3 ms·
They have already described the significant part: http://wayback.archive.org/web/20130530023856/http://lavabit.com/secure.html http://wayback.archive.org/web/2
by e12e 13y ago
They have already described the significant part:
http://wayback.archive.org/web/20130530023856/http://lavabit.com/secure.html http://wayback.archive.org/web/20130530023856/http://lavabit...
As far as I can tell it is a service that suffers from many of the same things as other services, especially concerning email that is sent to a recipient in clear text:
1) The email can be intercepted in clear text
2) If the service is compromised; a plain text copy can be made
3) If the service is compromised; a copy of the session key can be stored
4) If the service is compromised; a predictable/insecure session key can be used
5) They store a copy of the secret key; if the service is compromised - all session keys can be recovered when the user logs in (provides the password).
I've thought about engineering a similar system; but one based around GPG -- have users upload/associate a public key with their account, and if they receive unencrypted email encrypt it to them using their public key. 1,2,3 and 4) remain though -- and 4) may be the worst as it is almost impossible to detect/defend against AFAIK.
An alternative would be to set up a service that detects whether or not incoming mail is encrypted, and rejects it if it is not (along with information of where/how to install and set up GPG).
As others have mentioned this would not help with the who talks to who meta-data problem.