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MIT Researchers: Printable Keys Make Mechanical Locks Insecure
- w3pm 13y agoIs this surprising? I'd imagine 3D printing would be capable of replicating the form of nearly any solid object that fits within the bounded volume of a given 3D printer.
- sp332 13y agoI think this is more about acquiring the information. You have to know exactly how tall to make the cuts, where the grooves go, how long it is, etc. It's difficult information to get from a photo, if you don't have prior knowledge of the kind of key you're trying to imitate.
- apendleton 13y agoFor most key brands, though, the possible pin sizes are finite and discrete, so you just have to estimate the height of each pin from the picture and round to the nearest one. It's not that hard.
- Groxx 13y agoWhy wouldn't you have prior knowledge? You presumably know where it goes - just look at the keyhole. Or if not, a single identifiable object in the photo gives you a lot of scale information. I doubt they're as concerned about white-background newspaper-worthy shots like the NY keys, and more about shots at a distance (keys on a table, for instance). edit: http://www.jacobsschool.ucsd.edu/news/news_releases/release.sfe?id=791 http://www.jacobsschool.ucsd.edu/news/news_releases/release.... for an example
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- Groxx 13y agoProbably not likely. There are metal 3D printers (Shapeways, for instance), and IIRC the patents on that tech (laser sintering) are going to expire soon, so there will probably be a big boom in volume and material diversity.
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- donpdonp 13y agoIn other news, obvious consequence is obvious.
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- malandrew 13y agoInterestingly, just posting a photo of the NYC master key set should be enough to duplicate them. Has anybody already gone from that photo to 3D models to a set of functioning NYC skeleton keys? TBH, there is no reason that the city should be using such archaic key types. In Brazil, they typically used a four sided key like a philips head screwdriver that would need to be photographed from at least two sides to be able to reproduce.
- geektips 13y agoHave to fix this problem without changing to advanced systems
- alternize 13y agoi wonder if one could really copy more advanced keys (f.e. the ones from KABA [0] are pretty common here) by just having some scans of the keys. these keys generally have different layouts on each side, and sometimes also on the small top/bottom sides. so just a snapped photo definitely would not be sufficient. and even with flatbed scanners like the team in the article used, capturing the depth of the holes might be problematic... [0] http://www.kaba.com/access-control/en/Products-Solutions/Mechnical-Lock-Cylinders/332590/kaba-20.html http://www.kaba.com/access-control/en/Products-Solutions/Mec...
- fragmede 13y agoYou'd need four pictures - two of each side, to capture enough information to generate a 3d-model, instead of just the one. Better, but still vulnerable.
- hackula1 13y agoSo do hammers.
- dictum 13y agoIntrusion with a 3D-printed key is deniable, while breaking a lock isn't. Someone could enter your house with a printed key and you'd never know it; a destroyed lock would immediately tell you someone broke (or tried to break) into your house.
- carsonreinke 13y agoA key is a deterrent, nothing more.
- superuser2 13y agoGood. Can we finally have contactless smart card access control in the mainstream now? The audit and management features of an electronic access control system already make mechanical keys inexcusable on any door that >1 person needs to open. Hopefully revelations like this will push more organizations to upgrade.
- parineum 13y agoWhat if you need to use your lock when the power is out?
- superuser2 13y agoBattery backups, or even locks which are primarily battery-powered - this is typical for locks that are actually part of the door, rather than strikes installed in the doorframe. Either way, the owner almost always has a key that can mechanically override the electronics and open the door, but this is kept in a safe, rarely used, and will set off the "door forced" alarm.
- gknoy 13y agoHow does your safe help you if you are standing outside in the rain at midnight, after your generator/batteries have run down? (Perhaps you were on vacation when the power first ran out.)
