34 ms·

Mega to run ‘cutting-edge’ encrypted email

69 points by denzil_correa 13y ago

dbond 13y ago
I've only read the RFCs for email protocols once, so someone correct me if I'm wrong. But the only way email is ever going to be truly secure is if extensions are added to the current protocols to add end to end encryption of the message body. Otherwise there's always going to be a third party arm for law enforcement to twist where the message is in plain text for a short time. Also you can't trust the guy, I'd trust him to host illegal material because he wants it to stay up, but what happens when governments start offering bribes to hand over my emails?
- ecaron 13y ago
  I imagine that it'll be something involving browser-JS-baked PGP and an optional client-side driven indexing service (like a Sphinx search agent running in the task bar.) It'll weave in some sort of "Hey, you're emailing a service provider that doesn't support PGP enforcement - supply recipients public key, send unsecured message, or ask them to switch to MegaMail?"
  - dbond 13y ago
    Yea, I'd imagine it to be a shinier version of hushmail with lots of sketchy marketing thrown in...
- Zigurd 13y ago
  It seems like it could be done with a service offering public key info, and using key signing and web-of-trust to keep the keys reliable, and encrypting in open source client software not provided or updated by the mail service provider. That still leaves the service open to being strong-armed into sending you malware. And, of course, your mail headers are in the clear. But, apparently, to the Lavabit people, what I've outlined here isn't sufficient, and the implication is that the NSA and/or FBI has ways of compromising all email providers no matter how they operate.
  - dbond 13y ago
    This is why it really needs to be done at the protocol level, an email provider can't change the behavior of my desktop client and the process could be completely automated for the average user.
    - Zigurd 13y ago
      I'm not sure of the relevance of the protocol IF the service remains store-and-forward. Silent Circle and Lavabit seem to think it's better not to use email at all. An open Skype-like system is probably pretty good. Keys are ephemeral, and transferring encrypted files in audio-video sessions makes it hard to MITM.
      - dbond 13y ago
        Email is pretty bad, but its not going anywhere so we should try to fix it. The service would remain store-and-forward but the content would be encrypted throughout, something which is not currently possible without both parties knowing how to setup and use PGP.
- jadeddrag 13y ago
  I think you're looking for bitmessage which is an email replacement that hides the header and content, and is inspired by bitcoin.
- lessnonymous 13y ago
  You can already encrypt email bodies end-to-end using PGP. The unsolved problem is the (queue dramatic music) METADATA!!! For an email to get from your computer to the recipients, it has to have metadata that the intermediate computers understand: The SMTP protocol is designed to deliver your email by relaying it any which way it is set to. So when you send it, it goes to your office SMTP server, which then might relay it to your head office SMTP server, which then might relay it to the recipient's spam filtering service, which might then relay it to the recipient's head office, which might then relay it to your recipient's office from where the recipient retrieves the email when they're good and ready. SMTP is not ever going to be secure. Even if you use TLS (which most mail servers do by default these days) you're only encrypting the message-in-transit so any of the myriad of systems between each SMTP server can't read it. All it takes for the NSA to read your metadata (and cache your encrypted message) is to compromise one of the SMTP servers it passes through. Then they can compel you to decrypt it using any method they have at hand. The secure way to send email is to have your computer connect directly to your recipient's computer over an encrypted transport layer (TLS) and possibly for your recipient to authenticate to accept that connection (so AFK means no email). You'll have to know your destination point's IP address somehow. (DNS sounds fine, after all it's just a phonebook. However requesting an IP address could easily be logged and so you've leaked metadata again) This means you can't send an overnight email and expect someone to get it in the morning when they switch on their computer. If you want to do that it needs to sit on a server somewhere. And that server is subject to attack. So for convenience, we could build a server designed to accept any of these messages from anywhere. But it also needs to accept messages to anywhere as it can't be allowed to know who the recipient is. That's metadata. The problem now is how do I get my messages from my server? The server isn't allowed to have my key, so it can't go and attempt to decrypt every waiting message (or decrypt every envelope). At some point, you'll have to either give up convenience (can't get email unless you're both online) or security (you'll have to trust something you're not in control of). I'd be stocking up on tin cans. And string.
