63 ms·

No you don't. The only time you need to worry about the NSA having a back door into your random number generator is if you are worried either about the NSA atta

No you don't. The only time you need to worry about the NSA having a back door into your random number generator is if you are worried either about the NSA attacking you (in which case you probably don't have a chance anyway), or are worried that some learned of the NSA's back door and is exploiting that.

derefr 13y ago
That reminds me of a question I've been pondering on-and-off for a while: is it possible even in theory to use Sufficiently Advanced Mathematics (e.g. homomorphic encryption) to build a trusted computation environment on top of an untrustworthy foundation? For example, I want to run a VM on EC2, knowing the NSA's after something I have. Is there some way I could, even theoretically, build my VM, that would protect it from the NSA compelling Amazon's cooperation in ripping the data right from my VM's memory at the hypervisor level?
- tptacek 13y ago
  Possibly. For instance, look up some papers on White Box Cryptography; these are implementations of things like AES designed to run AES computations on untrusted platforms without revealing their key (the key gets "baked in" to the code that runs the algorithm in such a way that it's theorized to be cryptographically hard to extract the key from the algorithm). You are getting into the flip side of the DRM coin here; put differently: if there's a way to do what you want, there's also a way for the MPAA to do what it wants on PCs. Personally, I think there is, at least in the dollar-cost model of security.
  - ballard 13y ago
    It's a good insight. There is distinction between I/O (rendering the video and audio to the host) and computations of a seemingly blackbox. Would also be an interesting avenue for malware to grow into if possible. The problem is there's always been decryption code that has to live somewhere that effectively unlocks the whole thing. Edit: PyPy but zk computing for malware.
  - deleted 13y ago
    [deleted]
  - homeomorphic 13y ago
    Wouldn't this make nice foundations for hardware cryptographic tokens such as CryptoStick?
  - bch 13y ago
    I'm out of my depth here, but since this conversation seems precise, and is discussing theoretical and practical implementations, does this paper[1] factor in? If so, is it fair to say that at some level, without auditing every aspect of hardware, and every aspect of all software used at build time and runtime, you can't know? [1] http://cm.bell-labs.com/who/ken/trust.html http://cm.bell-labs.com/who/ken/trust.html
- ballard 13y ago
  Funny you should mention this. I was asked to "suggest solutions" to this in 2008 as a client-facing AWS enterprise consultant in the mobile industry. The naïve way relies on: "If there isn't a Rootkit or capture mechanism, it's secure if it's obscure." That will buy an iota of time. The other way is to simply not trust the host and end-to-end encrypt everything important. This is a PITA, but there is no current viable alternative without a significantly rigorous and extensive project (would be in the form of a VM for servers &| something that runs on js like asm.js) Mostly you need zero knowledge computation. Storage and network are easier probs. The intractable problem is eventually an answer needs to be presented somewhere. For now, you should minimize exposure as much as possible through all means available.
- sweis 13y ago
  We're working on a similar problem at PrivateCore: Protecting VM data in-use on outsourced infrastructure. We're running a high-assurance, remotely attestable hypervisor inside the CPU cache and encrypting all access to main memory. This protects against threats from the physical layer, like cold boot, DMA attacks, NVDIMMs, bus analyzers, etc. It's not quite what you're talking about in your Amazon and NSA scenario. Amazon doesn't let you bring your own hypervisor to run on bare metal and the NSA can compromise the CPU itself. However, our approach does give you assurance that someone with physical access can't easily snapshot your VM memory.
  - derefr 13y ago
    > remotely attestable hypervisor How does this bit work, by the way? What's stopping an altered hypervisor from lying to say it's unaltered? (This is the classic "how do you verify a player on your FPS isn't running a bot instead of a game-client" problem in a nutshell.)
    - sweis 13y ago
      Today we rely on the TPM to measure the state of the system using Intel TXT. These measurements are stored in platform configuration registers (PCRs) on the TPM device. There are known TPM and LPC bus vulnerabilities. That is why long-term we will move away from that dependency by utilizing upcoming CPU features.
  - e12e 13y ago
    > our approach does give you assurance that someone with physical access can't easily snapshot your VM memory. But how do you know the VM (or rather the hypervisor for the vm) is running on physical hardware, and not in a hypervisor? I can't think of a way you could be certain of this remotely? Perhaps you could be on-site for the boot-up, and then rely on the fact that snapshotting is very hard -- but it sounds rather fragile... Still very interesting project! I've been thinking a bit on "running inside the L/1/2/3 chache"-lately - but I hadn't thought about the particular idea that you could treat RAM as "external" -- assuming you could guarantee that you're always in cache.

