (and then risking that someone might choose to violate the gag order).
mustapha 13y ago
You're so far off :)

by nlh 13y ago

rgbrenner 13y ago

What are the ramifications if this is what happened? I strongly suspect they were able to get a copy of the kernel source code... They could be doing anything with it.. Porting it to a new platform.. Compiling it with unsafe GCC flags.. Or worse..

spangled 13y ago
This reminds me of a friend's response to the idea that the TouchID in the new iphone could be a way for the NSA to get your fingerprints: "Just imagine the shitstorm if they put a camera in there. Or a microphone."
- r4pha 13y ago
  Or a GPS.
- ris 13y ago
  There's no good way yet to uniquely identify a person based on a (dodgy) picture of them or sample of their voice. Whereas fingerprints are used for this daily* and a quickly searchable database of these (or just their "hashes") would be incredibly useful to _somebody_. *I'm not raising the issue of whether they _should_ be or not here, just that they are.
  - contingencies 13y ago
    There's no good way yet to uniquely identify a person based on a (dodgy) picture of them or sample of their voice Surely this is sarcastic. We can easily identify with great certainty from a relevant set... as Facebook does, for instance. You have a relevant set if you are many governments (the local government, and in many cases Israel via AMDOCS and its intelligence allies - primarily the US, but in some cases possibly their intelligence allies) or a motivated attacker (eg. with an insider, or hiring an insider via a private investigation firm), because you have the device call/messaging/physical location records from which to cross-match. Even if it's a land-line. You also have easy access to additional voice data (voicemail recording, 'this call may be recorded' records at large companies such as banks or wings of government, etc.). Public data sets on non-secret government telephone interception frequency even in 'free-ish' countries like Australia suggest extremely broad cultures around acceptable collection. (For .au I read a raw statistics report I can't seem to relocate recently, but http://www.smh.com.au/technology/technology-news/be-careful-she-might-hear-you-20120924-26h6r.html http://www.smh.com.au/technology/technology-news/be-careful-... is a good overview.)
deleted 13y ago
[deleted]
jeresig 13y ago
There was a discussion about this recently saying that it was highly unlikely. All the source was in Git and every git commit references the previous commit, making it highly challenging to modify an old commit without also modifying the commit id. More details: http://archive.is/Khq7R http://archive.is/Khq7R
- rgbrenner 13y ago
  Yes, it's unlikely they modified the source in git.. But it's possible they were able to download a copy and modify it locally... Possibly adding comments to document certain blocks of code.. Or adding unofficial patches for zfs support... Or worse..
  - adamnemecek 13y ago
    Isn't that against the Geneva Convention?
  - SimHacker 13y ago
    Like enabling ReiserFS??!
- jeffreyg 13y ago
  whoosh :)
- deleted 13y ago
  [deleted]
- joeyh 13y ago
  Here's how to do it: 1. Contribute a driver to the kernel. A network driver would be ideal, but any driver will do. Include a binary firmware blob, because including binary firmware blobs in drivers is how linux kernel devs roll (or how they used to roll). When creating the binary firmware blob, use a SHA1 preimage attack to actually create two versions with the same SHA. One is benign, and one runs your back door. 2. Root git server. Replace object containing firmware blob with the alternate version. This attack should be detectable by comparing blobs from old git clones with blobs from new ones, using a hash that has better preimage resistance than does SHA1. There are other ways to get your SHA1 colliding binary blob into a git commit in ways that are unlikely to be noticed. I demonstrated one (without actual SHA1 preimage attack) here: http://github.com/joeyh/supercollider http://github.com/joeyh/supercollider But a binary firmware blob is pretty much ideal.
woah 13y ago
The people need an answer. Does the NSA have a copy of the linux source code or not??!

dmix 13y ago

> WELCOME TO THE CRAPTOPOCLYPSE: From now on, every security discussion wastes 15 minutes on “but did the NSA DO IT?!?!’ no matter how absurd. https://twitter.com/grahamvsworld/status/375793987992715264 https://twitter.com/grahamvsworld/status/375793987992715264 I'd be more curious to see the actual report before speculating.

6cxs2hd6 13y ago
I think the point was, why hasn't the report been released yet, 2 years later? Could be they're lazy. Could be they're embarrassed. Could be they're legally prohibited from reporting it -- which in turn could be due to a NSL. Lots of "could be". But not entirely crazy to list all the possibilities... while waiting for the report, which we can probably all agree ought to be released by now.
- marcosdumay 13y ago
  My bet is on "lazy", but I think it's much easier to buy into the NSL explanation than the embarrassement one.
  - beernutz 13y ago
    At this point, I think you basically HAVE to assume it was NSA involvement. Most of the people who were considered paranoid before seem to have been underestimating things based on what we now know.
kbenson 13y ago
Let's just agree that from now on the NSA is responsible for all future security and privacy problems. If proven otherwise, we will assume the NSA is willing to share the blame. Then we can move forward with the rest of the discussion.

zokier 13y ago

If that were the case why would gregkh say that "There will be a report later this year".

fnordfnordfnord 13y ago

It's not a big leap. The report hasn't been disclosed because they are under legal obligation not to disclose. The report hasn't been disclosed because they are corrupt. The report hasn't been disclosed because they are embarrassed. The report hasn't been disclosed because they are lazy. The report hasn't been disclosed because they are incompetent. What other possibilities exist? Which one is most likely?

deleted 13y ago
[deleted]
bdonlan 13y ago
How about: The report hasn't been disclosed because they are busy with normal operations. The report hasn't been disclosed because they were pulled away from it to do some more urgent business, and since then it has been forgotten and/or important evidence has been lost. The report hasn't been released due to turnover in whatever group would be responsible for producing the report, which has caused the loss of important tribal knowledge regarding the event. As an outside observer, it's hard to say which it would be. However, I do find it unlikely that there would be a gag order - there is little surveillance data to be directly obtained from kernel.org, and attempting to backdoor the kernel itself would have a high risk of exposure and an extremely high risk of blowback from other governments who use Linux. Even if the NSA or CIA or some other TLA were behind it, they would have taken steps to ensure their identity would not be exposed in any investigation in the aftermath of a successful backdooring; there's no sense then effectively telling people who they are with a gag order (and then risking that someone might choose to violate the gag order).

mustapha 13y ago

You're so far off :)