  - Spooky23 13y ago
    Actually, its really simple. You operate your own mail system, and require secure network access to use it. For example, The social security administration requires each state to do this for the state employees who handle disability-related business. Those employees must use their mail system.
borplk 13y ago
No thanks Kim. It's just going to be some shiny app with marketing fluff sprinkled on top for the every day user to create the illusion of security and privacy for people who don't know any better. Very opportunistic.
xSwag 13y ago
I wouldn't trust him. He seems like such a shady guy[1] [1]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kim_Dotcom#Early_criminal_investigations http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kim_Dotcom#Early_criminal_inves...
- RDeckard 13y ago
  I've think he's got a vendetta against the US govt now. I bet he really wants to stick it to them after what they've done. Don't you agree?
  - benologist 13y ago
    He wants attention first and foremost.
- pfraze 13y ago
  Watch the Mega announcement [1] to get a very clear picture of this guy. He starts talking at [2]. 1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LwlLC2PUrH8 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LwlLC2PUrH8 2 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LwlLC2PUrH8&feature=player_detailpage&t=624 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LwlLC2PUrH8&feature=player_d...
  - skeletonjelly 13y ago
    Wow. Thanks for sitting through that for us!
- solarexplorer 13y ago
  That wikipedia entry does him no justice. In the 90ies he ran several Mailboxes (anyone remembers those?) where people shared warez and then he went on to sell his users data to an ip lawyer who used the data to sue them. Google for "Kimble" and "Gravenreuth" to read the details. I'd rather trust the NSA with my data...
  - qwertzlcoatl 13y ago
    Wow, there really doesn't seem to be anything off-limits for this dude. Even traditional ponzi schemes: > He set up a network of interlinked companies, including Trendax which was claimed to be an artificial intelligence-driven hedge fund delivering an annual return of at least 25%
RDeckard 13y ago
Kim Dotcom is a maverick!
sgarbi 13y ago
If PGP is the solution then a first step could be to agree on a standard markup inside the email so that we could point the email client to the public PGP for automatic unencryption.
6d0debc071 13y ago
Edit: After looking around, the following sounds very much like Bitmessage. Which doesn't work precisely like this, and I worry about how it'll scale if the messages get sent to everyone - how does that work with significant throughput? But in any cause sounds like a fairly well thought out system. ================== So, what would it take to trust an email provider? What'd that look like? All encryption done on your machine from code you compiled, or at least can compile. Open sourced, so it can be checked. Keys always in your control. The email should be split into several parts and then onion routed, with associated encryption, to another service with semi-random timing in the forwarding protocol to disrupt traffic analysis. This service then removes the final layers of encryption, reassembles the message and forwards it to the final destination. Preferably this last step/service is done on a semi-random basis within the forwarding network rather than with a centralised server. Each person serving as a forwarder and a sender would help to confuse traffic analysis when coupled with the semi-random forwarding as well. I might be wrong, however, I'm guessing that this isn't going to look like that. Otherwise, it seems to me, you're putting a lot of trust in the server. Even if they pass you some fancy script that does the encryption on your end and there's some way to check that it hasn't changed between visits. Even assuming they don't send you malware. They're still going to be able to see who you're sending stuff to. (And neither of those previous assumptions is non-controversial to begin with.)
spetsnaz 13y ago
I'd prefer not to trust neither him or they...
dil8 13y ago
What do people think of I2P Email? http://www.wiki.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/Anleitung-i2p-Susimail-sicheres-Email http://www.wiki.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/Anleitung-i2p-Sus...
AmVess 13y ago
I druther keep my e-mail on NSA's servers than Mega's. Given .com's past, it'd practically be the same thing.