- sigkill 13y agoThis mostly never happens. I've used fingerprint locks where the battery lasts easily for a year (that's with 5-6 accesses per day). Without getting into the discussion of the security factor of biometrics, the working mechanism of the lock itself is such that when it detects a success, a small servo engages some sort of a gear which enables you to complete the mechanical circuit (so to say) when you push the door lever down and move the physical lock with human effort. This means that the battery is never constantly used, only when the actual sensor is active. Even if it were dead, there exists a manual key override. Also, (I've tested this personally), the factor of safety is quite good in that, the lock starts beeping "LOW BAT" a good 3-4 weeks before the battery is completely drained. Also, (Another one) it doesn't leak information about low battery until there's a successful entry, so an evil attacker can sit near your house activating the sensor all day and he won't know his progress in draining the locks' battery.
- emhart 13y agoHuman behavior toward keys makes mechanical locks insecure. We've been able to reproduce keys, even fairly complex ones, well before 3D printers came along. Get a clean enough impression/scan/photograph and we can make it happen, perhaps 3D printing is seen as making it more accessible to the general population. I'm about to go on a whole thing here, so let me first say that I am excited about their work and I have personally been pushing for years to see more high security key printing happening (see Nirav Patel's Abus Plus key printing[0]) What I take umbrage with is the idea that this development is going to be the death of mechanical locks. Even the suggestion that it _should_ be the death of mechanical locks. In the Forbes article [1] One of the students behind this work suggested that his goal was the elimination of mechanical locks: "If we show that mechanical locks are vulnerable to key duplication just by having a handful of numbers you can download off the internet, hopefully they'll be phased out more quickly," says Van Albert. What this fails to address is that the cuts on your key are supposed to be a secret, and your behavior toward your keys should be the same as your behavior toward a password. You don't pass it around and you are very careful about who you trust it with. I also dislike the characterization of the discovery of the "numbers" in the main and sidebar bittings. That information has been publicly available and the suggestion that they "reverse-engineered" (from their abstract submitted to defcon)[2] the lock is a bit dramatic. Better, I think, to say that they "read the documentation." Obviously I have a chip on my shoulder when it comes to mechanical security, but I am confident saying that any call for the blanket abolition of mechanical locks is short-sighted and narrow-minded. This could have been an amazing opportunity to address human behavior as it relates to mechanical security, but instead it was wasted on the age-old call for the death of locks. There remain myriad places where a traditional lock is still required, there are myriad populations who are not able to sustain electronic locks. If the day does come when mechanical locks can be left to the dust of history, it will be more likely the result of dramatic shifts in society than in technology. It will be the death of all locks, not just mechanical ones. [0] https://github.com/nrpatel/PhysicalKeygen/blob/master/abus_plus.scad https://github.com/nrpatel/PhysicalKeygen/blob/master/abus_p... [1] http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/08/03/mit-students-release-program-to-3d-print-high-security-keys/ http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/08/03/mit-stu... [2] https://www.defcon.org/html/defcon-21/dc-21-speakers.html#Lawrence https://www.defcon.org/html/defcon-21/dc-21-speakers.html#La...
- s_q_b 13y agoYou can make a electronic bump key that will open most doors for <$100, most buildings have windows (cover them in duct tape to break without noise), and even the wire mesh in the walls of a "secure" building can be cut with thermite. If you want real physical security you're going to need much harder materials: steel, titanium, tungsten, concrete. This comment captures the security problem well. > "[Locks] are more of a tamper-evident seal, or a delay tactic. The issue with bumping, picking, carding, and 3d-printing is how it invalidates the current approaches towards those two aspects." However, of those options, 3D-printing is clearly the worst. Bump keys and carding latches takes seconds, picks minutes, and 3D printers hours. It seems that the only situation this method would be useful is with advance access to a key, a radial-pin lock, and a free 3D printer.
- kansface 13y ago3D printing is useful for not attracting attention during or after the fact. Also, it requires no skill to perform, just a photo.