derefr 13y ago

That reminds me of a question I've been pondering on-and-off for a while: is it possible even in theory to use Sufficiently Advanced Mathematics (e.g. homomorphic encryption) to build a trusted computation environment on top of an untrustworthy foundation? For example, I want to run a VM on EC2, knowing the NSA's after something I have. Is there some way I could, even theoretically, build my VM, that would protect it from the NSA compelling Amazon's cooperation in ripping the data right from my VM's memory at the hypervisor level?

tptacek 13y ago
Possibly. For instance, look up some papers on White Box Cryptography; these are implementations of things like AES designed to run AES computations on untrusted platforms without revealing their key (the key gets "baked in" to the code that runs the algorithm in such a way that it's theorized to be cryptographically hard to extract the key from the algorithm). You are getting into the flip side of the DRM coin here; put differently: if there's a way to do what you want, there's also a way for the MPAA to do what it wants on PCs. Personally, I think there is, at least in the dollar-cost model of security.
- ballard 13y ago
  It's a good insight. There is distinction between I/O (rendering the video and audio to the host) and computations of a seemingly blackbox. Would also be an interesting avenue for malware to grow into if possible. The problem is there's always been decryption code that has to live somewhere that effectively unlocks the whole thing. Edit: PyPy but zk computing for malware.
- deleted 13y ago
  [deleted]
- homeomorphic 13y ago
  Wouldn't this make nice foundations for hardware cryptographic tokens such as CryptoStick?
- bch 13y ago
  I'm out of my depth here, but since this conversation seems precise, and is discussing theoretical and practical implementations, does this paper[1] factor in? If so, is it fair to say that at some level, without auditing every aspect of hardware, and every aspect of all software used at build time and runtime, you can't know? [1] http://cm.bell-labs.com/who/ken/trust.html http://cm.bell-labs.com/who/ken/trust.html
ballard 13y ago
Funny you should mention this. I was asked to "suggest solutions" to this in 2008 as a client-facing AWS enterprise consultant in the mobile industry. The naïve way relies on: "If there isn't a Rootkit or capture mechanism, it's secure if it's obscure." That will buy an iota of time. The other way is to simply not trust the host and end-to-end encrypt everything important. This is a PITA, but there is no current viable alternative without a significantly rigorous and extensive project (would be in the form of a VM for servers &| something that runs on js like asm.js) Mostly you need zero knowledge computation. Storage and network are easier probs. The intractable problem is eventually an answer needs to be presented somewhere. For now, you should minimize exposure as much as possible through all means available.
sweis 13y ago
We're working on a similar problem at PrivateCore: Protecting VM data in-use on outsourced infrastructure. We're running a high-assurance, remotely attestable hypervisor inside the CPU cache and encrypting all access to main memory. This protects against threats from the physical layer, like cold boot, DMA attacks, NVDIMMs, bus analyzers, etc. It's not quite what you're talking about in your Amazon and NSA scenario. Amazon doesn't let you bring your own hypervisor to run on bare metal and the NSA can compromise the CPU itself. However, our approach does give you assurance that someone with physical access can't easily snapshot your VM memory.
- derefr 13y ago
  > remotely attestable hypervisor How does this bit work, by the way? What's stopping an altered hypervisor from lying to say it's unaltered? (This is the classic "how do you verify a player on your FPS isn't running a bot instead of a game-client" problem in a nutshell.)
  - sweis 13y ago
    Today we rely on the TPM to measure the state of the system using Intel TXT. These measurements are stored in platform configuration registers (PCRs) on the TPM device. There are known TPM and LPC bus vulnerabilities. That is why long-term we will move away from that dependency by utilizing upcoming CPU features.
- e12e 13y ago
  > our approach does give you assurance that someone with physical access can't easily snapshot your VM memory. But how do you know the VM (or rather the hypervisor for the vm) is running on physical hardware, and not in a hypervisor? I can't think of a way you could be certain of this remotely? Perhaps you could be on-site for the boot-up, and then rely on the fact that snapshotting is very hard -- but it sounds rather fragile... Still very interesting project! I've been thinking a bit on "running inside the L/1/2/3 chache"-lately - but I hadn't thought about the particular idea that you could treat RAM as "external" -- assuming you could guarantee that you're always in cache.