69 points by denzil_correa 13y ago

dbond 13y ago

I've only read the RFCs for email protocols once, so someone correct me if I'm wrong. But the only way email is ever going to be truly secure is if extensions are added to the current protocols to add end to end encryption of the message body. Otherwise there's always going to be a third party arm for law enforcement to twist where the message is in plain text for a short time. Also you can't trust the guy, I'd trust him to host illegal material because he wants it to stay up, but what happens when governments start offering bribes to hand over my emails?

ecaron 13y ago
I imagine that it'll be something involving browser-JS-baked PGP and an optional client-side driven indexing service (like a Sphinx search agent running in the task bar.) It'll weave in some sort of "Hey, you're emailing a service provider that doesn't support PGP enforcement - supply recipients public key, send unsecured message, or ask them to switch to MegaMail?"
- dbond 13y ago
  Yea, I'd imagine it to be a shinier version of hushmail with lots of sketchy marketing thrown in...
Zigurd 13y ago
It seems like it could be done with a service offering public key info, and using key signing and web-of-trust to keep the keys reliable, and encrypting in open source client software not provided or updated by the mail service provider. That still leaves the service open to being strong-armed into sending you malware. And, of course, your mail headers are in the clear. But, apparently, to the Lavabit people, what I've outlined here isn't sufficient, and the implication is that the NSA and/or FBI has ways of compromising all email providers no matter how they operate.
- dbond 13y ago
  This is why it really needs to be done at the protocol level, an email provider can't change the behavior of my desktop client and the process could be completely automated for the average user.
  - Zigurd 13y ago
    I'm not sure of the relevance of the protocol IF the service remains store-and-forward. Silent Circle and Lavabit seem to think it's better not to use email at all. An open Skype-like system is probably pretty good. Keys are ephemeral, and transferring encrypted files in audio-video sessions makes it hard to MITM.
    - dbond 13y ago
      Email is pretty bad, but its not going anywhere so we should try to fix it. The service would remain store-and-forward but the content would be encrypted throughout, something which is not currently possible without both parties knowing how to setup and use PGP.
jadeddrag 13y ago
I think you're looking for bitmessage which is an email replacement that hides the header and content, and is inspired by bitcoin.
lessnonymous 13y ago
You can already encrypt email bodies end-to-end using PGP. The unsolved problem is the (queue dramatic music) METADATA!!! For an email to get from your computer to the recipients, it has to have metadata that the intermediate computers understand: The SMTP protocol is designed to deliver your email by relaying it any which way it is set to. So when you send it, it goes to your office SMTP server, which then might relay it to your head office SMTP server, which then might relay it to the recipient's spam filtering service, which might then relay it to the recipient's head office, which might then relay it to your recipient's office from where the recipient retrieves the email when they're good and ready. SMTP is not ever going to be secure. Even if you use TLS (which most mail servers do by default these days) you're only encrypting the message-in-transit so any of the myriad of systems between each SMTP server can't read it. All it takes for the NSA to read your metadata (and cache your encrypted message) is to compromise one of the SMTP servers it passes through. Then they can compel you to decrypt it using any method they have at hand. The secure way to send email is to have your computer connect directly to your recipient's computer over an encrypted transport layer (TLS) and possibly for your recipient to authenticate to accept that connection (so AFK means no email). You'll have to know your destination point's IP address somehow. (DNS sounds fine, after all it's just a phonebook. However requesting an IP address could easily be logged and so you've leaked metadata again) This means you can't send an overnight email and expect someone to get it in the morning when they switch on their computer. If you want to do that it needs to sit on a server somewhere. And that server is subject to attack. So for convenience, we could build a server designed to accept any of these messages from anywhere. But it also needs to accept messages to anywhere as it can't be allowed to know who the recipient is. That's metadata. The problem now is how do I get my messages from my server? The server isn't allowed to have my key, so it can't go and attempt to decrypt every waiting message (or decrypt every envelope). At some point, you'll have to either give up convenience (can't get email unless you're both online) or security (you'll have to trust something you're not in control of). I'd be stocking up on tin cans. And string.
- Spooky23 13y ago
  Actually, its really simple. You operate your own mail system, and require secure network access to use it. For example, The social security administration requires each state to do this for the state employees who handle disability-related business. Those employees must use their mail system.