- emhart 13y agoAnd another thing! The French Patent office many years ago ceased allowing patents on keys that did not have a movable element, which led to the development of many keys that cannot be readily duplicated without access to either the restricted blanks or very serious equipment & knowhow with which to make the blanks. These systems remain well outside the realm of 3D printing. DOM Saturn[0], Mul-T-Lock Interactive (and up), Vachette Radial[2] and a handful of others.[3] Mechanical locks are far from dead, but I'd love if someone reading this took it as a challenge to reproduce keys with movable components. I'm a big proponent of pushing these systems and finding ways to circumvent them, using any technology available. I just don't like it when the response is to throw the baby out with the bathwater. [0] http://www.dom-sicherheitstechnik.com/DOM-ix-Saturn.667.0.html http://www.dom-sicherheitstechnik.com/DOM-ix-Saturn.667.0.ht... [1] http://www.mul-t-lockusa.com/614.html http://www.mul-t-lockusa.com/614.html [2] http://www.vachette.fr/fr/site/Vachette/Systemes-de-Securite-test/?productId=691126 http://www.vachette.fr/fr/site/Vachette/Systemes-de-Securite... [3]http://www.lockpicking101.com/viewtopic.php?f=9&t=56691 http://www.lockpicking101.com/viewtopic.php?f=9&t=56691 (edited to add links)
- deleted 13y ago[deleted]
- epoxyhockey 13y agoI looked at making 3D-printed keys for my own locks, just for show (think yellow key, green key, etc). I found two issues when researching its feasibility: printing accuracy and temperature range of the plastic. My results were that the lower-cost 3D printers didn't have the required precision, and more importantly, the printed plastic would simply melt if it sat in a hot car during the summer. My research is probably out of date now, so I wonder what kind of plastic is being used these days.
- nrp 13y agoThe accuracy and precision are sufficient for some keys using low cost 3D printers. I got simple pin and tumbler and disc detainer keys working off of my RepRap.[0] It requires some knowledge of the tolerances of the specific printer and lock. For example, the disc detainer model has wider cutouts than the discs require to account for blobbing corners on the print. Using something like a Formlabs 1 printer, that probably is no longer necessary. [0]: https://github.com/nrpatel/PhysicalKeygen https://github.com/nrpatel/PhysicalKeygen
- emhart 13y agoI was fairly annoyed that Forbes failed to acknowledge the Disc Detainer work, dismissing your 3D printing like so: "though Patel’s software only dealt with normal keys that can already be duplicated by any hardware store."
- denysonique 13y agoThat website has a memory leak. I left it open for about 10-15min and it ate 2GB of my ram.
- Digit-Al 13y agoThe site crashed Firefox almost immediately and died in Chrome after a few minutes on my laptop.
- gcb0 13y agoThis is lame beyond believe. Do you know how in the 80's and 90's everything that everyone was already doing was 'changing' because of computers. it's the same now with 3D printers. Forever you could duplicate a key in a machine with just a picture of the original. just because the machine to duplicate it become easier it's not going to change the world. dammit you could already do the same with a blank and a hand file, it would just take 40~200min depending on skill instead of 5~15min on the machine.
- Stwerp 13y agoBut MIT did this, so we should carefully point that out in the title so it is newsworthy. </unbridled snarkiness>
- luscious 13y agoThat's it Schlage. Time for 2-factor authentication key-rings. Schlage Master Security (SMS) "Turn the key, type the text"
- at-fates-hands 13y ago>>>>All you need is a friend that works there, or to take a picture of their key, or even a picture of the key hanging off their belt. I'm wondering how you can replicate a poorly taken smartphone camera image into a key that would unlock a high security lock. If you can't see the grooves clearly on the key from the photo, how does the software or printer know where the grooves should go? I feel like this is quite a stretch to think you can take a photo of a lock several feet away and get an exact duplicate from a 3D printer.
- tghw 13y agoI went to their DEFCON talk. The key is to realize that there are only a set number of positions for the pins, specifically six, three high and three low (for the sidecut. I believe there are also six positions for the main pins). If you can recognize the positions from the photo, then you can feed the numbers into the code they're publishing that generates a 3D model.
- stcredzero 13y agoWould it be possible to combine a parametric model of a given type of key with a device that can detect where the shear line is for each pin? I'm envisioning a device that you can stick into the lock one day, then go away and extract data that describes the key, which you feed into a parametric model, which you then use to produce the correct key using a 3D printer. Then you come back the next day and use this perfectly valid key to compromise physical security. A device which can do such detection could be far less expensive than a device to both detect and actuate the pins.