borplk 13y ago

No thanks Kim. It's just going to be some shiny app with marketing fluff sprinkled on top for the every day user to create the illusion of security and privacy for people who don't know any better. Very opportunistic.

xSwag 13y ago

I wouldn't trust him. He seems like such a shady guy[1] [1]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kim_Dotcom#Early_criminal_investigations http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kim_Dotcom#Early_criminal_inves...

RDeckard 13y ago
I've think he's got a vendetta against the US govt now. I bet he really wants to stick it to them after what they've done. Don't you agree?
- benologist 13y ago
  He wants attention first and foremost.
pfraze 13y ago
Watch the Mega announcement [1] to get a very clear picture of this guy. He starts talking at [2]. 1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LwlLC2PUrH8 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LwlLC2PUrH8 2 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LwlLC2PUrH8&feature=player_detailpage&t=624 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LwlLC2PUrH8&feature=player_d...
- skeletonjelly 13y ago
  Wow. Thanks for sitting through that for us!
solarexplorer 13y ago
That wikipedia entry does him no justice. In the 90ies he ran several Mailboxes (anyone remembers those?) where people shared warez and then he went on to sell his users data to an ip lawyer who used the data to sue them. Google for "Kimble" and "Gravenreuth" to read the details. I'd rather trust the NSA with my data...
- qwertzlcoatl 13y ago
  Wow, there really doesn't seem to be anything off-limits for this dude. Even traditional ponzi schemes: > He set up a network of interlinked companies, including Trendax which was claimed to be an artificial intelligence-driven hedge fund delivering an annual return of at least 25%

RDeckard 13y ago

Kim Dotcom is a maverick!

sgarbi 13y ago

If PGP is the solution then a first step could be to agree on a standard markup inside the email so that we could point the email client to the public PGP for automatic unencryption.

6d0debc071 13y ago

Edit: After looking around, the following sounds very much like Bitmessage. Which doesn't work precisely like this, and I worry about how it'll scale if the messages get sent to everyone - how does that work with significant throughput? But in any cause sounds like a fairly well thought out system. ================== So, what would it take to trust an email provider? What'd that look like? All encryption done on your machine from code you compiled, or at least can compile. Open sourced, so it can be checked. Keys always in your control. The email should be split into several parts and then onion routed, with associated encryption, to another service with semi-random timing in the forwarding protocol to disrupt traffic analysis. This service then removes the final layers of encryption, reassembles the message and forwards it to the final destination. Preferably this last step/service is done on a semi-random basis within the forwarding network rather than with a centralised server. Each person serving as a forwarder and a sender would help to confuse traffic analysis when coupled with the semi-random forwarding as well. I might be wrong, however, I'm guessing that this isn't going to look like that. Otherwise, it seems to me, you're putting a lot of trust in the server. Even if they pass you some fancy script that does the encryption on your end and there's some way to check that it hasn't changed between visits. Even assuming they don't send you malware. They're still going to be able to see who you're sending stuff to. (And neither of those previous assumptions is non-controversial to begin with.)

spetsnaz 13y ago

I'd prefer not to trust neither him or they...

dil8 13y ago

What do people think of I2P Email? http://www.wiki.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/Anleitung-i2p-Susimail-sicheres-Email http://www.wiki.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/Anleitung-i2p-Sus...

AmVess 13y ago

I druther keep my e-mail on NSA's servers than Mega's. Given .com's past, it'd practically be the same thing.